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 Abstract (Portuguese) 
O objectivo desta tese é de examinar o impacto no preço das ações da empresa adquirente 
causado pelo anúncio de aquisição de outra empresa, diferenciando entre transações 
domésticas, de inbound e outbound de mercados emergentes assim como entre transações de 
diversificação ou focadas numa indústria. Adicionalmente, fatores contextuais que impactam 
os padrões de criação de valor observados no estudo podem ser determinados. Os resultados, 
que foram obtidos através de uma amostra de 1,434 transações num periodo de tempo desde 
Janeiro de 2000 até Janeiro de 2016 e considerando uma janela de acontecimento de 21dias de 
trading (-10, +10) sobre o anúncio, sugerem que as trasações das empresas alvo e adquirentes 
em mercados emergentes criam, em média, o maior valor com um CAAR de 2.41% em 
comparação com M&A outbound e inbound com CAARs de 1.32% e 1.26% respetivamente. 
Adicionalmente, aquisições de diversificação criam um maior valor para os acionistas do que 
transações focadas numa indústria tanto para mercados desenvolvidos como emergentes. 
Finalmente, os resultados da regressão OLS sugerem que existe uma correlação positiva entre 
a criação de valor para os acionistas da empresa adquirente e a dimensão relativa da 
transação, o estatuto legal privado da empresa-alvo assim como o método de pagamento 
(dinheiro e ações). Por outro lado, a percentagem de controlo adquirida não foi comprovada 
como significante.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract (English) 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the value impact on acquiring companies’ share prices 
caused by takeover announcements, differentiating between domestic, inbound and outbound 
emerging markets transactions as well as between industry diversifying and industry focused 
M&A. Additionally contextual factors shall be determined that drive the value creation 
patterns observed in the event study. The results obtained for a total sample of 1,434 
transactions in a time period from January 2000 until January 2016 and an event window of 
21 trading days (-10,+10) around the announcement day suggest that transactions with target 
and acquiring companies coming from emerging markets on average create the highest value 
with a CAAR of 2.41% in comparison to outbound and inbound M&A with CAARs of 1.32% 
and 1.26% respectively. Additionally, industry diversifying takeovers are equally superior to 
focused transactions in terms of value creation for both developed and emerging markets 
acquiring companies engaged in outbound and inbound M&A respectively. Finally, OLS-
regression results suggest that there is a positive correlation between acquiring firms’ 
shareholder value creation and relative deal size, non-public legal status of the target company 
as well as a combined payment method (cash and stock), whereas for the percentage of 
ownership acquired no statistically significant results are obtained. 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter first information about the background of the subject are provided, followed by 
a discussion of the problem and the problem statement. Finally, the structure of the thesis is 
outlined. 
1.1 Background 
Rapid technological development, globalization as well as increased competition today 
creates major challenges for companies trying to maintain their competitive position. 
Therefore, worldwide ongoing industry consolidation can be observed since firms strive to 
gain competitive advantages through the realization of synergies improving efficiency and 
thus the overall performance (Tausfeef & Nishat, 2014). Especially mergers & acquisitions 
(M&A) are popular means of companies searching for business expansion and reacting to the 
constant change in today’s dynamic business environment (Shah & Arora, 2014).  
In the period following the global crisis in 2008 a wide range of companies was forced to 
engage in business restructuring in order to maintain the competitive level leading to a new 
wave of M&A starting in 2010 indicated by an annual increase in total deal value of 19.0% 
(Kengelbach & Roos, 2011; Shah & Arora, 2011). However, with difference to previous 
peaks in M&A activities emerging market firms were increasingly engaged in takeovers 
indicated by the fact that in 2013 25% of total M&A involved either an emerging market 
acquiring or target firm. In 2004 emerging market companies participated in only 10% of the 
worldwide M&A .The described trend is illustrated in Exhibit 1 (Kengelbach et al., 2013). 
Exhibit 1 − Distribution of Global M&A Value 
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However, recently a different phenomenon concerning the expansion of emerging markets 
companies can be observed. More precisely, today an increasing number of emerging markets 
firms is involved in cross-border acquisitions due to the “shift in the economic axis of the 
world” (Narayan & Thenmozhi, 2014: 1451).  
Since the 21st century there is an ongoing trend of companies acquiring or merging with 
companies located outside their home market (Delios & Beamish, 2004). According to 
Weisebach & Erel (2012) the worldwide volume of cross-border acquisitions has been 
growing from 23% of the total M&A volume in 1998 to 45% in 2007. Originally, primarily 
U.S. firms used cross-border M&A as a strategic tool for growth and expansion, whereas 
European M&A activity remained heavily concentrated within national borders. Despite an 
integration of national economies, privatization of different economic sectors as well as listing 
of large European corporations, regulatory takeover barriers such as corporate takeover pills, 
government control or regulatory and antitrust provisions impeded especially inbound cross-
border M&A activities in Europe (Campa & Hernando, 2004). Therefore, in 2014 cross-
border M&A by European acquiring companies comprise mainly outbound M&A with a 
volume of $365.8 billion and a particular focus on U.S. targets, whereas intra-European cross-
border acquisitions amounts only to $264.5 million in 2014 (Corte et al., 2015).  
Cross-border M&A in emerging markets became popular during the 1990s indicated by an 
increase from 4% in the 1980s to 48% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asia in 
the 1990s. Prior to that, primarily green-field investments contributed to FDI in emerging 
markets (Chari et al., 2004). Especially the realization of several economic reforms in 
developing countries such as India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Russia led to an increase 
in inbound cross-border M&A activities in these regions.  
In the 1980s and 1990s inbound cross-border M&A from advanced markets such as US, 
Europe, Japan or newly industrialized economies such as Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
dominated over outbound cross-border M&A in emerging markets. Therefore, emerging 
markets companies benefited from a transfer of technological and organizational skills from 
developed to developing countries. In the following especially large emerging markets 
companies started to engage in outward internationalization through cross-border M&A 
leading to an increase of outward FDI to $83 billion in 2004 or 11% in world stock (Luo & 
Tung, 2007). Since the late 2000s emerging market companies have shifted their focus to also 
to developed markets indicated by 100 cross-border transactions annually with an average 
yearly deal volume of $28 US-Dollars in 2010 (Cogman et al., 2015). Han et al. (2010) 
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illustrate that emerging market governments enthusiastically promote outward FDI. More 
precisely, China supports domestic companies in cross-border acquisitions applying an 
outward FDI policy system that comprises specific finance and taxation policies, risk-
safeguard mechanisms, information service networks, direction guidance, simplified approval 
processes and interim measures for joint annual inspection of overseas investment.  
In the past the main driver for outbound emerging markets cross-border transactions was the 
acquisition of strategic resources such as technology, management capabilities or other 
intangible assets. Due to the ongoing development and maturation of emerging markets firms, 
M&A today are increasingly used as a mean to tap into new markets and thus to gain new 
customers (Cogman et al., 2015). Huaichuan & Yip (2008) suggest that the extent of strategic 
intent for the bidding firm is dependent on the company’s internal and external conditions, the 
experience in the home market as well as the capacity of the top management. Since all of 
these factors have been improved to a large extent in emerging markets recently, a rational 
way in terms of strategy can be increasingly observed today also for emerging market 
acquirers. 
In 2005, foreign sales and foreign employment for the top 100 emerging markets 
multinational companies increased by 48% and 73% respectively. The rapid economic 
development, liberal market policies in combination with the desire to expand into the key 
international markets and the strategic objective to exploit competitive advantages especially 
in the cost-effective mass manufacturing industry led to the active participation of emerging 
markets multinationals in cross-border M&A (Han et al., 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 
2002; Rui & Yip, 2008). 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
The increasing number of emerging markets companies expanding business operations 
through international acquisitions in combination with a lack of research in this particular area 
illustrates the need to question the generalizability of existing literature focusing solely on 
international M&A with developed markets acquirers. To which extent empirical findings as 
well as the conceptual framework applied in these studies can be used to analyze cross-border 
acquisitions with bidding firms coming from emerging markets is not clarified yet (Bhagat et 
al., 2011). According to Bruner et al. (2002) emerging markets firms show significant 
differences in comparison to firms from developed markets such as financial reporting 
transparency, liquidity level, corruption, volatility as well as governance and taxation 
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structure. Therefore, empirical findings on companies from developed countries are expected 
to have a low relevance for emerging markets firms suggesting further research in this area.  
There is a wide range of studies focusing on the short term value creation effect of cross-
border M&A. However, as suggested by Narayan & Thenmozhi (2014) most of these studies 
base their empirical findings on samples with acquiring and target firms coming from 
developed markets such as the United States of America (USA) or Europe. Although 
increasingly research also shifts towards the analysis of emerging markets acquiring 
companies (e.g. Bhagat et al., 2011; Narayan & Thenmozhi, 2014; Tauseef & Nishat, 2014), 
only rarely a comparison between inbound emerging markets acquisitions and outbound 
emerging markets takeovers is conducted. 
Additionally, research on the short term value impact of acquisitions on bidding companies is 
still inconclusive. Whereas some studies indicate a slightly positive impact on the shareholder 
value around the acquisition date (Jain et al., 2014), others suggest limited value destruction 
arising from the takeover announcement (e.g. Kuipers et al., 2002; Martynova & Renneboog, 
2008). Therefore further studies are recommended, in order to determine factors explaining 
the existence of these contradictory results. 
Finally, especially among managers and academics there is the widespread belief that the 
acquisition of strategically related companies increases the bidding firm’s economic value. 
However, existing studies examining these managerial and academic expectations obtain 
inconclusive results (Barney, 1988). Furthermore, there is a gap in existing research linking 
the impact of a diversification strategy on acquiring companies’ shareholder value with the 
previously mentioned phenomenon of an increasing trend towards emerging markets 
outbound M&A activity (refer to point 1.1). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Based on the background of increasing outbound M&A activity in emerging markets and the 
previously outlined existing gaps and inconsistencies in research, this thesis analyzes the topic 
of market reactions around M&A announcements involving emerging markets companies. 
Furthermore, this study is supposed to contribute to the determination of value drivers in 
outbound emerging markets and inbound emerging markets M&A activities by quantifying 
the impact of an industry diversification strategy on the wealth generation of acquiring 
companies in contrast to a focused non-diversification strategy. Therefore, the following 
research question is going be addressed: 
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How does the takeover of a company in developed markets through a firm in 
emerging countries affect the share price of the acquirer in the short term in 
comparison to both inbound emerging markets as well as domestic takeovers 
and how does the impact of a diversification strategy differ from an industry 
focused strategy in terms of shareholder value creation for acquiring 
companies? 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
In the following first an overview about the theoretical framework is provided. More 
precisely, existing research with focus on M&A objectives is discussed, followed by the 
introduction of literature on M&A value creation with a special focus on cross-border 
acquisitions as well as industry diversifying transactions. Based on the theoretical framework 
a set of hypotheses is developed in order to sufficiently address the problem statement (refer 
to point 1.3). 
Then information on the data sources is provided, followed by a description of the data 
collection process. Additionally, the chosen research approach is justified and discussed, 
while the analytical framework used in this thesis comprising the event study approach as 
well as cross-sectional regression analysis is outlined. 
In a next step the empirical findings are presented and analyzed. More precisely, descriptive 
statistics on the samples as well as findings in the event study and the OLS-regressions are 
illustrated and interpreted. 
Finally, an overview about the major findings as well as limitations in this study is provided, 
followed by recommendations for future research as well as managerial implications of the 
thesis results.  
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2. Theoretical Framework  
The following chapter starts with the introduction and discussion of M&A objectives. 
Following this, studies focusing on the value creation in M&A are introduced differentiating 
between domestic, inbound emerging market as well as outbound emerging markets 
transactions. Furthermore, different contextual factors affecting the value impact are debated. 
Finally, research focusing on the effect of industry diversifying M&A on shareholder value 
creation in the short term is introduced and compared. The theoretical framework is also used 
to develop a set of hypotheses addressing the problem statement outlined in point 1.3. 
2.1 Motives for M&A 
The reasons of companies to engage in M&A have been discussed extensively in research. 
According to Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993), there are three major motives for corporate 
takeovers comprising the synergy and the agency motive as well as hubris hypothesis.  
2.1.1 Efficiency Theory 
According to the efficiency theory, M&A are planned means to achieve synergies (Trautwein, 
1990). The synergy motive implies that bidding companies are motivated by potential 
economic gains resulting from merging the resources of the acquiring and the target 
companies. Therefore, acquisitions occur when the value of the combined firms exceeds the 
sum of the values of the individual firms (Seth et al., 2000). According to Finkelstein & 
Sidney (2007) this economic gain can be associated with financial, operational or managerial 
synergies. Additionally, Porter (1980) and Knoll (2008) argue that multi-business firms may 
be equipped with the ability to leverage market power across business units creating corporate 
value through market power synergies. 
Financial Synergies 
Financial synergies may arise from the modification of a company’s capital caused by an 
acquisition or merger (Lewellen, 1971). The sources of financial synergies may comprise the 
following: a reduction of the company’s systematic risk, the establishment of a more efficient 
internal capital market, financial economies of scale as well as tax advantages (Knoll, 2008).  
The reduction in risk can be achieved either through the construction of a business portfolio 
with uncorrelated cash flows or through managerial actions which reduce the sensitivity of the 
company’s returns to general economic disturbances (Knoll, 2008). From the reduction in 
systemic risk acquiring companies can derive value in two ways. First, cost of debt can be 
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reduced significantly through the coinsurance effect referring to a lower bankruptcy risk of 
marginally profitable multi-business firms due to higher credit ratings (Ross et al., 2004; 
Knoll, 2008). Second, stakeholders comprising employees, customers and suppliers are more 
willing to make firm specific investments such as understanding the firm’s culture and 
building relationships within the company (Barney, 2002; Knoll, 2008).  
The establishment of an internal capital market refers to the central allocation of capital in 
order to grow existing businesses or to finance new ventures in a multi-business firm. Major 
benefits are reduced financing costs and higher capital flexibility as well as a more efficient 
capital allocation (Liebeskind, 2000; Knoll, 2008). 
Financial economies of scale may be realized through the issuance of equity and debt 
securities stemming from lower transaction and floatation costs due to the spread over a 
greater dollar volume of securities (Levy & Sarnat, 1970; Knoll, 2008). 
Tax advantages can be realized through M&A activities in two ways. First, contingent on the 
allowance of “corporate profit accounting”, losses in one business unit can offset profits in 
other units reducing the overall taxable profit. Second, due to higher debt capabilities of 
multi-business firms compared to single-business companies, firms engaged in M&A usually 
take advantage of the fact that interest payments are tax deductible leading to a lower overall 
tax liability (Scott, 1977; Stapelton, 1982; Tirole 1988; Knoll, 2008). 
However, research indicates that there is no evidence for a reduction in systematic risk and a 
superior internal market, whereas size advantages in the capital market as well as tax 
advantages seem to exist leading to contrary opinions about the financial synergy hypothesis 
(Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Rumelt, 1986; Scherer et al., 1975, Trautwein, 1990). 
According to the theory of Modigliani & Miller (1958) financial synergies cannot exist since 
the market value of a company is independent from its capital structure assuming perfect 
capital markets. However, in a real world scenario the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs 
may result in a reduction of cost of capital benefiting shareholders (Trautwein, 1990). In case 
of a difference in risks or default costs between the acquiring and the target firm, financial 
synergies from M&A can even assume negative values (Leland, 2007). 
Operational Synergies 
Operational synergies stem from reducing the costs of the involved business units or from 
offering unique products and services by either combining operations of two firms or by 
transferring knowledge. By weighing potential advantages against the costs of combining or 
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transferring assets these synergies can be quantified (Trautwein, 1990). Operative synergies 
can be classified into two major classes namely efficiency synergies and growth synergies. 
Whereas efficiency synergies relate to the sharing of operative resources across businesses, 
growth synergies are defined as growth advantages resulting from the (re)combination of 
complementary operative resources across businesses (Knoll, 2008). 
Efficiency synergies mainly relate to the achievement of economies of scope. According to 
Huyghebaert & Luypaert, 2013 economies of scope are related to the cost advantage of 
producing and distributing multiple products through one company rather than by separate 
firms. According to Knoll (2008) economies of scope are realized if the total cost of 
production for two businesses “Y1” and “Y2” within one entity (C(Y1, Y2)) is below the level 
of combined costs in case of separated production in two single firms (C(Y1) + C(Y2)). 
Therefore, economies of scope between two businesses can be formally expressed as 
following (Knoll, 2008):  
                        
Where: 
 C = total costs of production, Y1 = output of business 1, Y2 = output of business 2 
Whereas efficiency synergies are based on the sharing of similar resources, growth synergies 
may be realized through combining resources such as product components across businesses 
in order to achieve solutions and create real customer value. Thus, growth synergies are 
realized when the total revenue generated through utilization of the resource bases of two 
companies “X1” and “X2” together within one company is higher than the value of the 
combined revenue when employing the distinct resource bases in two separated firms. 
Therefore, according to Knoll (2008) growth synergies can be formally expressed as 
following: 
                                     > 0 
Where: 
R = total revenues, V= value, X1 = resource base business 1, X2 = resource base business 2 
With reference to operative synergies, existing literature also differentiates between revenue 
and cost synergies. Cost reduction may be achieved through economies of scale, economies of 
scope or a reduction in assets (Porter, 1985). By spreading fixed costs of operations over a 
larger number of units, companies can achieve economies of scale. In contrast, an increase in 
revenues may stem from jointly used marketing and distribution systems (Simmonds, 1990). 
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According to Huyghebaert & Luypaert (2013) cost-based synergies are achieved especially in 
the first year following the acquisition through economies of scale in spreading selling and 
administration expenses. However, according to a study conducted by Chatterjee (1986) 
operational synergies tend to create less value than financial synergies or collusive synergies 
and the ability to charge higher prices. 
Managerial Synergies 
Through M&A and the associated permutation and combination of management resources, 
more extensive and efficient resources may arise leading to an improvement of the existing 
management and finally to an increase in revenues (Zhang & Zhou, 2011). Hill & Jones 
(2007) refer to entrepreneurial capabilities, organizational design knowledge as well as 
superior strategic skills that can be levered by a company after integrating the target firm 
leading to value creation. 
M&A transactions may lead to executives encouraging risk taking and innovative ideas within 
the company leading to an increase in entrepreneurial capabilities (Knoll, 2008). Additionally, 
synergies may be exploited through an increase in the firm’s capabilities to “(1) create 
structure, culture, and control systems that motivate and coordinate employees, (2) balance 
exploitation and exploration, and (3) align environment, structure and strategy continuously” 
(Knoll, 2008: 48). Finally, multi-business firms might benefit from superior strategic 
capabilities derived either from the superior ability to enhance performance or from the 
sophisticated diagnosis of problems sources (Hill & Jones 2007: 348, Knoll, 2008). 
According to Trautwein (1990) management synergies are especially realized when the target 
company benefits from superior planning and monitoring abilities of the acquiring firm’s 
management. Especially managerial and operational synergies are often claimed but only 
rarely realized (Kitching, 1967; Porter, 1987; Trautwein, 1990).  
Market Power Synergies 
Finally, market power synergies relate to advantages in the performance of multi-business 
firms due to the leverage of market power across businesses resulting in a reduction of 
competition and thus in an increase in prices and revenues (Porter, 1980; Knoll, 2008). Knoll 
(2008) distinguishes between four strategies multi-business companies employ in order to 
extract market power synergies namely “predatory pricing”, “bundling”, “reciprocal buying 
and selling” as well as “mutual forbearance”.  
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Predatory pricing refers to the practice of selling products or services below market prices or 
even costs in order to threaten or drive out competitors with inferior financial capabilities. 
Since multi-business firms are able to shift profits between their business units they are 
enabled to engage in predatory pricing practices offsetting short term losses by long-term 
advantages of higher prices and increasing market share (Barney, 2007 & Knoll, 2008). 
Multi-business firms may extract market power synergies by engaging in bundling and the 
practice of extending monopoly power from one business in a related one through the 
bundling of two products.  
Market power synergies can also be realized through entering in reciprocal buying and selling 
agreements with companies that are suppliers to some business units but additionally buy 
services or products from another business unit within the same company.  
Finally, mutual forbearance is defined as “the ceding of control or the ceding of control of 
one product or geographic market to a competitor in exchange for that competitor's 
acquiescence in another market (Golden & Ma; 2003: 479).” Mutual forbearance is observed 
especially in cases of competitors operating in various common markets while being able to 
pose a credible threat to each other. As a consequence participating companies prefer to 
cooperate instead of suffering mutual harm (Golden & Ma; 2003 & Knoll, 2008). 
Exhibit 2 summarizes the four outlined categories of synergies, while detailing which means 
are used by companies to exploit each category of benefits. 
Exhibit 2 − Motives for Cross-Border M&A 
Financial Operational Managerial Market Power 
Reduction 
of systemic risk 
Efficiency synergies 
(economies of scope) 
Entrepreneurial 
capabilities 
Predatory Pricing 
Establishment of 
an internal market 
Growth synergies Organizational  
design capabilities 
Bundling 
Financial 
economies of scale 
Economies of scale Enhancing performance 
of functions/individuals 
Reciprocal  
buying and selling 
Tax 
advantages 
Reduction 
of assets 
Diagnosis of the source 
of performance problems  
Mutual 
Forbearance 
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2.1.2 Agency Motive 
According to the agency motive companies engage in M&A activities since the management 
of the acquiring company seeks opportunities to increase its welfare at the expense of the 
acquirer firm’s shareholders (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). 
Agency can be defined as a relationship between two parties, whereby the agent agrees to act 
on behalf of the principal. This refers to the relationship between shareholders and 
management since owners employ the management to run the company and to represent them.  
In general, individuals tend to maximize their own expected utility leading to a potential 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers (Schroeder et al., 2009). Wang & 
Moini (2012) suggest that there are three theories explaining the agency problem namely 
“empire building”, “free cash flow theory” as well as the ”excessive managerial risk 
aversion”. 
Empire building refers to the tendency of managers to increase the size of the firm beyond the 
optimum in order to increase the number of resources controlled and thus their power (Jensen, 
1986). Growth in sales and thus the company’s size is positive correlated to an increase in 
management compensation (Murphy, 1985).  
The free cash flow theory states that agency problems increase with the amount of free cash 
held by the company since managers tend to invest excess cash flows even in projects with a 
negative net present value discounted at the relevant cost of capital instead of paying 
dividends to the shareholders and thus to maximize stock price and shareholder value. The 
loss in welfare to the shareholders is classified as agency costs of free cash flow and is 
positive correlated to the amount of excess cash hold by companies. Therefore, cash-rich 
companies are recommended to be financial market oriented when funding investments in 
order to have the potential to pay out all excess cash and to reduce agency costs (Jensen, 
1986).  
Excessive managerial risk aversion relates to the fact that managers in contrast to investors 
engage in M&A activities to reduce the non diversifiable risk of losing employment and/or 
the professional reputation (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Wang & Moini, 2012). 
Agency costs to the principal may limit the conflict of interest by establishing incentives for 
the agent to reduce a conflict of interest and/or by controlling the behavior of the agent. The 
principal sometimes pays the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to prevent actions 
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harming the principal. However, with agency costs of zero it is impossible to perfectly align 
interests of both the shareholders and the managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In order to align management incentives with the shareholders’ interests, stock and option 
based management compensation is frequently applied by companies. However, Bergstresser 
& Philippon (2006) argue that this may lead to the unfavorable situation of executives 
“managing” earnings to keep the stock price up. Their results suggest that CEOs with an 
overall compensation very sensitive to the firm’s share price on average lead companies with 
a high level of earnings management. 
2.1.3 Hubris Hypothesis 
According to the hubris hypothesis managers often make mistakes in evaluating potential 
target companies and wrongly assume the existence of potential future synergies causing 
value destruction for the acquiring company (Ahmad, 2011; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; 
Seth et al., 2000).  
This behavioral theory formulated by Roll (1986) implies that managers led by the 
overconfidence bias systematically evaluate merger opportunities too optimistic and deviate 
from rational decision making. The results suggest that around the takeover announcement the 
combined value of the target firm and the bidder firm decreases slightly. More precisely, the 
average decrease in the market value of the bidding firm offsets the average increase in the 
target firm’s market value. Roll (1986) shows that bidder firms on average pay too much for 
their targets. Bids with a valuation below the current market price are abandoned, whereas 
only bids exceeding the current market price have the potential of being accepted. Therefore, 
the takeover premium can be explained by a one-sided random error caused by the bidding 
firm. By assuming market efficiency and asset prices that reflect all information, according to 
Roll (1986) takeovers can only be caused by managerial hubris and the unrealistic belief that 
the bidding firm can manage the target firm’s assets more efficient. Although a large number 
of transactions have become regarded as failure over the time, many companies continue to 
screen the market for potential target companies (Cai & Vijh, 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 
2008; Yang, 2015). 
According to Malmendier & Tate (2008) past research focused too much on the average 
announcement effects to merger bids analyzing hubris hypothesis. In fact, a wide range of 
research articles have been published that both either support (e.g. Narayan & Thenmozhi, 
2014 ; Roll, 1986) or contradict (e.g. Boateng & Du, 2015; Chari et al., 2004) hubris 
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hypothesis taking the value creation perspective. Therefore, Malmendier & Tate (2008) take 
the approach to directly measure which CEO can be classified as “overconfident” and to 
analyze whether these CEOs tend to destroy shareholder value through acquisitions. The 
results suggest that CEOs classified as overconfident have higher odds of making an 
acquisition. This effect is stronger if the M&A transaction is diversifying and solely requires 
internal financing. Additionally, the market reaction on the takeover announcement is 
significantly more negative for overconfident than for non-overconfident CEOs. Unlike to the 
agency problem, overconfident managers are convinced of taking value maximizing and 
rational decisions. Therefore, stock and option based compensations and similar incentives are 
unlikely to correct their sub-optimal decisions. However, Malmendier & Tate (2008) point out 
that both financing constraints as well as independent directors as counterbalance in decision 
making are appropriate means to influence overconfident CEOs. 
2.1.4 Other Motives 
In addition to the three previously outlined three motives for M&A activities, there is a wide 
range of theories/hypothesis about motivating factors. Wang & Moini (2012) differentiate 
between theories referring to “passive responses to the change of the external environment” 
and hypothesis relating to “decision making based on a strategic plan”. The latter can be 
further divided into “rational hypothesis” as well as “bounded rational hypothesis”, whereas 
the first comprises theories on both the “country level” as well as on the “industry level”. 
More precisely, both the outlined efficiency theory as well as the explained agency motive 
relate to “rational hypotheses”, whereas hubris theory can be categorized among the “bounded 
rational hypotheses” (Wang & Moini, 2012). In contrast to that, theories based on “passive 
responses to a changing environment” are less frequently applied to explain the rationale 
behind M&A and have minor importance in existing literature. Exhibit 33 (Appendix; Wang & 
Moini, 2012) provides an overview about the extensive selection of theories/hypotheses 
related to the motives of M&A. 
2.2 M&A Value creation 
A wide range of research studies is focusing on the implications of M&A on shareholder 
value creation. On the one hand, event studies analyze the effects of M&A transactions on the 
stock prices of acquiring and target companies around the announcement day. On the other 
hand, research suggests what type of firm characteristic or contextual condition makes it more 
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likely that a particular merger will generate or destroy shareholder value (Campa & 
Hernando, 2004). 
2.2.1 Effects of Objectives on Value Creation 
Berkovitch & Narayan (1993) summarized the three major motives for M&A activities (refer 
to point 2.1) and their effect on the abnormal returns of target and acquiring firm around the 
announcement day. If takeovers are motivated by synergy, abnormal returns for both target 
and acquiring company are supposed to be positive. In case of takeovers caused by the agency 
motive, total value to the shareholders of the combined firm is supposed to be negative with 
negative abnormal returns for the acquiring and positive abnormal return for the target firm. 
For hubris hypothesis takeovers are expected to result in abnormal returns of zero. More 
precisely, for the target company hubris motive should lead to positive abnormal returns 
offsetting the acquiring firm’s negative abnormal returns. Exhibit 3 summarizes the effects of 
different M&A objectives on value creation.  
Exhibit 3 − Effects of M&A Objectives on Value Creation 
M&A Motive Total Gain Acquirer Gain Target Gain 
Synergy Positive Positive Positive 
Agency Negative Negative Positive 
Hubris Zero Negative Positive 
2.2.2 Target Company 
In general, evidence indicates that target shareholders benefit from takeovers by gaining 
positive abnormal returns around the announcement day. These returns are economically 
significant independent from variations in time period, type of merger deal, industries, 
observation period and abnormal returns measurement method. 
Mallikarjunappa & Panduranga (2013) examine the stock price responses of target 
companies to the announcement of takeovers in India. Their results show that target 
companies’ shareholders benefit from cumulative abnormal returns of 37.0%. Schwert (2000) 
showed in an extensive study that in the U.S. targets benefit from both successful and 
unsuccessful takeover bids by on average cumulative abnormal returns of 20.0%. Although 
Akben & Selcuk (2014) obtain similar results, in their study the cumulative abnormal returns 
for Turkish target companies are significantly lower with 8.5%. However, both Akben-Selcuk 
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(2014) as well as Mallikarjunappa & Panduranga (2013) observed that the major portion of 
the wealth is created at or prior to the announcement day indicating either an early leakage of 
information or a market anticipation of the takeover. 
Panel A in Exhibit 34 (Appendix) summarizes 10 major studies on the impact of takeover 
announcements on the abnormal returns of target companies. The cumulative abnormal 
returns are positive in a range from 3.6% to 41.7% in all studies except for event window 
timeframes that do not include the announcement day. Cumulative abnormal returns for target 
shareholders are significant and positive despite variations in sample size, time period, 
industry and geographical scope. To conclude, M&A transactions are expected to deliver 
premium returns to the shareholders of target companies (Bruner, 2002). 
2.2.3 Acquiring Company 
For the value impact of M&A on acquiring firms’ shareholders research research results are 
inconclusive. More precisely, a wide range of studies indicates small negative cumulative 
abnormal returns, whereas others report zero or slightly positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
Martynova & Renneboog (2008) analyzed the impact of both domestic and cross-border 
acquisition announcements on shareholder wealth of European, Russian and British acquiring 
companies. The results suggest that domestic and cross-border acquiring companies suffer 
from negative cumulative abnormal returns of -2.5% and -3.6% respectively around the 
acquisition announcement day. Similar results are published by Kuipers et al. (2002) 
analyzing 138 U.S. acquiring companies over a time period from 1990–1998. Despite 
variations in the event window period, results show negative cumulative abnormal returns 
ranging from -1.3% to -2.1% for event windows including the announcement day. Panel B1 in 
Exhibit 34 (Appendix) summarizes 11 major studies that suggest the existence of negative 
cumulative abnormal returns ranging from -0.01% to -4.6% despite variations in time period, 
industry and geographic scope.  
On the contrary, Jain et al. (2014) observed for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
positive cumulative abnormal returns of 1.6% and 2.7% respectively for Indian acquiring 
companies and an event window of 11 days around the announcement day. In line with these 
results, Beitel et al. (2002) found very small positive cumulative abnormal returns for the 
acquisition firm focusing on European banks as acquirer. The research paper of Moeller et al. 
(2005) indicates that merger announcements were profitable for bidding firms’ shareholders 
from 1990–1997, whereas during the period from 1998–2001 merger announcements were 
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strongly costly for bidding firms’ shareholders. More precisely, a few large acquisitions 
caused strong negative abnormal returns for the bidding firms outweighing the positive 
impact on the bidding firms’ returns of thousands of other acquisitions. Panel B2 in Exhibit 
34 (Appendix) illustrates 12 major studies showing mainly positive cumulative abnormal 
returns for acquiring companies around the takeover announcement day suggesting 
shareholder value creation for bidding companies. 
To summarize, out of the 23 studies listed up in Panel B in Exhibit 34 (Appendix) 11 suggest 
value destruction, whereas 12 indicate a small positive wealth creation for the shareholders of 
the acquisition company. Therefore, there is no strong support for either positive or negative 
cumulative abnormal returns for the bidding firm suggesting that shareholder wealth more or 
less remains unchanged. Schipper & Thompson (1983) argue that positive abnormal returns 
for bidding firms occur prior to the announcement of an acquisition reflecting investors’ 
anticipation of future acquisitions. Therefore, around the merger announcement stock price 
reaction is attenuated explaining the weak and contradictory results for abnormal returns of 
bidding firms in this timeframe. 
Hypothesis Development 
With reference to review of previous literature about value creation/destruction through 
mergers and acquisitions, the first hypothesis developed suggests that cumulative abnormal 
returns for acquiring companies in both domestic and cross-border transactions are above zero 
in the short term around the M&A announcement. This hypothesis is based on most recent 
research focusing on acquiring companies from emerging markets, which predominantly 
indicates shareholder value creation for bidding firms around the announcement day (Aybar & 
Thanakijsombat, 2015; Chari et al., 2004; Jain et al., 2014; Tauseef & Nihast, 2014). 
Hypothesis 1: The CAAR for the acquirer in the short term around the announcement 
date is larger or equal to zero. 
2.2.4 Deal- and Company Specific Factors  
According to Martynova & Renneboog (2008) both characteristics of the bidding and target 
companies as well as characteristics of the deal itself have an impact on shareholder value. In 
the following only the relevant factors are discussed, on which there is consensus in existing 
literature regarding their impact on post-acquisition wealth of the acquiring company (Al 
Masud & Den Hertong, 2014). 
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Characteristics of the Bidding and Target Company 
Martinova & Rennebog (2008) suggest that dissimilar corporate governance standards 
between bidder and target have the potential to generate synergies related to corporate 
governance improvements. However, negative spillover effects may occur when the acquirer 
imposes its lower governance standards on the target. 
Bradley & Sundaram (2004) show that the legal status of the target firm impacts the post-
acquisition valuation of the acquiring company. Their results indicate that privately held 
target companies negatively influence post-acquisition returns for the bidding company 
possibly due to information asymmetries arising from lower disclosure requirements. 
Deal Specific Factors 
According to Eckbo et al. (1990) a mix of cash and stock as payment method is superior to 
either all-stock or all-cash bids in terms of impact on the average abnormal returns. Whereas 
all-cash bids suffer from taxes on capital gains to be paid by the target shareholders, 
information asymmetry is the major drawback of all-stock deals. However, all-cash deals 
seem to be more beneficial than all-equity bids, since information asymmetries cause greater 
on average value losses (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2011). 
The deal value is supposed to be positive correlated with post-acquisition wealth generation, 
whereas the acquiring company’s size is negatively correlated with value creation (Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005). Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011) suggest that the relative size of 
the target calculated as the transaction value divided by the market value of the acquirer 
positively influence value creation in M&A since deals with larger relative value lead to less 
adverse selection problems. 
Another deal factor influencing post-acquisition returns is the percentage of ownership or 
corporate control acquired by the bidding firm. According to Chari et al. (2004) majority 
control leads to significant value creation for the acquiring firm. La Porta et al. (1998) 
suggest that the positive correlation is based on the fact that the acquirer of majority control is 
less exposed to weak investor protection and thus there is a lower probability of being 
expropriated by the management. 
2.3 Cross-Border Acquisitions  
Due to the ongoing trend of companies acquiring or merging with companies located outside 
their home market (refer to point 1.1) in the following first the motives and challenges of 
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cross-border acquisitions are discussed followed by the introduction of research focusing on 
shareholder value creation in this type of M&A. 
2.3.1 Motives for Cross-Border M&A 
According to Boateng et al. (2008) there are four main factors motivating acquiring 
companies to search for target firms abroad: “access to resources and technologies”, 
“diversification”, “market access and expansion” as well as “the efficiency theory”.  
Access to Resources and Technologies 
According to the organizational learning perspective (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) and the 
resource based view (RBV) (Eisehardt & Schoonhoven, 1996 ; Madhok, 1997) acquiring 
firms are motivated to engage in cross-border acquisitions in order to adopt new capabilities 
and knowledge (Boateng et al., 2008). The fact that product life cycles become shorter and 
new critical technologies frequently challenge existing products and/or business models lead 
to companies being incapable of maintaining sophistication (Ohmae, 1989). Therefore, the 
exploitation of external know-how sources becomes crucial explaining the shift from 
domestic to cross-border M&A activities. According to Errunza & Senbet (1981) acquiring 
companies are incentivized to engage in cross-border M&A in order to obtain managerial and 
marketing skills as well as to bypass government regulations that create market entry barriers. 
Furthermore, Shimizu et al. (2004) point out that cross-border M&A may be used as a mean to 
internalize an acquirer’s intangible assets and thus to achieve a reduction of transaction costs 
by avoiding the costly market mechanism of transferring these assets. Additionally, the 
acquirer may benefit from the target’s intangible assets through reverse internalization. 
Therefore, according to Seth et al. (2000, 2002) and Boateng et al. (2008) both internalization 
and reverse internalization have the potential of avoiding misappropriation of intangible assets 
while reducing transaction costs and can be seen as major motive for cross-border M&A.  
Geographic Diversification 
Denis et al. (2002) and Trautwein (1990) suggest geographic diversification as a potential 
motive for cross-border M&A. According to Boateng & Glaister (2003) cross-border M&A 
provide the opportunity for the acquiring firm to limit both the costs and the risk of entering 
into a foreign market since transaction costs can be reduced by the establishment of an 
internal capital market. Seth et al. (2002) suggest that geographical diversification with the 
objective to reduce operational and financial risk is one source of value creation in cross-
border M&A but not in domestic acquisitions.  
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Beamish et al. (1989) show that multinational entities pursuing a geographic diversification 
strategy over an extended period of time benefit from a superior financial performance. 
Furthermore, their results suggest that there is a positive correlation between the financial 
performance of a multinational entity and the degree of internationalization but only up to a 
certain critical threshold value from where on the level of performance diminishes due to the 
challenge of maintaining a certain profitability level.  
The exertion of market power through an international scope is another potential source of 
value creation for companies engaged in cross-border M&A (Manzon et al., 1994; Morck & 
Yeung, 1992; Seth et al. 2000). Additionally, a more diversified portfolio of economic 
activities located in imperfectly correlated countries leads in line with the modern portfolio 
theory to a reduction in earnings volatility and an improvement in investors’ risk-return 
opportunities (Boateng et al., 2008).  
Market Access and Expansion  
Datta & Puia (1995) suggest that a third motive for cross-border M&A is the opportunity to 
gain instant access to new markets with already established sales volume. Therefore, cross-
border M&A have the major advantage of speed and time. Several previous studies pointed 
out that the establishment of a global organization is costly, time consuming as well as 
difficult and risky due to barriers in culture, business practices and institutional constraints 
(e.g. Barkema et al., 1996; Boateng & Glaister, 2003; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Boateng et al. 
(2008) show that acquiring companies enjoy immediate access to a local network comprising 
suppliers, customers and distributors. Additionally, Wang & Moini (2012) point out that 
acquiring companies engaged in cross-border M&A may be motivated by geographic 
expansion, rapid growth or the improvement of the product and/or service mix. 
Efficiency Theory 
According to the efficiency theory firms engaging in M&A activities are incentivized by the 
achievement of potential synergies as outlined in point 2.1.1 (Trautwein, 1990). However, 
especially cross-border acquisitions provide opportunities to achieve financial synergies by 
benefiting either from exchange rate differentials (Kish & Vasconcellos, 1993) or different tax 
policies between acquiring and target countries (Servaes & Zenner, 1994). More precisely, 
McCann (2001) claims that inbound acquisitions are motivated by lower tax rates in the 
acquiring company’s home country, whereas high tax rates provoke outbound M&A activity. 
This view is supported in studies from Manzon et al. (1994) and Georgen & Renneborg 
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(2004). Di Iorio et al. (2011) suggest that especially in research and development intensive 
industries acquiring companies benefit from cross border acquisitions. However, the results 
indicate that these gains are shared between both acquiring and target companies. Ghauri & 
Buckley (2003) suggest that cross-border M&A can be used to exploit operational synergies 
trough either a reduction of costs by large scale production or the pooling of resources leading 
to superior products/services and thus higher market share and profitability. 
Bounded Rationality 
In their study Wang & Moini (2012) show that both “overconfidence” as well as “imitation” 
biases have direct influence on cross-border M&A decisions and thus motivate acquiring 
companies to engage in these transactions. 
The overconfidence bias (refer to point 2.1.3) in this context relates to the tendency of the 
acquiring company to have overoptimistic expectations about the potential benefits of the 
target company leading frequently to an overpricing of the target firm and thus to value 
destruction (Wang & Moini, 2012). Ferris et al. (2009) suggest that CEO overconfidence is 
especially an international phenomenon with presence in the international M&A market. The 
overconfidence bias in cross-border M&A decisions is especially present in young companies 
headquartered in Christian countries valuing individualism and short term orientation (Ferris 
et al. 2009).  
Furthermore, Wang & Moini (2012) empirically show that acquiring companies imitate 
prevailing behavior of competitors and follow the trend of engaging increasingly in cross-
border acquisitions.  
Finally, Wang & Moini (2012) also mention the “process theory” as well as the “escalating 
confirmation” bias as possible motivating factors for cross-border M&A. Whereas the process 
theory states that M&A decision are based on an existing process influenced by limited 
information processing capabilities and former experience of executives as well as 
organizational routine, the escalating confirmation bias refers to the tendency of decision 
makers to escalate commitment to a previously selected course of action even though there is 
objective evidence that this course is harmful (Wang & Moini, 2012; Kelly & Milkman, 2013). 
However, so far there is no empirical evidence about the prevalence of both the process 
theory and the escalating confirmation bias in decisions about cross-border M&A. 
Exhibit 4 provides a final overview about the major motivating factors for cross-border M&A. 
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Exhibit 4 − Motivating Factors for Cross-Border M&A 
Resource  
Based View 
Geographic 
Diversification 
Market Access 
and Expansion 
Efficiency  
Theory 
Bounded 
Rationality 
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capability and 
knowledge transfer 
Internal Capital 
Market (lower 
transaction costs) 
Instant access to  
new markets 
 and customers 
Exploit  
differences 
 in the tax regimes 
Overconfidence 
bias 
Technology and  
innovation transfer 
Superior  
financial 
performance  
Existing network 
 of local suppliers  
and distributors 
Benefit  
from exchange 
 rate differentials 
Imitation bias 
(herding theory) 
Avoidance of 
government 
regulations 
Exertion 
of market power 
Established 
sales volume 
 Cost  
reduction through 
 economies of scale 
(Process  
Theory) 
Intangible  
asset (reverse) 
internalization 
Risk-reward 
optimization 
(portfolio theory) 
Improvement 
 of the service  
and/or product mix 
Pooling of 
resources across 
business units 
(Escalating 
confirmation  
bias) 
2.3.2 Challenges in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
With reference to existing literature there are two major concepts relating to challenges 
burdening value creation in cross-border acquisitions namely ”liability of foreignness” 
(Zaheer, 1995) as well as “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema et al., 1996). 
Liability of Foreignness 
According to Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) liability of foreignness is defined as 
additional costs incurring for firms operating in overseas markets that local firms do not face 
(Zaheer, 1995). It can be differentiated between four not necessarily independent sources: 
(1) Costs related directly to spatial distance and different time zones comprising travel, 
transportation as well as coordination costs 
(2) Firm-specific costs caused by the company’s lack of experience in a local environment 
(3) Costs linked to the host country environment including economic nationalism and 
discrimination of foreign companies 
(4) Costs arising from the home country environment such as sales restrictions 
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According to Zaheer (1995) liability of foreignness occurs especially in competitive 
industries. Furthermore, their study suggests that rather than imitating practices of domestic 
firms (local isomorphism) multinational companies should import firm-specific capabilities 
and organizational practices in order to overcome the liability of foreignness. However, Wu 
(2016) suggests that initially local isomorphism may improve a firm’s performance but then 
fails to provide benefits over time indicating that with cumulating experience in a local 
market a firm specific strategy has to be developed. 
Double-layered Acculturation 
Barkema et al. (1996) state that acquiring companies engaged in cross-border M&A face 
cultural differences from two different perspectives and are thus required to achieve “double 
layered acculturation”. On the one hand, bidding companies have to adjust to the national 
culture which might substantially deviate from the culture in their home country. On the other 
hand, acculturation is even more challenging when the foreign entry is realized with a partner 
namely the target company, since both organizational cultures embedded in different national 
cultures have to be combined. The impact of cultural distance on the value creation in cross-
border M&A is controversially debated. Aybar & Ficici (2009) show in their study that there 
is a positive correlation between cultural distance and value creation in cross-border M&A for 
the acquiring company. This is supported by Chakrabarti et al. (2004) suggesting that cross-
border acquisitions perform better in the long-run, when acquirer and target companies come 
from cultural disparate countries potentially due to higher synergies and organizational 
strengths in the global marketplace. In contrast to that, Datta (1991) and Very et al. (1996) 
found a negative correlation between organizational cultural differences and post-acquisition 
performance. 
2.3.3 Value Creation in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
In general recent literature suggests that cross-border acquisitions create more value around 
the announcement day for acquiring companies than domestic acquisitions. Additionally, 
especially acquiring companies coming from emerging markets may benefit more from cross-
border than from domestic acquisitions, while there is a range of additional contextual factors 
such as company size, ownership or geographical scope of the transaction influencing the 
value impact of cross-border M&A. 
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Domestic vs. Cross-Border Acquisitions 
The internalization framework suggests that acquiring firms generate value in cross-border 
M&A by internalizing imperfections in the host-country in case firm-specific assets find no 
comparable value elsewhere (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Morck & Yeung, 1991, 1992; 
Williamson, 1979). However, cross-border effects seem to have turned positive only during 
the late 1990s and the early 2000s, leading to recent studies suggesting higher value creation 
for both target and acquiring companies in cross-border acquisitions than in domestic 
acquisitions (e.g. Francis et al., 2008; Danbolt & Maciver, 2012).  
While results of Eckbo & Thorburn (2000) suggest that US acquiring companies gain less 
than Canadian acquiring companies in takeovers of Canadian targets, Moeller & 
Schlingemann (2005) show that US acquiring companies generate higher shareholder value in 
domestic than in cross-border transactions. Similar results for European acquiring companies 
where found by Campa & Hernando (2004) and by Aw & Chatterje (2004) but solely limited 
to the pre-announcement window.  
However, more recent studies conducted by Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011), Danbolt 
& Maciver (2012) and Jain et al. (2014) find different results suggesting that both target and 
acquiring company on average achieve significantly higher abnormal returns in cross-border 
than in domestic acquisitions. In their study Jain et al. (2014) compared domestic takeovers 
with cross-border acquisitions of Indian bidding companies. The results indicate that 
shareholders of the bidding company benefit from positive cumulative abnormal returns 
associated with cross-border acquisitions, whereas in domestic acquisitions the acquirer 
shareholders lose significantly value around the announcement day. 
Emerging Markets 
According to various recent studies, acquiring companies from emerging markets seem to 
benefit more from emerging market outbound cross-border acquisitions than from domestic 
acquisitions in terms of value creation. According to the bootstrapping theory suggested by 
Khanna & Palepu (2004) and Martynova & Rennebog (2008) the market positively perceives 
the emerging markets bidding firm’s attempt to bootstrap itself to the higher governance 
standards of a developed target country through an acquisition. Bhagat et al. (2011) analyze 
the impact of corporate governance measures on the bidding firm’s returns around the 
announcement date of cross-border acquisitions. The study focuses on bidding firms in 
emerging markets and indicates that the stock market rewards developing country bidding 
firms, while better corporate governance measures in the target country positively impact the 
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acquirer’s returns. While Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) and Boateng & Du (2015) suggest 
in their studies that there is a significant value creation in cross-border acquisitions for 
acquiring companies coming from emerging markets, Jain et al. (2014) shows that this value 
creation is higher for outbound cross-border than for domestic transactions. 
Other Contextual Factors 
Existing literature indicates a wide range of contextual factors with the potential of positively 
influencing value creation for acquiring companies in cross-border transactions. Boateng & 
Du (2015) suggest that state ownership supports value creation for bidding firms by 
encouraging investments in strategic important sectors and by providing opportunities for 
value-creating activities.  
A second factor frequently covered in existing literature is the transaction value. Aybar & 
Thanakijsombat (2015) show that large size cross-border acquisitions lead to a relatively 
higher value generated through economies of scale and a less intense bidding competition. 
Additionally, wealth is more likely created if the bidding firm is equipped with previous 
experience in the target country, if the target country has a relatively high risk profile and if 
the cross-border acquisition involves bidding and target firms from regions with distant 
cultures. According to Aybar & Ficici (2009) the extent of control pursued as well as the 
relative size, private ownership of the target and diversified corporate structure of the 
acquiring company positively impacts the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring 
company around the acquisition announcement.  
Hypotheses Development 
By summarizing the reviewed literature about value creation in cross-border transactions, the 
second hypothesis suggests that there is a larger cumulative abnormal return for acquiring 
companies from emerging countries engaged in emerging markets outbound cross-border 
transactions than for acquiring companies from emerging countries conducting domestic 
emerging markets transactions.  
Hypothesis 2: The CAAR for acquirers engaged in outbound emerging markets 
acquisitions is larger than the CAAR for acquirers from emerging 
markets engaged in domestic emerging markets M&A. 
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2.3.4 Inbound vs. Outbound Cross-Border Acquisitions 
As outlined in point 1.1 the volume of cross-border M&A activity with acquiring companies 
from emerging markets targeting developed countries is increasing rapidly. Therefore, this 
thesis aims at analyzing the difference on value creation between inbound and outbound 
cross-border M&A in emerging markets. Inbound cross-border M&A is in the following 
classified as cross-border M&A activities from acquiring companies established in developed 
countries targeting developing countries, whereas outbound cross-border M&A refers to 
acquiring companies coming from developing countries targeting companies in developed 
countries. According to Shimizu et al. (2004) existing research comparing wealth generation 
for acquiring companies in inbound and outbound cross-border acquisitions is inconclusive. 
Outbound M&A 
For outbound M&A literature suggests both value creation and value destruction leading to 
conflicting result. Especially the bootstrapping theory (refer to point 2.3.3.) developed by 
Khanna & Palepu (2004) and Martynova & Rennebog (2008) indicates that cross-border 
transactions have a positive impact on the wealth of the acquiring company, since investors 
appreciate the bidding company’s attempt to benefit from the higher governance standards of 
a target from developed countries. The view of value creation for emerging market cross-
border acquiring companies is confirmed by studies from Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015), 
Bhagat et al. (2011), Boateng & Du (2015) and Jain et al. (2014).  
However, in their study Aybar & Ficici (2009) provide empirical evidence that the 
bootstrapping theory does not hold true for 433 mergers and acquisitions of emerging-markets 
multinationals in a time period from 1991–2004. Narayan & Thenmozhi (2014) suggest 
pronounced value destruction for shareholders of bidding firms when emerging market 
companies acquire developed market target firms mainly due to their limited experience in 
undertaking cross-border acquisitions. Additionally, their study suggests that emerging market 
bidding firms are often obliged to engage in tender offer-based acquisitions due to their lower 
bargaining power in international financial transactions leading to high premium offers and 
thus value destruction. 
Additionally, Danis & Schmahl (2012) conducted an event study comparing M&A acquiring 
firm shareholder value creation of intra-European deals with cross-border transactions of 
Chinese and Indian acquiring companies. Their results indicate that both samples on average 
create shareholder value for the acquiring firm, while intra-European transaction acquirers 
benefit from significant higher abnormal returns.  
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According to Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) investors of acquiring companies from 
emerging markets react positively in a period of up to four days after the cross-border M&A 
announcement, whereas beyond this time frame abnormal returns of the bidding firm become 
negative. 
Aybar & Ficici (2009) suggest that acquisition announcements of high-tech bidding firms and 
for target companies in related industries are associated with value destruction for bidding 
companies from emerging markets, whereas target size, private ownership of the target and a 
diversified structure of the bidder positively affect the bidder value. 
According to Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011) a weak legal and institutional 
environment in the country of the acquiring firm leads to higher prices in cross-border M&A 
burdening the abnormal returns around the announcement date for the bidding company. In 
contrast to that, a stronger legal and institutional environment in the home country of the 
acquiring country increases the bidding firm’s shareholder gain by reducing the deal price 
(Kuipers et al., 2009).  
Exhibit 35 (Appendix) provides an overview about contextual factors impacting shareholder 
value for acquiring companies from developing countries engaged in cross-border 
acquisitions targeting developed countries firms. 
Inbound M&A 
According to Chari et al. (2004) firms from developed markets acquiring targets from 
emerging markets benefit from a statistically significant increase in returns around the 
announcement day. Additionally, the study shows that value gains mainly stem from the 
transfer of majority control from the target to the developed market acquirer indicated by 
higher abnormal returns for acquiring companies obtaining majority control. 
The study of Kale (2004) showed that foreign multinational acquirers of Indian targets benefit 
from significantly higher value in their transaction than acquirers from India. However, this 
difference in value creation reduces significantly over time and might reflect the 
multinationals’ higher skills and experience in terms of acquisition procedures. In a recent 
study Narayan & Thenmozi (2014) draw similar conclusions suggesting that developed 
market firms acquiring emerging market targets have a 50 per cent chance of creating value 
which mainly stems from their experience in undertaking cross-border acquisitions.  
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Hypothesis Development 
Based on the comparison between outbound and inbound M&A in developing markets a third 
hypothesis is developed suggesting that cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms from 
developed countries acquiring developing country targets are higher than for developing 
markets acquiring firms engaged in outbound M&A: 
Hypothesis 3: The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets engaged in inbound 
emerging markets acquisitions is larger than the CAAR for acquirers 
from emerging markets in outbound emerging markets acquisitions. 
2.4 Industry Diversification  
Existing research shows that there is a difference in the impact on the acquiring firm’s share 
price between an acquisition of a target in a related industry and one in an unrelated business 
segment (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). Walker (2000) considers diversification to be the acquisition 
of target companies in a different industry measured by the first two digits of the four digits 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), whereas a non-diversified strategy refers to the 
acquisition of target companies within the same industry. 
2.4.1 Relevance of the Topic 
There is a widespread belief among managers and academics that strategic relatedness can 
increase economic value of acquiring companies. However, already Barney (1988) points out 
the importance of analyzing the effect of relatedness on value creation in M&A, since results 
in studies are not consistent with managerial and academic expectations. Additionally, the fact 
that since two decades in France, Germany and the U.K. the number of both diversified and 
non-diversified firms has increased at the expense of single business firms highlights the 
importance of the topic (Sudarsanam, 2003).  
This seems to hold true also for other regions including emerging markets. Boateng et al. 
(2008) show that for Chinese bidding companies engaging in cross-border acquisitions one 
main strategic objective is diversification. According to Huaichuan & Yip (2008) today most 
of the Chinese bidding companies use acquisitions as mean to achieve strategic objectives. 
More precisely, acquiring companies strive to achieve competitive advantages by updating 
their portfolio and thus through diversification. Furthermore, the study suggests that the extent 
of strategic intent for the bidding firm is dependent on the company’s internal and external 
conditions, the experience in the home market as well as the capacity of the top management. 
Since there was large progress for these factors in the last years in the emerging markets, it is 
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expected that there is a rational way in terms of strategy and that diversification is a main 
incentive to engage in M&A. 
2.4.2 Value Impact of Industry Diversification 
There is literature with contradicting opinions about the value effect of relatedness between 
acquirer and target around takeover announcements. However, especially for emerging 
markets studies consistently suggest that diversification strategies are more valuable to 
shareholders than non-diversified takeovers. 
Value creation 
On the one hand literature supports the hypothesis of value creation through industry 
diversification. According to Stulz (1990) risk reduction may be achieved through the co-
insurance effect benefiting diversified companies due to a less fluctuating aggregated cash 
flow leading to a lower bankruptcy risk and higher credit ratings.  
Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2005) suggests that value creation through industry diversification may 
stem from an increase in market power and the ability to affect prices. Additionally, 
diversified companies have the potential to exert conglomerate power by engaging in cross-
subsidization (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). More precisely, Aybar & Ficici (2009) argue that 
presence in different industries yields to additional firm value due to the ability to exploit 
diverse conditions as long as the costs of maintaining the diversified company network do not 
exceed a certain threshold. Their results show that in an event window of 15 days around the 
takeover announcement diversified acquiring firms experience less value destruction than 
non-diversified.  
Furthermore, different studies point out that internal capital markets are less dependent from 
specific industry segments than external capital markets indicating that resource allocation in 
diversified companies is expected to be more efficient compared with non-diversified firms 
(e.g; Matsusaka & Nanda, 1996; Rieck, 2002; Stein, 1997).  
Barney (1988) analyzed the effect of strategic relatedness between bidding and target firm on 
the shareholder value of the acquiring company. The results suggest that strategic relatedness 
has the potential of being translated into positive abnormal returns for the acquiring firm. 
However, Barney (1988) argues that bidding firms must understand both their own 
relatedness to the target firm as well as the relatedness of competing bidders to the target. In 
order to obtain positive abnormal returns other bidders are required to value the target firm at 
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a lower level. Therefore, the existence of imperfectly competitive markets for corporate 
control is required to obtain positive abnormal returns. 
Value Destruction 
On the other hand various studies illustrate potential drawbacks of an industry diversification 
strategy burdening value creation for acquiring companies and promote strategic relatedness 
as value driver. Cross-subsidization of failing business segments as well as agency costs 
might increase through a diversification strategy leading to value destruction (e.g. Denis et al. 
2001; Jensen, 1986; Rieck, 2002; Stein, 1997; Stulz, 1990).  
According to Scharfstein & Stein (1999) investors require more information to evaluate 
diversified companies. However, investors are usually not provided with additional 
information leading to information asymmetries and to diversified companies being traded to 
a discount compared to non-diversified firms. 
Walker (2000) studies the impact of different strategic objectives for mergers and acquisitions 
on the shareholder value creation of bidding firms. The results suggest that diversification 
leads to an on average unfavorable stock market return for bidding firms, since bidding 
companies usually have other more favorable opportunities around the announcement date of 
the acquisition.  
Martynova & Renneborg (2006) compare cumulative abnormal returns for bidding companies 
in diversifying takeovers with those in industry-related M&A deals. While the share price 
decreases by -1.4% preceding a diversifying takeover announcement, it increases by 1.4% for 
intra-industry takeover announcements. 
Developed vs. Emerging Markets 
Palich et al. (2000) state that there is not a linear but a curvilinear relationship between the 
level of industry diversification and market power. Therefore, companies initially seem to 
increase their market power, whereas beyond a certain level of diversification this power 
seems to decrease. However, most emerging markets companies engaged in cross-border 
M&A are supposed to be in an initial stage of diversification benefiting from an increase in 
market power. This is consistent to the findings of Khanna & Palepu (1997, 1999) suggesting 
that a focused non-diversified strategy is inferior to a diversified strategy in emerging markets 
acquiring companies. However, Narayan & Thenmozi (2014) show in their study that there is 
no significant difference in value creation for emerging markets bidding companies in terms 
of diversifying or focused M&A strategy.  
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Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2012) show in their study that European developed country 
acquirers benefit from industry diversification decisions in M&A leading to shareholder value 
creation dominating over an increase in costs caused by the agency problem or asymmetric 
information. In contrast to that Martynova & Rennebog (2008) show that intra-European 
diversifying mergers lead to lower abnormal returns than focused mergers. This is confirmed 
by Dos Santos et al. (2008) illustrate that US acquirers engaged in industrial diversified M&A 
activities destroy value even after controlling the pre-acquisition value of the target. 
Generally, diversifying acquisitions are more favored by acquirers belonging to countries with 
a weak legal and institutional environment indicating that emerging markets acquirers are 
more likely to engage in diversified M&A (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2012). 
Purkayastha et al. (2012) summarized existing literature on the diversification effect on both 
emerging market acquirers and developed market acquirers. The study concludes that related 
diversification has the potential to benefit developed market acquiring firms through synergy 
realization, whereas for emerging market bidding firms unrelated diversification is rather 
beneficial leading to superior market power and profitability. Purkayastha et al. (2012) argue 
that in developing countries internal growth is limited due to institutional constraints leading 
to rather network-based/diversified growth, while the absence of financial and market 
intermediaries triggers the need for diversification in order to internalize these intermediate 
functions provided by institutions and markets in developed economies. In contrast to that 
developed countries acquiring firms already benefit from unrelated diversification benefits. 
Therefore, related diversification and an increase in efficiency are used as an additional mean 
to create value (Purkayastha et al., 2012). 
Hypotheses Development 
To summarize, emerging market acquirers being in the initial stage of the diversification 
process are supposed to benefit from unrelated diversifying acquisitions due to an increase in 
market power and profitability (Palich et al., 2000). However, for developed market acquiring 
companies there are conflicting literature results regarding the value impact of diversified 
M&A. While value creation in unrelated diversifying acquisitions is doubtful, related 
diversification is expected to create superior value through the realization of synergies. 
Therefore, the fourth set of hypotheses suggests that acquiring companies from both 
developing countries and from developed countries achieve higher abnormal returns in 
diversified than in focused cross-border transactions, whereas the difference between 
37 
 
diversified and focused cross-border transactions is expected to be higher for developing 
countries acquirers. 
Hypothesis 4a: The CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets engaged in industry 
diversifying emerging markets outbound acquisitions is larger than the 
CAAR in industry focused outbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4b: The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets engaged in industry 
diversifying emerging markets inbound acquisitions is larger than the 
CAAR in industry focused inbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4c: The difference between industry diversifying and focused CAARs is 
larger for outbound acquirers from emerging markets than for inbound 
bidding companies from developed markets. 
2.5 Synthesis 
Exhibit 36 (Appendix) provides an overview over the four sets of hypotheses. While the first 
hypothesis concerns the general impact of acquisition announcements on value creation, the 
hypothesis 2 relates to differences in the wealth impact between outbound and domestic 
emerging market transactions. Finally, hypothesis 3 focuses on the difference in value 
creation between inbound and outbound M&A in emerging markets, while hypotheses 4a–4c 
deals with the value impact of an industry diversification strategy. By testing the hypotheses, 
the outlined research question expressed as problem statement (refer to point 1.3) is supposed 
to be sufficiently addressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
3. Data 
In the following information about the data collection procedure as well as the sources and 
structure of the data is provided. In order to be able to compare the value impact of domestic 
and cross-border M&A, inbound and outbound emerging market M&A as well as industry 
diversifying and industry focused M&A different data samples are required. 
3.1 MSCI Classification 
In a first step both emerging markets as well as developed markets have to be defined. 
Therefore, the classification of MSCI Inc. was applied. MSCI Inc. is an independent provider 
of equity, fixed-income and hedge fund market indexes as well as analytic tools for 
institutional investors. The choice is justified by the high reputation of the company within 
and outside of the financial industry indicated by various awards for excellence in the field of 
index providing (MSCI, 2016). Whereas for developed markets the composition of countries 
applied for the MSCI World Index was used, emerging markets compose countries included 
in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. Therefore, in the following emerging markets and 
developed markets are classified as illustrated in Exhibit 5 (MSCI Classification, 2016).  
Exhibit 5 − Market Classification  
MSCI World Index MSCI Emerging Markets Index 
Developed Markets Emerging Markets 
Americas 
Europe & 
Middle East 
Pacific Americas 
Europe, 
ME&A 
Asia 
Canada 
United States 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
Australia 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Singapore 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Peru 
Czech Rep. 
Egypt 
Greece 
Hungary 
Poland 
Qatar 
Russia 
South Africa 
Turkey 
UAE 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
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3.2 Thomson SDC Database 
In the next step, the Thomson SDC (Security Data Corporation) Database is used to derive 
M&A announcement data for a period from 31/01/2000 until 31/01/2016 for the three 
different samples illustrated in Exhibit 6 comprising transactions of listed acquiring 
companies from developed and emerging markets: 
Exhibit 6 − Overview Data Samples 
 
The starting point of the time period was chosen in order to capture the whole effect of the 
shift from emerging markets acquirers to engage in outbound M&A and not only in domestic 
M&A which was initiated in the 2000s (refer to point 1.1). Furthermore, only M&A 
announcements with a transaction value higher than $20 million and a “completed” 
transaction status are considered, while the percentage of shares purchased by the acquirer is 
required to be above 50% (Narayan & Thenmozhi, 2014). The latter shall ensure that the 
acquiring company has the ability to monitor and direct the financial performance of the 
target firm post the acquisition. Additionally, all transactions are excluded for which no 
datastream code for the acquiring company was available. According to the approach of 
Narayan & Thenmozhi (2014) the effect of compounding mergers was eliminated by 
removing transactions from the samples in which an acquiring company is engaged in more 
than one acquisition in the sample within three years following the first transaction. For each 
of the samples the following information is derived from the SDC database: 
- Date of M&A announcement  
- Name of acquiring and target companies 
- Macro industry name and SIC-code of acquiring and target companies 
- Nation of acquiring and target companies 
- Market value in $ million at announcement day and datastream code of acquirer 
- Percentage of shares acquired 
- Value of transaction in $ million  
- Payment method used (cash-only, stock-only or combined) 
- Legal status of target company (listed or non-listed) 
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Finally, the three samples are further split into six subsamples differentiating between 
industry diversifying and industry focused M&A. More precisely, M&A with acquiring and 
target companies having the same SIC-code are classified as focused, whereas transactions 
with acquiring and target companies from different industries indicated by different SIC-
codes are classified as diversifying. Exhibit 7 provides an overview about all samples and 
subsamples.  
Exhibit 7 − Overview Data Subsamples  
 
3.3 Thomson Reuters Datastream 
The database Thomson Reuters Datastream collects and provides financial information of 
companies and markets, while additionally containing macroeconomic data collected from the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Grønsund, 2013). In the following both the daily share prices 
(dividend adjusted) of the acquiring companies as well as the referring country index prices 
(dividend adjusted) are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
Share Prices Acquirer 
For all acquiring companies in the six subsamples Thomson Reuters Datastream is used to 
source the relevant data namely daily share price and referring share price date. Daily share 
prices (dividend adjusted) are retrieved at least 265 days prior to the acquisition and 10 days 
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post the acquisition announcement, while transactions with incomplete share price availability 
are excluded from the samples.  
Total market index 
Additionally, the daily prices (dividend adjusted) of the total market index for the referring 
home country of each acquirer in the same time period pre- and post-acquisition is retrieved. 
More precisely, Thomson Reuters Datastream provides for most relevant countries its own 
stock index representing all equities trading in a country’s stock market (Datastream, 2016). 
All the transactions for which daily market index prices are not available over the relevant 
time period are excluded from the samples. 
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4. Methodology 
The following chapter addresses the chosen research approach and research method. 
Additionally, the analytical framework comprising the event study methodology as well as 
OLS-regressions is presented 
4.1 Research Approach and Method 
First, an overview about the chosen research approach is provided. In a second step common 
research methods for the analysis of value creation in M&A are briefly discussed.  
4.1.1 Research Approach 
In this thesis a deductive research approach is chosen (Bryman & Bell, 2011). According to 
Wilson (2010) a deductive approach is characterized by the hypotheses development based on 
existing theories, while the adequate research strategy has to be designed in order to test the 
hypotheses. More precisely, Snieder & Larner (2009) argue that reasoning in the deductive 
research approach starts with the existing theory and leads to the development of new 
hypotheses, which are subject to tests through the confrontation with observations resulting 
either in the confirmation or the rejection of the hypotheses. Exhibit 8 (Deductive Approach, 
2016) provides an overview about the different major steps in a deductive research approach. 
Exhibit 8 − Deductive Research Approach  
 
By applying the deductive research approach, hypotheses in this thesis are developed based 
on existing literature in the field of value creation through M&A for acquiring firms. 
Especially the comparison between outbound and inbound M&A value creation in emerging 
markets is not sufficiently addressed by research and thus analyzed. After development of the 
hypotheses the observations namely the data samples collected are processed and analyzed. 
Finally, by applying the research methodology and statistics, hypotheses can either be 
confirmed or rejected (Exhibit 8). 
4.1.2 Discussion of Research Methods 
Bild (1998) distinguishes between four methods that can be applied in order to determine 
value creation in M&A namely market method, accounting studies, incremental cash flow 
method, as well as the interview method (Al Masud & Den Hertong, 2014). 
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Market method 
In the context of value creation in M&A event studies mainly rely on the market method and 
the hypothesis about the efficiency of perfect capital markets. More precisely, Mandelker 
(1974) shows in his study that share prices of both acquiring and target firm reflect all 
economic gains/losses expected from the acquisition already at the time of the merger. 
Therefore, the method enables researcher to determine in the short term around the 
announcement date the value creation potential of M&A activities and is thus considered to be 
efficient and easy-to-apply indicated by its frequent usage in research. Additionally, all data 
required such as share prices and announcement dates are usually publicly available as well as 
easy and fast to obtain. However, the major drawback is the fact that stock market reactions to 
M&A announcements may reflect various factors independent from the marginal impact of 
the acquisition (Al Masud & Den Hertong, 2014; Bild, 1998). 
Accounting Studies 
According to accounting studies the value creation of a merger can be examined by assessing 
different accounting return measures such as return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), 
return on capital employed (ROCE) or return on sales (ROS) pre- and post-acquisition (Bild 
1998; Bild et al. 2002). Accounting studies can be differentiated between absolute 
performance studies and relative performance studies. Whereas absolute performance studies 
compare the average performance of the newly consolidated entity during the post-merger 
period with the average performance of the acquirer and the target during the pre-merger 
period, relative performance studies compare the average performance of the consolidated 
entity in the post-merger period to the average performance of a control group comprising 
comparable companies in the same post-merger period. While it is difficult to find an 
appropriate control group that has the potential to model the performance development of the 
consolidated entity in absence of the merger event, the major drawback of accounting studies 
is that they do not account for the cost of the acquisition, the time value of money and profits 
earned beyond the analyzed post-acquisition period (Al Masud & Den Hertong, 2014; Bild, 
1998). Additionally, accounting performance measures can be easily misstated, while in 
contrast to the event study firm specific internal accounting data are required that are not 
always publicly available. 
 
Incremental Cash Flow Method 
This approach takes the perspective of financial theory and addresses the key question 
whether the present value of the financial benefits arising from the acquisition exceeds the 
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present value of the costs and the initial investment (Bild et al., 2002). Therefore, value 
creation takes place in case of a higher present value for the financial benefits than for the 
costs. Furthermore, the discount factor representing the cost of capital considers both the risk 
of incremental cash flow as well as the time value of money (Al Masud & Den Hertong, 
2014; Bild, 1998). However, predictions for both incremental cash flows and cost of capital 
based on internal company data are usually required, while in line with the accounting studies 
the risk of misstatement is present. 
Interview Method 
The approach is based on personal interviews conducted with managers of both the acquiring 
company as well as the target company, who are asked to classify the transaction either as 
“success” or as “failure”. Therefore, the interviews can only take place a considerable time 
post the acquisition in order to capture the implications of the decision (Al Masud & Den 
Hertong, 2014; Bild et al., 2002). Major drawbacks of this method are the time consuming 
interview process as well as the possibly biased view of certain managers, while additionally 
researchers are dependent on not publicly available internal data. 
Chosen Method 
After discussing the four different research methods the market method is applied in the 
following measuring the value creation of M&A through stock price reactions in the short 
term around the announcement day. Especially the fact that the remaining methods are very 
time consuming and require internal data which are in many cases difficult to obtain led to the 
decision. Additionally, due to its frequent use in research the market method provides a high 
degree of comparability with results of existing studies. The disadvantage of confounding 
factors, that might drive the share price independent from the impact of the acquisition is 
addressed by three main initiatives: 
- Elimination of the compounding mergers effect (refer to point 3.2). 
- Elimination of other major confounding events comprising stock splits, dividends and 
earnings announcements (Brown & Warner, 1985), administration changes (Cannella 
& Hambrick, 1993) and joint venture announcements (McConnell & Nantell, 1985) 
through manual examination of ad-hoc press releases of the acquiring firm within the 
event window (refer to 3.2.3) as suggested by DeFond et al. (2010).  
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- According to Brown & Warner (1985) and Nageswara et al. (2014) a reduced size of 
the event window (refer to 4.2.3) decreases the probability of undetected confounding 
events. 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework is twofold. First, the event study methodology is applied in order to 
determine statistically significant value creation patterns within the samples and subsamples. 
Second, an OLS-regression analysis shall determine which explanatory factors influenced 
value creation patterns observed in the event study.  
In this chapter the research methodology applied namely the event study methodology is 
introduced and discussed followed by an explanation of its typical procedural structure, the 
definition of the event window, an overview of the calculation and aggregation of abnormal 
returns as well as the discussion of conducted significance tests. Finally, an overview about 
the OLS-regressions run for each of the three samples is provided. 
4.2.1 Introduction of Event Studies 
The design of the research strategy in this thesis comprises the application of the event study 
methodology (Brown & Warner, 1985) in order to analyze the short-term reactions of the 
stock market to M&A announcements. Especially in the field of finance and accounting the 
event study enjoys a variety of applications comprising firm specific and economy wide 
events (MacKinlay, 1997). While already Jarrel & Poulsen (1989) used the event study 
methodology to measure the effect of M&A announcements on shareholders’ returns, a wide 
range of other events such as stock splits (Fama et al., 1969), dividend announcements 
(Asquith & Mullins, 1983) as well as earning announcements (Ball & Brown, 1968) has been 
analyzed with the application of this method. 
4.2.2 Structure of Event Studies 
According to MacKinlay (1997) the general flow of analysis within event studies is always 
following the same procedure, despite various fields of applications. In a first step the event of 
interest as well as the period for which the share prices of the involved company are examined 
namely the event window have to be defined. In a next step the sample selection based on 
specific criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of a given company in the study is conducted. In 
the following the impact of the event is appraised by the measurement of the abnormal 
returns. Finally, the firm specific abnormal returns are aggregated and the statistical 
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significance of the results obtained is tested by using t-statistics. Exhibit 9 provides an 
overview about the major steps in a typical event study. 
Exhibit 9 − Event Study Process 
 
4.2.3 Definition of Event and Event Window 
For this study the event of interest is the announcement day of M&A relating to one of the 
three categories detailed below: 
(1) “Outbound emerging markets” M&A announcements: this category comprises M&A 
announcements with acquiring firms from emerging markets and target companies 
from developed markets. 
(2) “Inbound emerging markets” M&A announcements: the category refers to M&A 
announcements with acquiring firms from developed markets and target companies 
from emerging markets. 
(3) “Domestic emerging markets” M&A announcements: domestic in this category refers 
to M&A announcements that comprise both acquiring as well as target companies 
from emerging markets, whereas it is not required that both firm come from the same 
country within the emerging markets.  
The M&A announcement day is determined by “the date one or more parties involved in the 
related M&A transaction makes the first public disclosure of common or unilateral intent to 
pursue the transaction (no formal agreement is required)” (Definitions Thomson, 2016) and 
retrieved from the Thomson SDC Database. Furthermore, the date of each M&A 
announcement in the following is defined as “event date” or classified as “day zero”. For an 
announcement happening on a non-trading day, the next following trading day is considered 
to be the event day.  
The event window or the period for which the share prices of the involved company are 
examined has to be defined. Existing research about M&A value creation is characterized by a 
wide range of different event windows covering both short term as well as long term even 
windows. Whereas the latter may comprise months or even years around day zero, short term 
event windows only include days or a few months around the event date (Al Masud & Den 
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Hertong, 2014; Tuch & O´Sullivan, 2007). However, the event window is supposed to be 
larger than the event period allowing the examination of the period surrounding the event 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
 According to Shah & Arora (2014) the event window should comprise both the pre-event and 
the post-event period. While the pre-event period takes into account potential leakage of 
information, the post-event period considers delays in the information dissemination 
(Peterson 1989).  
In this thesis a short term event window is applied, in order to improve validity of the results 
obtained. Furthermore, a considerable long pre-event period is included in the event window 
to take into account market anticipation to the takeover and potential information leakage, 
which is more likely to occur in transactions involving emerging market parties due to a 
weaker legal and institutional environment. Short term event windows are preferred to long 
term event windows since according to Andrade et al. (2001) the results are characterized by 
higher statistical significance, while there is less probability that confounding events may 
influence results within the short time period. The event window chosen with reference to the 
approach of Aybar & Ficici (2009) covers 21 trading days comprising the event trading day, 
10 pre-event trading days and 10 post-event trading days (-10,+10). Exhibit 10 illustrates the 
composition of the event window. 
Exhibit 10 − Event Window 
 
4.2.4 Sample Selection 
The detailed process of deriving the samples and subsamples from the data sources is outlined 
in the points 3.2 and 3.3. However, the following criteria are applied in order to determine 
whether a transaction is included or excluded from the samples: 
- Transaction has to be classified as either outbound emerging market, inbound 
emerging market or domestic emerging market M&A (Exhibit 6) 
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- The time period considered comprises 31/01/2000 until 31/01/2016 
- Thomson SDC Database has to provide: date of M&A announcement, SIC-code 
and nation of acquirer and target, transaction volume in $ million, percentage of 
shares acquired, datastream code of acquirer 
- Thomson Reuters Datastream has to provide: daily share prices (dividend 
adjusted) and dates for the acquirers 265 days pre- and 10 days post-acquisition, 
daily prices (dividend adjusted) of the total market index for the referring home 
country of each acquirer 265 days pre- and 10 days post-acquisition 
- The acquiring company has to be listed 
- The transaction volume has to be equal or higher than $20 million. 
- The acquired percentage of shares has to be higher than 50% 
- No compounding merger effects three years following the included transaction 
- No confounding events within the event window period 
- No overlap to existing event window 
4.2.5 Abnormal Return Measurement 
The appraisal of the event’s impact is achieved through the calculation and analysis of the 
abnormal returns for the acquiring company in the event window. The abnormal return equals 
the difference between the actual return of the stock over the event window and the predicted 
normal return, which “is defined as the expected return without conditioning the event taking 
place” (MacKinlay, 1997:15). For company i and the event date t the abnormal return can be 
expressed as: 
                    
Where: 
- Rit is the actual return  
- E(Rit | Xt) is the predicted normal return for the period t. 
Logarithmic Return 
The logarithmic return is used in this thesis to convert daily share and index prices to daily 
returns. More precisely, the return at day t for the security of firm i is computed as the 
difference between the natural logarithm of the closing share price Pit for the security of firm i 
at the day t and the natural logarithm of the closing share price Pi t-1 for the security of firm i at 
the previous day t-1 (Hudson & Gregoriou, 2010): 
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The application of logarithmic returns in contrast to ordinary returns based on simple interest 
over the period leads to several advantages. Logarithmic returns are also interpreted as 
continuously compounded returns. Thus, for non-stochastic processes the frequency of 
compounding is irrelevant enabling an easy comparison of returns across assets. Additionally, 
logarithmic returns are symmetric and contrary to ordinary returns in case of equal magnitude 
but opposite sign cancel each other out (Hudson & Gregoriou, 2010). Finally, Roll (1983) 
shows that the estimation of returns over longer periods based on simple returns leads to 
unsatisfactory results, whereas logarithmic returns are time additive and time series properties 
can easier be derived for additive than for multiplicative processes (Hudson & Gregoriou, 
2010). 
Estimation Window 
To determine the abnormal return and thus the impact of the event, the normal or the expected 
return within the event window assuming the absence of the event needs to be predicted. 
Therefore, the definition of an estimation window is required which usually comprises a 
period prior to the event excluding day zero in order to prevent the event from influencing the 
normal return performance parameter estimates (MacKinlay, 1997).  
In line with the approach of Aybar & Ficici (2009) the estimation window is chosen to start 
265 trading days prior to the event day until the beginning of the event window. Therefore, 
the estimation windows includes an interval of 255 trading days ranging from t=-265 to t=-11 
(-265,-11). Exhibit 11 provides an overview about both the estimation and the event windows. 
Exhibit 11 − Estimation and Event Windows 
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Market Model  
The prediction of normal returns is achieved either through the constant mean or the market 
model (MacKinlay, 1997). In the market model introduced by Fama (1976) the return of a 
security is related to the return of a market portfolio assuming a linear relation between the 
security return and the market return as well as joint normality of asset returns. Usually broad 
based stock indices represent the market portfolio. As explained in point 3.3 for each home 
country of the acquirer the referring total market index provided by Thomson Reuters 
Datastream is used as relevant market portfolio. According to the market model the normal or 
expected return can then be expressed as: 
                    
Where: 
- Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security of firm i and the market portfolio m 
- αi and βi are relationship parameters between individual share and market returns 
-     is the zero mean disturbance term: E(    = 0) , Var(   ) =    
  
As outlined by Bunkanwanicha et al. (2013) in the following the actual returns of the 
referring acquiring company are regressed on the returns of the relevant total market index 
during the estimation window in order to obtain the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 
the market model parameters     and    . Therefore, as next step the abnormal return (ARit) for 
the stock of firm i at the time t can be calculated by applying the following formula: 
                        
Where: 
-      and     are the OLS estimates of the market model parameters. 
Constant Mean Return Model 
In addition to the market model MacKinlay (1997) suggests the constant mean return model in 
order to calculate the abnormal return (AR) for the acquiring company and thus to assess the 
share price impact of the transaction. According to Brown & Warner (1980, 1985) the 
constant mean return model often leads to results similar to more sophisticated models, 
although it is supposed to be very simple. The main assumption of the constant mean return 
model is that the mean return of the acquiring firm’s shares calculated in the estimation period 
remains stable over time. Therefore, the normal or expected return can be expressed as: 
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Where: 
-      is the period t-return on the security of firm i 
-    is the mean return for the security of firm i in the estimation window 
-    is the time period t zero mean disturbance term: E(   = 0) , Var(  ) =    
  
Therefore, the abnormal return (ARit) for each acquiring company i at the time t is computed 
with the difference of the actual period t-return (Rit) on the security of company i and the 
normal expected return (     on security i derived from the mean return (    over the 
estimation window:    
              
In accordance with MacKinlay (1997) the market model is considered to be superior to the 
constant mean return, since it excludes the portion of the return that is related to the variation 
in the market’s return. However, in order to conduct a solid and comprehensive data analysis 
in this thesis the results of both models are analyzed and compared. 
Aggregation of Abnormal Returns 
In order to be able to draw inferences for the M&A announcement events, observations of 
abnormal returns have to be aggregated (MacKinlay, 1997). Aggregation can take place on 
two levels namely through time and across securities of different firms. Aggregation through 
time and for one individual security is achieved through the concept of cumulative abnormal 
return addressing a multiple period event window. Therefore, the cumulative abnormal return 
(CART1T2) between days T1 and T2 is the sum of the abnormal returns of the security of firm i 
between the days T1 and T2: 
                
  
    
 
Aggregation across securities of different firms requires independence of the individual 
cumulative abnormal returns. Therefore, according to MacKinlay (1997) no overlap in the 
event windows of included securities should exist. This is ensured in the sample selection by 
the exclusion of transactions leading to overlapping event windows. Furthermore, the 
following distributional assumptions have to be maintained (MacKinlay, 1997): 
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           ~ N(0,   
 ,(    )) 
After forming all CAR’s security by security aggregation across different securities for N 
events (M&A announcements) through the time period T1 to T2 can be performed to derive 
the cumulative abnormal average return            for the referring time period : 
             
            
 
   
 
 
4.2.6 Significance Tests 
Results obtained through the event study methodology are tested for their statistical 
significance in order to determine the robustness of the results.  
Parametric vs. Nonparametric 
The impact of an event on the returns of companies can be gauged with both parametric as 
well as non-parametric tests which are broad classifications of statistical procedures. Whereas 
parametric tests are based on a set of assumptions about the distribution of the sample 
population, nonparametric tests are not relying on assumptions about the shape or parameters 
of the distribution (Hoskin, 2011). 
The most common parametric assumption is that observations are normally distributed. Due 
to the large size of the total aggregated sample (N = 1434 M&A announcements) and of each 
subsample (N ≥ 102) the assumption of normality is deemed to be valid (Hoskin, 2011). 
Additionally, the mean, minimum, maximum, skewness and excess kurtosis is calculated and 
analyzed for the average daily return of each subsample indicating a normal distribution with 
a stable mean across the subsamples ranging from 0.07% and 0.23%, skewness with no 
significant deviation from 0 and kurtosis centered around 3 (Exhibit 37). Therefore, in this 
thesis a parametric test was chosen. In contrast to nonparametric tests, parametric tests are 
statistically more “powerful” since they have higher probability that the procedure indicates 
association between two variables when they are truly associated. Furthermore, nonparametric 
test results are usually more difficult to interpret than results obtained through parametric 
tests, since the nonparametric approach frequently relies on rankings of values in the data and 
not on the actual data (Hoskin, 2011). 
Parametric test 
Significance tests are applied in order to verify the confirmation or rejection of a null 
hypothesis. More precisely are parametric test suggested by Brown & Warner (1985) is used 
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relying on the assumption that individual company’s abnormal returns are distributed 
normally. The test accounts for cross-sectional dependence (crude adjustment) and thus 
considers dependence across firms’ average residuals the in event time. Due to its easy 
application it is frequently used in several event studies comprising Holthausen (1981) and 
Leftwich (1981) or more recently Georgen and Renneboog (2004) and Bunkanwanicha et al. 
(2013). By assuming independent, identical and normal distribution of abnormal returns the 
test statistics is distributed student-t under the null hypothesis of abnormal returns equal to 
zero.  
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that cross-sectional average abnormal returns (AARs) are 
equal to zero implying that the M&A announcement has no effect on the acquirer’s returns. 
The test statistics is the ratio of AARt for each day t surrounding the event and its standard 
deviation denoted as      . The standard deviation can be estimated from the time series of 
AARs. The AARt on day t in the event window can be expressed as (Mallikarjunappa & 
Panduranga, 2013): 
       
     
 
   
 
   
Where : 
- AARt is the average abnormal return on day t in the event window 
- ARit is the abnormal return on security of firm i on day t 
- N is the total number of securities 
- t represents the days surrounding the event day 
-       is the standard deviation of AARt that can be expressed as: 
       
                   
 
   
     
 
Where :  
-           is the mean of AARs in the estimation period: 
           
 
     
 
   
 
 
   
 
             t= -265 to -11 days   
-      is the average abnormal return on day t in the estimation period 
- T-d are the degrees of freedom or values in calculation of a statistic free to vary  
- T is the number of days in the estimation period, which is equal to 255  
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Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are 
statistically equal to zero. Therefore, the test statistics to determine the statistical significance 
of CAARs can be expressed as the following ratio (Mallikarjunappa & Panduranga, 2013): 
Test statistics = 
    
            
 
Where : 
- T is the number of days over which AARs are cumulated in the event window 
- CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return:                  
-      = standard deviation of AARt (T here equals the number of estimation period 
days): 
     = 
                   
 
   
     
  
Critical Discussion 
Especially event date clustering causing cross-sectional correlation is supposed to negatively 
influence test results (Boehmer et al., 1991). However, as mentioned in point 4.2.4 
overlapping event windows have been excluded from all samples benefitting the test 
assumptions that residuals are uncorrelated and that event induced variance is insignificant. 
Furthermore, as the event window with 21 trading days is relatively short in comparison to the 
estimation period with 255 trading days time series dependence can be considered as a rather 
unimportant factor (Binder, 1998). Finally, in accordance to the approach of Bhagat et al. 
(2011) winsorization was conducted at the 1% level. More precisely, the top 1% extreme 
values obtained were excluded from the sample and the calculation of AARs, CAARs and 
      in order to reduce the harmful effect of spurious outliers. 
4.3 OLS-Regression 
A regression analysis is conducted in order to determine which contextual factors influence 
the value creation patterns observed in the event study in each of the three samples namely 
“domestic emerging markets”, “outbound emerging markets” as well as “inbound emerging 
markets” (Exhibit 6). In the following an overview about cross-sectional regressions is 
provided, followed by the introduction of the dependent variable as well as the description of 
the selected explanatory variables. Finally, the combined regression model is presented. 
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4.3.1 Cross-Sectional Regression Model 
In order to examine the association of the abnormal return magnitude and specific 
characteristics of the event observation a cross-sectional regression model can be applied. 
Therefore, a cross-sectional regression of the abnormal returns on the characteristics of 
interest is conducted (MacKinlay, 1997). For a sample comprising N abnormal return 
observations and M characteristics of interest the regression model can be described as 
(MacKinlay, 2000): 
                               
Where : 
- CARj is the jth cumulative abnormal return observation 
- xmj,m = 1, . . . , M, are M characteristics for the jth observation  
-   is the zero mean disturbance term uncorrelated with x’s 
-   , m = 0,...,M are the regression coefficients  
4.3.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the cross-sectional regression model is the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) obtained at day ten post the acquisition in the event window comprising 21 
trading days around the event date (-10,+10).  
As described in point 4.2.5 the cumulative abnormal return (CART1T2) between days T1 and T2 
is the sum of the abnormal returns of the security of firm i between the days T1 and T2: 
                
  
    
 
4.3.3 Explanatory Variables 
The choice of explanatory variables is mainly based on the analysis of previously discussed 
research focusing on the value impact of M&A announcements on acquiring companies (refer 
to point 2.2.4).  Additionally, the choice is limited to variables for which the necessary input 
data is accessible in the Thomson SDC Database (refer to point 3.2). In the following a short 
description of the variables included in the regression model is provided, while the expected 
influence of these variables on the value creation is expressed in hypotheses. 
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Relative Deal Size 
The variable “relative deal size” is defined as the announced deal value divided by the market 
value of the acquiring firm as of the event day. According to Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) 
and Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011) there is a positive correlation between the value 
of the deal and post-acquisition value creation for acquiring companies (refer to point 2.2.4). 
Therefore, it is assumed that a higher value transaction in relation to the bidding company’s 
market value lead on average to a higher CAR for the acquirer. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive correlation between CAR and relative deal size. 
Corporate Control 
The explanatory variable “corporate control” is defined as the announced percentage of 
ownership acquired by the bidding firm. As previously discussed in point 2.2.4 a positive 
correlation between the ownership stake and bidding firm’s value creation is suggested due to 
less risk for the acquiring company to be expropriated by the management in case of high 
corporate control (Chari et al. 2004, La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, hypothesis 6suggests 
that higher percentage of ownership obtained leads also to higher CAR for the acquiring firm. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive correlation between CAR and corporate control. 
Payment Method 
A distinction is made between three different payment methods namely “cash”, “stock” and 
“combined” (stock and cash). Therefore, a categorical variable comprising three categories is 
established where one of the three categories is classified as control group and for the 
remaining two categories dummy variables are defined. Through the obtained regression 
coefficients a decision can be made whether the impact of each dummy on the CAR is higher 
or below the influence of the control group (Al Masud & den Hertog, 2014). The dummy 
variables can be defined as illustrated in Exhibit 12: 
Exhibit 12 – Dummy Variables Payment Method 
“Cash” 
1 if only cash as payment method 
0 if otherwise 
“Stock” 
1 if only stock as payment method 
0 if otherwise 
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As discussed in point 2.2.4 a combined payment method is expected to be superior in terms of 
acquiring company’s shareholder value generation in comparison to all-cash or all-stock bids 
(Eckbo et al., 1990). Whereas all cash-bids suffer from taxes on capital gains to be paid by the 
target shareholders, information asymmetry is the major drawback of all-stock deals (Feito-
Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2011). Therefore, it is assumed that deals with a combined 
payment method have a more positive influence on the CAR than r cash-only and stock-only 
bids. 
Hypothesis 7a: For M&A announcements with cash as payment method the CAR is 
lower than for announcements with the combined payment method. 
Hypothesis 7b: For M&A announcements with stock as payment method the CAR is 
lower than for announcements with the combined payment method. 
Legal Status of Target Company 
To test the impact of the legal status of the target company a categorical variable is 
established where a dummy variable for public listed firms is defined with the control 
category consisting of non-public target entities as indicated in Exhibit 13. 
Exhibit 13 – Dummy Variable Legal Status 
“Public” 
1 if public listed target company at event day 
0 if otherwise 
According to Bradley & Sundaram (2004) the legal status of the target company has an 
influence on the post-acquisition valuation of the acquiring firm. More precisely, a privately 
held target company on average negatively influences the shareholder value of the acquirer 
possibly due to information asymmetries arising from lower disclosure requirements (refer to 
point 2.4.2). Therefore, it is assumed that the acquisition of a public listed target has a more 
positive influence on the CAR than the acquisition of a non-public listed target. 
Hypothesis 8: For M&A announcements with public listed target companies the CAR 
is higher than for announcements with non-listed target companies. 
Exhibit 38 (Appendix) provides an overview about all stated hypotheses in this thesis. 
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4.3.4 Final Regression Model 
The following multiple regression model is applied in order to determine the impact of the 
explanatory factors described in point 4.3.2 on the dependent variable CAR: 
                                                                   
Additionally, similar to the approach of Bhagat et al. (2011) winsorization was conducted at 
the 5% level. More precisely, statistics were transformed through the limitation of extreme 
values in order to reduce the effect of spurious outliers. 
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5. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
The following chapter first presents and analyzes descriptive statistics about the samples and 
subsamples. In a second step, the empirical findings with reference to the developed 
hypotheses are illustrated, discussed and interpreted. Finally, the results obtained in the OLS-
regressions are presented and debated.   
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics was performed for each of the three individual samples (Exhibit 6). 
More precisely, first the sample size for the three samples and the six subsamples is provided. 
Then the distribution per country is explained and illustrated, followed by the distribution per 
industry. Finally the deal time period as well as the distribution between industry diversifying 
and focused transactions is presented. 
5.1.1 Sample Size 
After consolidating all samples 1,434 M&A announcements are included in the aggregated 
total sample. As specified in Exhibit 14 a distinction is made between three samples which are 
further decomposed into six subsamples. 
Exhibit 14 – Sample and Subsample Size 
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Samples 
For sample 1 with acquiring and target companies coming from emerging markets, also 
classified as “domestic emerging market“ sample, 519 transaction announcements are 
considered. Sample 2 with acquiring company coming from emerging countries and target 
companies from developed countries, classified as “outbound emerging market” sample, 
contains 298 takeover announcements. Furthermore, sample 3 with acquirers from developed 
countries and target companies from emerging countries, classified as “inbound emerging 
market” comprises 617 M&A announcements (Exhibit 14).  
Subsamples 
By further decomposing the three samples into six subsamples through differentiation 
between industry diversifying and focused transactions, subsample 1a referring to 
“diversifying domestic emerging market” and subsample 1b classified as “focused domestic 
emerging market” comprise 275 and 244 takeover announcements respectively. Subsample 2a 
classified as “diversifying outbound emerging market” and subsample 2b referring to 
“focused outbound emerging market” include 196 and 102 transaction announcements 
respectively. Finally, subsample 3a classified as “diversifying inbound emerging market” and 
sample 3b or “focused inbound emerging market” sample contain 339 and 278 M&A 
announcements respectively (Exhibit 14). 
Critical Discussion 
According to Kengelbach et al. (2013) in key emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (BRIC) the number of inbound cross-border deals exceeded the number of 
outbound cross-border deals in the period from 2010 until 2012 supporting the sizes obtained 
in our outbound sample 2 and inbound sample 3. However, while in India the number of 
inbound transactions in the period of 2010 until 2012 also exceeded local transactions 
supporting the larger size of outbound sample 3 in contrast to the domestic sample 1, in 
Brazil, Russia and China local transactions are the predominant M&A type contradicting our 
findings. Especially the fact that in this thesis domestic transactions are defined as transaction 
with both parties coming from emerging market countries but not necessarily from the same 
country might explain this deviation. Furthermore, the exclusion of deals below $20 million 
transaction value is likely to negatively affect the size of the “domestic emerging market” 
sample 1, whereas “inbound emerging markets” M&A contained in sample 3 are supposed to 
have a larger transaction value and thus are less affected. According to Khandewal et al. 
(2015) the average deal value for a domestic Indian transaction amounted to $14.1 million in 
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2013, whereas the average inbound cross-border transaction value was almost five times 
larger with $67.7 million in 2013. 
5.1.2 Average Daily Returns 
Exhibit 37 provides an overview about descriptive statistics for acquiring companies’ daily 
returns across all samples and subsamples for both the estimation and the event window. 
Domestic vs. Inbound vs. Outbound 
Exhibit 37 illustrates that on an aggregated basis both “domestic emerging markets” (Panel A) 
acquiring firms as well as “inbound emerging markets” (Panel C) acquiring firms achieve 
within the event window a higher mean daily average return than in the estimation period. 
More precisely, the mean daily average return for Panel A and Panel C acquiring companies 
in the estimation period is 0.09% and 0.07% respectively, whereas the referring mean daily 
return in the event window assumes a value of 0.22% and 0.12% respectively. In contrast to 
that “outbound emerging markets” (Panel B) acquiring firms achieve on an aggregated basis a 
mean daily average return in the event window of 0.07%, whereas in the estimation period the 
referring mean daily average return with 0.06% is slightly lower. 
Furthermore, for acquiring firms of Panels A,B and C on a aggregated basis the minimum 
average daily return within the the estimation period is with -0.36%, -0.35% and -0.32% 
respectively more negative than in the event window with -0.11%, -0.21% and -0.23% 
respectively. Additionally, on an aggregated basis the maximum daily average return within 
the event window for acquiring companies in Panels A−C is with 0.64%, 0.67% and 0.96% 
respectively higher than in the estimation period with 0.57%, 0.63% and 0.38% respectively. 
Moreover, Exhibit 37 illustrates that on average the skewness coefficient of the daily average 
returns in the estimation period for acquiring companies of Panel A, B and C is 0.00, 0.01 and 
-0.08 respectively, indicating a very small right-skewed distribution for Panel B daily average 
returns and a slightly left-skewed distribution for Panel C daily average returns. In contrast to 
that daily average returns in the event window for Panels A, B and C follow a slightly right-
skewed distribution and the skewness coefficient assumes positive values with 0.13, 1.19 and 
1.87.  
Exhibit 37 reveals that on average, excess kurtosis is smaller than 3 (negative excess kurtosis) 
for Panel A, B and C acquiring companies’ daily average returns in the estimation period with 
0.05, -0.12 and 0.07 indicating a platykurtic distribution. In the event window negative excess 
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kurtosis with -0.81 and 0.84 is also obtained for Panel A and B, whereas a slightly leptokurtic 
distribution is obtained for Panel C daily average returns with a value of 4.62. 
In the following the question is addressed how these descriptive statistics can be interpreted in 
relation to the first three hypotheses formulated. However, since descriptive statistics relates 
to average daily returns while abnormal returns are addressed only in point 5.2 no final 
conclusion can be drawn and merely assumptions on the following analysis are provided: 
Hypothesis 1: The CAAR for the acquirer in the short term around the announcement 
date is larger or equal to zero. 
While the descriptive statistics presented in Exhibit 37 support this hypothesis for Panel A and 
Panel C acquiring companies, Panel B acquiring firms engaged in “outbound emerging 
markets” acquisitions seem to destroy shareholder value indicated by a decrease in the mean 
daily average return of 0.07% in the estimation period to 0.06% in the event window. 
Hypothesis 2: The CAAR for acquirers engaged in outbound emerging markets 
acquisitions is larger than the CAAR for acquirers from emerging 
markets engaged in domestic emerging markets M&A. 
According to the results obtained in Exhibit 37 the opposite has to be assumed. Whereas for 
acquiring companies engaged in “domestic emerging markets” (Panel A) bidding firms the 
mean daily average return increases from the estimation period with 0.09% to 0.22% in the 
event window, for “outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms a decrease from 0.07% to 
0.06% in referring period can be observed. 
Hypothesis 3: The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets in inbound emerging 
markets acquisitions is larger than the CAAR for acquirers from 
emerging markets in outbound emerging markets acquisitions. 
Descriptive statistics of the referring samples in Exhibit 37 supports the hypothesis. Whereas 
for “outbound emerging markets” acquiring companies the mean daily average return 
decreases from the estimation to the event window, for “inbound emerging markets” 
acquiring firms from developed countries a small increase from 0.07% in the estimation 
period to 0.12% in the event window is observed. 
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Diversifying vs. Focused 
Whereas for acquiring companies in Panels A,B and C engaged in an industry diversifying 
takeover the mean daily average return increases from 0.11%, 0.07% and 0.07% respectively 
in the estimation window to 0.23%, 0.10% and 0.16% respectively in the event window, a 
similar pattern for focused transactions can only be observed for acquirers engaged in 
“domestic emerging markets” transactions with an increase from 0.08% to 0.20%. For 
industry focused takeovers and Panel B and C acquiring companies a decrease in the mean 
daily average return from the estimation period with 0.08% and 0.06% respectively to -0.01% 
and 0.04% occurs (Exhibit 37).  
Furthermore, for acquiring companies, independent on the Panel and on a diversifying or 
focused M&A strategy, the minimum daily average return increases from the estimation to the 
event window (Exhibit 37). 
 For industry diversifying M&A strategies the maximum daily average return increases only 
for emerging markets inbound and outbound acquirers from 0.76% and 0.64% respectively in 
the estimation window to 1.10% and 1.35% respectively in the event window, whereas for 
domestic emerging markets bidding firms the maximum daily average return decreases from 
0.83% to 0.68% (Exhibit 37). 
For industry focused M&A strategies the maximum daily return behaves exactly the opposite. 
More precisely, while for domestic emerging markets acquiring companies engaged in 
industry focused transactions the maximum daily average return increases from 0.70% in the 
estimation window to 0.77% in the event window, for Panel B and C acquirers engaged in 
emerging market inbound and outbound focused M&A it decreases from 0.83% and 0.88% 
respectively to 0.58% and 0.74% respectively (Exhibit 37). 
In the following it is outlined how these finding relate to the hypotheses developed focusing 
on the value impact of industry diversifying and focused takeovers. 
Hypothesis 4a: The CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets engaged in industry 
diversifying emerging markets outbound acquisitions is larger than the 
CAAR in industry focused outbound acquisitions. 
Based on the results presented in Exhibit 37 hypothesis 4a can be supported. Whereas for 
outbound emerging markets acquirers following an industry diversifying M&A strategy mean 
daily average return increase from 0.07% in the estimation window to 0.10% in the event 
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window, for the referring acquiring firms following a focused M&A strategy the referring 
return decreases from 0.08% to -0.01%. 
Hypothesis 4b: The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets engaged in industry 
diversifying emerging markets inbound acquisitions is larger than the 
CAAR in industry focused inbound acquisitions. 
The descriptive statistics illustrated in Exhibit 37 supports hypothesis 4b. While for inbound 
emerging markets acquirers following an industry diversifying M&A strategy the mean daily 
average return increases from 0.07% in the estimation window to 0.16% in the event window, 
for the referring acquiring companies engaged in a focused M&A strategy the referring return 
decreases from 0.06% to 0.04% 
Hypothesis 4c: The difference between industry diversifying and focused CAARs is 
larger for outbound acquirers from emerging markets than for inbound 
bidding companies from developed markets. 
Based on the results from the descriptive statistics in Exhibit 37 it is difficult to make further 
assumptions regarding hypothesis 4c. However, for inbound emerging markets bidding firms 
the increase for the diversifying M&A strategy in the mean daily average return from 
estimation to event window is larger with 0.09% than for outbound emerging markets 
acquirers with 0.03%. However, the decrease for the focused strategy is with -0.02% smaller 
than in the case of outbound emerging markets bidders with -0.09%. Therefore, the difference 
between diversifying and focused M&A announcements in the mean daily average returns 
increased for outbound bidding firms from -0.01% (=0.07-0.08%) in the event window to 
0.11% (=0.10% - (-0.01%)), whereas for inbound acquirers from 0.01% (0.07%-0.06%) to 
0.12% (0.16%-0.04%). Therefore, by referring to the “difference-in-difference”, described by 
Ashenfelter & Card (1985) as the observation of outcomes for two groups comparing two 
periods, it can be stated that the difference between diversifying and focused M&A 
announcements in the mean daily average return for outbound acquirers rose by 0.12% 
(0.11%-(-0.01%)) from estimation to event window, whereas the referring difference for 
inbound acquirers rose to a slightly smaller extent by 0.11% (0.12%-0.01%) indicating that 
hypothesis 4c potentially cannot be rejected in the following (Exhibit 37). 
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5.1.3 Distribution per Target Country 
Exhibit 15 provides an overview about the target companies’ distribution per country for each 
of the three samples namely “domestic emerging markets”, “outbound emerging markets” as 
well as “inbound emerging markets”. 
Samples 
The first sample covering 519 emerging markets M&A announcements with acquirer and 
target coming from emerging markets is dominated by Chinese target companies with 42.8% 
of all target firms coming from this region. Other relevant target countries are South Korea 
(13.3%), Brazil (6.9%), Malaysia (6.6%), Russia (5.2%), India (4.2%) and Taiwan (3.1%). 
Sample 2 comprising in total 298 transaction announcements with acquiring firms from 
emerging markets and target firms from developed countries mainly  includes targets from the 
Exhibit 15 − Country Distribution Target Companies 
Sample 1 
Domestic Emerging Markets 
Sample 2 
Outbound Emerging Markets 
Sample 3 
Inbound Emerging Markets 
Target Nation N % Target Nation N % Target Nation N % 
China 
South Korea 
Brazil 
Malaysia 
Russia 
India 
Taiwan 
South Africa 
Poland 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Philippines 
Chile 
Mexico 
Greece 
Peru 
Colombia 
Czech Rep. 
Egypt 
UAE 
Qatar 
 
Total 
222 
69 
36 
34 
27 
22 
16 
14 
12 
11 
10 
8 
7 
6 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
 
519 
42.8 
13.3 
6.9 
6.6 
5.2 
4.2 
3.1 
2.7 
2.3 
2.1 
1.9 
1.5 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
 
100.0 
USA 
Canada 
Singapore 
UK 
Hong Kong 
Australia 
Italy 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Japan 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Austria 
France 
Denmark 
Finland 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Norway 
Ireland Rep. 
Isreal 
New Zealand 
Sweden 
Total 
80 
31 
29 
29 
28 
23 
12 
11 
9 
8 
7 
6 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
298 
26.8 
10.4 
9.7 
9.7 
9.4 
7.7 
4.0 
3.7 
3.0 
2.7 
2.3 
2.0 
1.3 
1.3 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.7 
0.7 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
100.0 
China 
Brazil 
India 
Russia 
South Africa 
Mexico 
Chile 
Poland 
Turkey 
Malaysia 
Taiwan 
Colombia 
Czech Rep. 
Thailand 
Egypt 
Philippines 
UAE 
Hungary 
Greece 
 
 
 
 
Total 
181 
69 
46 
39 
35 
32 
30 
30 
28 
26 
24 
16 
15 
14 
8 
7 
7 
6 
4 
 
 
 
 
617 
29.3 
11.2 
7.5 
6.3 
5.7 
5.2 
4.9 
4.9 
4.5 
4.2 
3.9 
2.6 
2.4 
2.3 
1.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
0.6 
 
 
 
 
100.0 
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USA (26.8%) and Canada (10.4%) followed by diverse regions including Singapore (9.7%), 
United Kingdom (9.7%), Hong Kong (9.4%) and Australia (7.7%). European target 
companies mainly come from Italy (4.0%), Germany (3.7%), the Netherlands (3.0%), Spain 
(2.3%) and Switzerland (2.0%). Finally, in sample 3 containing 617 takeover announcements 
of emerging country targets and developed country bidding firms the target companies mainly 
come from China (29.3%) followed by Brazil (11.2%), India (7.5%), Russia(6.3%), South 
Africa (5.7%), Mexico (5.2%), Chile (4.9%) and Poland (4.9%).  
Critical Discussion 
The fact that China is the major target for M&A activity within emerging markets is line with 
the country’s status as biggest emerging economy, while newly industrialized emerging 
countries such as South Korea and Taiwan become more and more liberal towards M&A 
activities (Cao, 2007).  
Furthermore the result that Singapore and Hong Kong are among the major targets of 
emerging markets acquiring companies is consistent to findings of Di Giovanni (2005) and 
Hijzen et al. (2008) showing that geographical distance decreases investment activity. 
Additionally, North America and Western Europe as major target for emerging market 
acquiring companies confirms existing statistics about emerging markets outbound M&A 
activities (Deloitte China, 2016). According to EY (2015) USA, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Germany and the Netherlands are major target countries in cross-border transactions 
completed in a period from 2004 until 2013 supporting the findings in Exhibit 15. 
Finally, the target country distribution within sample 3 is consistent to results suggested by 
Luo & Tung (2007) illustrating that emerging countries such as India, China, Brazil, South 
Africa, and Russia became attractive targets for foreign acquirers due to the realization of 
several economic reforms (refer to point 1.3). Furthermore a study conducted by A.T. Kearney 
(2008) shows that developed country acquirers engaged in inbound emerging markets M&A 
mainly target China, India, Poland, Brazil, Mexico and Russia. 
5.1.4 Distribution per Acquiring Country 
Exhibit 16 illustrates the acquiring firms’ distribution per country in all of the three samples. 
Samples 
As expected sample 1 classified as “domestic emerging markets” including a total number of    
519 takeover announcements with acquirers and target firms from emerging markets is mainly 
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Exhibit 16 – Country Distribution Acquiring Companies 
Sample 1 
Domestic Emerging Markets 
Sample 2 
Outbound Emerging Markets 
Sample 3 
Inbound Emerging Markets 
Acquirer nation  N % Acquirer nation N % Acquirer nation N % 
China 
South Korea 
Brazil 
Malaysia 
Russia 
India 
Taiwan 
South Africa 
Poland 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Chile 
Mexico 
Greece 
Turkey 
Peru 
Colombia 
Egypt 
UAE 
Czech Rep. 
Hungary 
Qatar 
Total 
221 
72 
33 
31 
26 
25 
17 
15 
13 
10 
8 
8 
7 
7 
6 
6 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
519 
42.6 
13.9 
6.4 
6.0 
5.0 
4.8 
3.3 
2.9 
2.5 
1.9 
1.5 
1.5 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
100.0 
China 
India 
South Africa 
Malaysia 
Russia 
South Korea 
Brazil 
Poland 
Taiwan 
Philippines 
Mexico 
Thailand 
Greece 
Colombia 
Indonesia 
UAE 
Turkey 
Chile 
Egypt 
Hungary 
Peru 
Qatar 
 
Total 
66 
55 
29 
23 
22 
20 
16 
9 
9 
8 
7 
7 
6 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
298 
22.1 
18.5 
9.7 
7.7 
7.4 
6.7 
5.4 
3.0 
3.0 
2.7 
2.3 
2.3 
2.0 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.0 
0.7 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
 
100.0 
USA 
Hong Kong 
UK 
Japan 
France 
Canada 
Singapore 
Spain 
Australia 
Italy 
Germany 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
Finland 
Norway 
Austria 
Ireland Rep. 
Denmark 
Israel 
Portugal 
New Zealand 
Total 
133 
81 
72 
47 
37 
36 
34 
28 
20 
19 
17 
17 
14 
11 
10 
9 
9 
7 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1 
617 
21.6 
13.1 
11.7 
7.6 
6.0 
5.8 
5.5 
4.5 
3.2 
3.1 
2.8 
2.8 
2.3 
1.8 
1.6 
1.5 
1.5 
1.1 
1.0 
0.6 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
100.0 
 
dominated by Chinese acquirers (42.6%). Additionally, acquirers from South Korea (13.9%), 
Brazil (6.4%), Malaysia (6.0%), Russia (5.0%) and India (4.8%) have major stakes in the 
sample. Bidding companies from emerging countries with target companies in developed 
countries in sample 2, classified as “outbound emerging markets”, mainly come from either 
China (22.1%) or India (18.5%). Additionally, acquiring companies coming from countries 
such as South Africa (9.7%), Malaysia (7.7%), Russia (7.4%), South Korea (6.7%) and Brazil 
(5.4%) are major part of sample 2. Finally, the “inbound emerging markets” sample 3 
comprises Western acquiring companies mainly coming from the USA (21.6%), United 
Kingdom (11.7%), France (6.0%), Canada (5.8%), Spain (4.5%) and Australia (3.2%). 
Additionally, bidding firms from developed markets in Asia such as Hong Kong (13.1%), 
Japan (7.6%) and Singapore (5.5%) are a major part of sample 3 which is probably due to 
their geographical proximity to the Asian emerging markets (Exhibit 16).  
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Critical Discussion 
China’s dominance as acquiring company in “domestic emerging markets” and “outbound 
emerging markets” transactions can be explained through its status as largest economy in the 
emerging markets indicated by approximately 3,500 companies classified as multinational, 
while also Russia with 1,000, India with 815 and Brazil with 220 multinational enterprises are 
non negligible players (Sauvant et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, Chinese leadership among emerging markets in “outbound emerging markets” 
M&A activity is also based on the government’s outward FDI policy system promoting and 
supporting Chinese companies to engage in outbound M&A activities (refer to point 1.3). 
Similar policies can be found in M&A leading emerging market countries such as India, 
Malaysia and Russia. Furthermore, the raise of “sovereign wealth funds” which are state 
owned investment funds increasingly engaged in foreign equity investments and growing 
especially in countries such as Russia, Malaysia, China and India explains the relatively high 
outbound M&A deal activity of these countries (A.T. Kearney, 2008). 
The large share of Asian developed markets such as Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore is in 
accordance with findings of Di Giovanni (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2008) indicating that M&A 
activity is negative correlated to geographical distance. Furthermore, the country distribution 
in sample 3 confirms the early path of internationalization for multinational enterprises 
coming mainly from advanced markets in the US, Europe and Japan as well as from more 
recently industrialized economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
5.1.5 Distribution per Target Industry 
Exhibit 17 provides an overview about the industry distribution of the target companies 
analyzed in all of the three samples. 
Samples 
In sample 1 covering 519 “domestic emerging market” transaction announcements the target 
companies are mainly operating in the Industrials (14.6%), Materials (14.5%), High-
Technology (14.1%) and the Financials (12.1%) industries, whereas e.g. the Consumer 
Products (3.9%) and Retail (3.7%) industries are less represented. For the 298 “outbound 
emerging markets” M&A announcements in sample 2 targets mainly come from the Materials 
(22.5%), High-Technology (16.1%), Financials (14.1%), Industrials (9.7%), Energy (9.4%) 
and Consumer Staples (8.7%) segments. Finally, the 617 takeover announcements of 
developed countries acquirers  purchasing emerging  market target firms included in sample 3  
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Exhibit 17 – Industry Distribution Target Companies 
Sample 1 
Domestic Emerging Markets 
Sample 2 
Outbound Emerging Markets 
Sample 3 
Inbound Emerging Markets 
Target industry N % Target Industry N % Target Industry N % 
Industrials 
Materials 
High-Tech 
Financials 
Energy  
Consumer Staples 
Real Estate 
Media&Entertainm. 
Healthcare 
Telecommunication 
Consumer Products  
Retail 
Total 
76 
75 
73 
63 
40 
37 
36 
28 
27 
25 
20 
19 
519 
14.6 
14.5 
14.1 
12.1 
7.7 
7.1 
6.9 
5.4 
5.2 
4.8 
3.9 
3.7 
100.0 
Materials 
High-Tech 
Financials 
Industrials 
Energy 
Consumer Staples 
Consumer Products 
Healthcare 
Retail 
Real Estate 
Media&Entertainm. 
Telecommunications 
Total 
67 
48 
42 
29 
28 
26 
17 
13 
12 
7 
5 
4 
298 
22.5 
16.1 
14.1 
9.7 
9.4 
8.7 
5.7 
4.4 
4.0 
2.3 
1.7 
1.3 
100.0 
Materials 
Financials 
Industrials 
Consumer Staples 
Energy 
High-Tech 
Consumer Products 
Healthcare 
Media&Entertainm. 
Retail 
Real Estate 
Telecommunications 
Total 
118 
88 
72 
64 
61 
57 
39 
31 
23 
22 
21 
21 
617 
19.1 
14.3 
11.7 
10.4 
9.9 
9.2 
6.3 
5.0 
3.7 
3.6 
3.4 
3.4 
100.0 
mainly comprise target firms operating in industries such as Materials (19.1%), Financials 
(14.3%), Industrials (11.7%), Consumer Staples (10.4%), Energy (9.9%) and High-
Technology (9.2%) (Exhibit 17).  
Critical Discussion 
In sum there is a very similar target firm industry distribution across all three samples with 
takeovers of companies mainly operating in the Industrials, Materials, High-Technology, 
Financials, Energy and Consumer Staples industries (Exhibit 17). This is in line with a study 
conducted by A.T. Kearney (2008) suggesting that acquirers from both emerging and 
developed markets target the same industries when engaging in cross-border acquisitions.  
According to the Emerging Markets M&A Review conducted by Andrade (2015) target 
companies in “domestic emerging markets” M&A mainly come from the Industrials, 
Financials, Energy and Power as well as the High-Technology industries supporting the 
targets’ industry distribution in sample 1 illustrated in Exhibit 17. 
 Furthermore, Bhagat et al. (2011) show that in a period from 1991 until 2008 major target 
industries from emerging market acquirers engaged in outbound M&A are the Financials, 
Materials and Consumer Staples segments which is consistent to the distribution found in 
sample 2 (Exhibit 17). Similar results are obtained for Chinese outbound M&A activities 
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published by Deloitte (2016) showing that Technology, Manufacturing and Consumer 
Business assets were the most attractive in mature markets for Chinese outbound investors.  
The target company industry distribution obtained for sample 3 (Exhibit 17) is confirmed by a 
study conducted by Jian et al. (2012) indicating that developed country acquiring firms 
especially focus on Chinese targets from the Materials, Energy, High-Technology and 
Industrial industries. 
5.1.6 Distribution per Acquiring Industry 
Exhibit 18 illustrates the acquiring firms’ industry distribution in all of the three samples. 
Exhibit 18 – Industry Distribution Acquiring Companies 
Sample 1 
Domestic Emerging Markets 
Sample 2 
Outbound Emerging Markets 
Sample 3 
Inbound Emerging Markets 
Acquirer industry N % Acquirer Industry N % Acquirer Industry N % 
Materials 
Industrials 
High-Tech 
Financials 
Consumer Staples 
Energy 
Real Estate 
Telecommunication 
Healthcare 
Media&Entertainm. 
Consumer Products  
Retail 
 
Total 
83 
80 
65 
61 
43 
41 
29 
29 
27 
23 
19 
19 
 
519 
16.0 
15.4 
12.5 
11.8 
8.3 
7.9 
5.6 
5.6 
5.2 
4.4 
3.7 
3.7 
 
100.0 
Materials 
High-Tech 
Industrials 
Energy 
Consumer Staples 
Financials 
Healthcare 
Consumer Products 
Retail 
Real Estate 
Media&Entertainm. 
Telecommunication 
 
Total 
65 
54 
34 
31 
28 
26 
18 
17 
9 
7 
5 
4 
 
298 
21.8 
18.1 
11.4 
10.4 
9.4 
8.7 
6.0 
5.7 
3.0 
2.3 
1.7 
1.3 
 
100.0 
Materials 
Financials 
Industrials 
Consumer Staples 
Energy 
High-Tech 
Healthcare 
Consumer Products 
Telecommunications 
Real Estate 
Retail 
Media&Entertainm. 
Government Agency 
Total 
121 
83 
75 
69 
64 
59 
34 
28 
28 
22 
17 
16 
1 
617 
19.6 
13.5 
12.2 
11.2 
10.4 
9.6 
5.5 
4.5 
4.5 
3.6 
2.8 
2.6 
0.2 
100.0 
 
Samples 
Acquiring companies included in sample 1 focusing on 519 “domestic emerging markets” 
M&A announcements are mainly operating in the Materials (16.0%), Industrials (15.4%), 
High-Technology (12.5%), Financials (11.8%), Consumer Staples (8.3%) and Energy (7.9%) 
industries. In sample 2 comprising 298 “outbound emerging market” takeover announcements 
acquiring companies are especially coming from the Materials (21.8%) and High-Technology 
(18.1%) industries followed by the Industrials (11.4%), Energy (10.4%), Consumer Staples 
(9.4%) and the Financials (8.7%) segments. Finally, in sample 3 containing 617 “inbound 
emerging market” transaction announcements acquiring companies are mainly operating in 
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the Materials (19.6%) segment followed by Financials (13.5%), Industrials (12.2%), 
Consumer Staples (11.2%), Energy (10.4%) and High-Technology (9.6%) industries (Exhibit 
18).  
Critical Discussion 
To summarize, industry distribution for acquiring companies is very homogeneous across the 
three samples with major industries comprising the Industrials, Materials, High-Technology, 
Financials, Energy and Consumer Staples industries (Exhibit 18). A research report published 
by Dunne et al. (2012) illustrates that especially acquiring companies from the High-
Technology, Financials, Consumer Products and Services industries engage in both “domestic 
emerging markets” and “outbound emerging markets” M&A which is consistent with the 
findings obtained in sample 1 and 2 presented in Exhibit 18. 
Furthermore, in line with the results obtained for sample 3 (Exhibit 18), a study conducted by 
EY (2015) shows that US acquiring companies engaged in cross-broder transactions mainly 
come from the Financials, Industrials, Healthcare, High-Technology, Consumer Staples and 
Materials industries. 
5.1.7 Time Distribution 
Exhibit 19 presents the time distribution of M&A announcements in all of the three samples. 
Exhibit 19 – Deal Distribution Over Time 
Sample 1 
Domestic Emerging Markets 
Sample 2 
Outbound Emerging Markets 
Sample 3 
Inbound Emerging Markets 
Time Period N % Time Period N % Time Period N % 
2012−2016 
2008 −2012 
2004−2008 
2000−2004 
Total 
216 
153 
99 
51 
519 
41.6 
29.5 
19.1 
9.8 
100.0 
2012−2016 
2008 −2012 
2004−2008 
2000−2004 
Total 
109 
90 
75 
24 
298 
36.6 
30.2 
25.2 
8.1 
100.0 
2012−2016 
2008 −2012 
2004−2008 
2000−2004 
Total 
124 
199 
188 
106 
617 
20.1 
32.3 
30.5 
17.2 
100.0 
Samples 
For sample 1 and 2 both referring to M&A activities initiated by acquiring companies from 
emerging markets the M&A announcement frequency increases with time. More precisely, in 
the period from 2012−2016 a larger number of transaction announcements with 216 and 109 
for sample 1 and sample 2 respectively is observed compared to the first period from 
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2000−2004 with 51 and 24 for sample 1 and sample 2 respectively. For sample 3 and 
“inbound emerging markets” M&A announcements a different pattern occurs. While for the 
first three periods from 2000 −2012 an increase in deal frequency is observable, there is a 
slowdown of almost -37.7% in the deal frequency comparing the period 2008−2012 with the 
latest period from 2012−2016 (Exhibit 19).  
Critical Discussion 
In accordance to the time distribution shown in sample 1 and 2 (Exhibit 19) research results 
indicate high growth rates for both domestic and outbound M&A emerging market activities. 
A study conducted by Kengelbach et al. (2013) illustrates that the value of M&A transactions 
with emerging markets involvement increased from $250 billion in the year 2000 to $400 
billion in the year 2012, while especially in China, Brazil and Russia local domestic 
transactions are the predominant transaction type with 62%, 61% and 56% of total M&A. 
Additionally, a study from KPMG (2016) suggests ongoing growth in the number of 
transactions comprising both acquirer and target coming from emerging markets with an 
increase of 25% from 2014 to 2015.  
According to Bhagat et al. (2011) emerging markets outbound cross border M&A value 
increased from $37 billion in 2004 to $182 billion in 2008 equaling a growth of 392% and 
confirming the time distribution findings for sample 2 presented in Exhibit 19. Furthermore, 
outbound emerging market M&A continues to grow especially driven by the activity of 
Central Eastern European (CEE), Russian and Chinese acquiring firms (KPMG, 2016). 
According to KPMG (2016) the slower growth rates in China, the low interest rate 
environment in the USA in combination with continuing political uncertainties in emerging 
countries such as Russia and Brazil currently prevents developed markets investors from 
acquiring emerging market targets. Especially in China, the key target country for developed 
countries acquirers (Exhibit 19) flight of capital, fluctuating inflation, rising labor costs as 
well as the uncertainty related to the regulatory approval system lead to a decrease in inbound 
cross-border M&A activities (Dusek et al., 2013). 
5.1.8 M&A Strategy Distribution 
Exhibit 20 illustrates the distribution between industry diversifying and focused M&A 
announcements in all of the three samples. 
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Exhibit 20 – Distribution of M&A Strategies 
Sample 1 
Domestic Emerging Markets 
Sample 2 
Outbound Emerging Markets 
Sample 3 
Inbound Emerging Markets 
M&A Form N % M&A Form N % M&A Design N % 
Diversified 
Focused 
Total 
375 
144 
519 
72.3 
27.7 
100.0 
Diversified 
Focused 
Total 
201 
97 
298 
67.4 
32.6 
100.0 
Diversified 
Focused 
Total 
390 
227 
617 
63.2 
36.8 
100.0 
Samples 
Sample 1 comprising “domestic emerging markets” M&A announcements includes with 
72.3% a significantly higher portion of industry diversifying takeover announcements than 
focused with 27.7%. Similar but slightly less extreme results are obtained for sample 2 with 
67.4% of all transaction announcements being diversifying and 32.6% being industry focused. 
Finally, sample 3 including “inbound emerging markets” M&A announcements shows the 
smallest difference in the distribution among industry diversifying and focused takeover 
announcements with 63.2% and 36.8% respectively (Exhibit 20).  
Critical Discussion 
The findings are in accordance with existing research indicating that especially emerging 
markets companies being in the initial stage of diversification benefit from an increase in 
market power while the lack of financial and market intermediaries in combination with a 
weak legal and institutional environment triggers the industry diversification needs (refer to 
point 2.4.2). Since developed markets companies usually do not suffer from these 
imperfections in the governmental and market systems, they rather seek for efficiency 
improvements in related industries explaining the relatively low share of industry diversifying 
M&A announcements in sample 3 compared to sample 1 and 2 (Exhibit 20).  
5.2 Main Findings 
In this chapter, first results obtained in the event study, referring to the general impact of 
acquisition announcements on value creation in the aggregated total sample, are presented and 
analyzed, followed by a distinction between outbound and domestic emerging markets as well 
as between outbound and inbound emerging markets. In a next step, the impact of an industry 
diversification strategy is compared with the impact of an industry focused M&A strategy.  
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5.2.1 General Value Impact of M&A Announcements 
Exhibit 39 (Appendix) presents both average abnormal daily returns (AARs) and cumulative 
average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) of acquiring firms in the total aggregated sample 
during the event window period, while comparing AARs and CAARs obtained through the 
market model with AARs and CAARs calculated through the constant mean model.  
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
Results suggest that especially around the event day (day zero) the AARs in both the market 
and the constant mean model assume positive values significant different from zero on the 
level of 1%. These positive AARs assume higher values for the market model with 0.32%, 
0.65% and 0.50%, while also stretching over a longer period starting two days prior to the 
event until day one post the event (-2, +1). In the first days of the event window ( -10,-3) prior 
to the M&A announcement both models do with one exception not indicate statistically 
significant AARs suggesting that there is no clear value impact of the M&A announcement in 
this period of trading days (Exhibit 39 in Appendix). Similar results are obtained in the end of 
the event period (+4, +10) post the acquisition announcement implying that the value impact 
of the M&A announcement is limited to a short period around the event day (-2, +1). The fact 
that AARs are already observed two days prior to the actual announcement of the takeover is 
frequently observed in similar studies (e.g. Akben-Selcuk, 2014; Bhagat et al., 2011; Schipper 
& Thompson, 1983). The reason is very likely potential leakage of information since a large 
fraction of the sample comprises acquiring companies listed in developing markets with a 
weaker legal and institutional system (Peterson 1989). 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
The development of the acquiring firms’ CAAR obtained through both the market and the 
constant mean model in the event window for the aggregated sample is illustrated in Exhibit 
21. Additionally, the referring values and significance tests are presented in Exhibit 39 
(Appendix). The results presented in Exhibit 39 (Appendix) suggest that the CAAR for 
acquiring firms in the aggregated sample over the event period of 21 trading days (-10, +10) 
assumes a positive value of 1.69% and 1.38% ten days post the acquisition  announcement in 
the market and the constant mean model respectively. However, the CAAR is statistically 
significant on the level of 1% only in the case of the market model, whereas for the constant 
mean model no statistical significance is obtained. The CAAR is in both models driven by 
abnormal daily returns achieved in a period (-1,+1) within the event window, whereas in the 
beginning of the event period (-10, -2) and in the end of the time frame (+2,+10) the CAAR is  
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Exhibit 21 − CAAR Development for Aggregated Sample 
 
 
Presented are the cumulative abnormal daily returns (CAARs) for acquiring 
companies in the aggregated sample. It is distinguished between the CAARs 
obtained through the market model and trough the constant mean model. The 21-
days event window is presented on the horizontal axis. 
more or less stable indicated by not significant abnormal returns (Exhibit 21; Exhibit 39 in 
Appendix). 
Hypothesis Decision 
Therefore, based on the empirical findings presented hypothesis 1 concerning the transaction 
announcement impact on the acquiring company’s shareholder value cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 1: The CAAR for the acquirer in the short term around the announcement 
date is larger or equal to zero. 
More precisely, the more sophisticated market model suggests a positive CAAR on day ten 
post the acquisition announcement for the acquiring companies of 1.69 statistically significant 
on the 1% level. Therefore, acquirers in the aggregated sample on average create shareholder 
value through M&A announcements in the short term around the event date. In our 
aggregated sample this value creation is mainly limited to a period of three event period 
trading days starting one day one prior to the event and ending one day post the event (-1, +1).  
Critical Discussion 
These findings can contribute to the contradictory results in existing literature about the value 
creation of M&A for acquiring companies (refer to point 2.2.3). Since to a large extent the 
sample of this thesis contains emerging market acquirers and both most recent studies as well 
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as research about emerging market bidding firms suggests value creation, the confirmation of 
hypothesis 1 is consistent to current research in this field (e.g. Aybar & Thanakijsombat, 
2015; Chari et al., 2004; Jain et al., 2014; Tauseef & Nihast, 2014). Furthermore, the 
sophistication of the market model in comparison to the simple constant mean model as 
suggested by MacKinlay (1997) can be confirmed. For both, AARs and CAARs the market 
model yields to a higher quantity of statistically significant results that are additionally 
consistent and thus validated with results of comparable research studies. 
5.2.2 Domestic vs. Outbound M&A  
Exhibit 40 (Appendix) presents AARs and CAARs for acquiring companies engaged in 
“domestic emerging markets” (Panel A) and “outbound emerging markets” (Panel B) M&A 
during the event window period, while comparing daily AARs and CAARs obtained through 
the market model with AARs and CAARs calculated through the constant mean model. 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
The results suggest that Panel A acquiring firms with the market model approach benefit from 
statistically significant positive AARs in the short term prior and post the event day (-2,+1) as 
well as to the end of the event window period post the acquisition announcement (+6,+8), 
whereas acquiring companies engaged in “outbound emerging markets” M&A solely achieve 
positive AARs significant different from zero in a period of one day prior to the event day 
until one day post the acquisition announcement (-1,+1). The results are almost similar for the 
constant mean model, while the AARs tend to assume lower values and are less statistically 
significant (Exhibit 40 in Appendix). However, independent on the model applied for both 
Panel A and Panel B acquiring companies the highest and most statistically significant AARs 
are achieved on the M&A announcement day with 0.61% and 0.55% as well as 0.72% and 
0.60% respectively. 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
Exhibit 22 illustrates the development of both “domestic emerging markets” as well as 
“outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms’ CAARs during the event window period with 
application of the market model, whereas Exhibit 23 presents the referring information with 
use of the constant mea model.Additionally, the referring exact values and significance 
statistics are provided in Exhibit 40 (Appendix). The results in Exhibit 40 (Appendix) suggest 
that the CAAR for “domestic emerging markets” acquiring companies over the event window 
of 21 trading days (-10, +10) assumes a positive value statistically significant on the 1% level 
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of 2.41% in the market and 2.62% in the constant mean model. In contrast to that, “outbound 
emerging markets” acquiring firms achieve in the same period a considerable smaller and 
statistically not significant CAAR of 1.32% in the market and 0.12% in the constant mean 
model. 
Exhibit 22 illustrating a comparison between CAARs for “domestic emerging markets” and 
“outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms within the event window obtained through the 
market model suggests that the CAARs for both types of acquirers develop similar around 
values of zero in a period from ten to two trading days prior to the event day (-10,-2), whereas 
in the following period of the event window (-1,+2) the CAARs for both type of acquirers 
similarly increase up to statistically significant values on a 5% level of 1.15% and 1.46% 
respectively on day two post the acquisition announcement. However, in the remaining event 
period (+3, +10) “domestic emerging markets” acquirers’ CAARs constantly increase up to a 
value of 2.41% statistically significant from zero on a 1% level at day ten post the acquisition 
announcement, whereas “outbound emerging markets” acquiring companies’ CAARs slightly 
decrease to a value of 1.32% not statistically significant different from zero (Exhibit 22; 
Exhibit 40 in Appendix) 
Exhibit 23 relating to CAARs calculated with the constant mean model illustrates slightly 
different results and suggests that CAARs for both type of acquirers only develop similar 
around values of zero until seven days prior to the event day (-10,-7). In the following period 
(-6,-3) “outbound emerging markets” acquirers’ CAARs decrease to not statistically 
significant values of -0.89% on day three prior to the event day, while “domestic emerging 
markets” acquirers’ CAARs continue to be stable around values of zero up to two days prior 
to the M&A announcement (-10, -2). In the following “domestic emerging market” acquirers’ 
CAARs increase throughout the remaining event period (-1,+10) to a maximum value of 
Exhibit 22 − Market Model CAARs Domestic and 
Outbound 
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2.62% statistically different from zero on a 1% level at day ten post the event, whereas 
“outbound emerging markets” CAARs increase only until two days post the acquisition 
announcement (-1,+2) up to a value of 0.83% being not statistically significant before they 
decrease back to values around zero five days post the acquisition announcement (+3, +5) and 
remain on this level for the remaining event window (-5,-10) (Exhibit 23, Exhibit 40 in 
Appendix). 
Hypothesis Decision 
Therefore based on the empirical findings outlined, hypothesis 2, referring to the difference in 
the impact of M&A announcements on “domestic emerging markets” acquirers and 
“outbound emerging markets” bidding firms, cannot be confirmed. 
Hypothesis 2: The CAAR for acquirers engaged in outbound emerging markets 
acquisitions is larger than the CAAR for acquirers from emerging 
markets engaged in domestic emerging markets M&A. 
More precisely, the sophisticated market model indicates that “domestic emerging markets” 
acquiring firms achieve over the event window a higher CAAR of 2.41% statistically 
significant on the level of 1% in contrast to “outbound emerging markets” firms with a CAAR 
on day ten post the acquisition announcement of only 1.32% being not statistically significant. 
This difference is especially due to statistically significant positive AARs for “domestic 
emerging markets” firms in the post-acquisition event period (+6, +8). In contrast to that, for 
“outbound emerging markets” bidding firms the value generation is limited to a very short 
period around the M&A announcement (-1, +1) where statistically significant positive AARs 
can be achieved (Exhibit 40 in Appendix). 
Critical Discussion 
There may be several reasons explaining the difference between the expected outcome based 
on existing results in research (e.g. Jain et al., 2014; Khanna & Palepu, 2004; Martynova & 
Rennebog, 2008) and the actual results presented above.  
First, the definition of domestic M&A differs from the general definition applied in most 
studies. Whereas in this thesis “domestic emerging markets” M&A refers to transactions with 
acquiring and target companies from emerging markets but not necessarily the same country, 
usually domestic M&A comprises transaction with acquiring and target company coming 
from the same country. Therefore, sample 1 in this thesis referring to “domestic emerging 
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markets” M&A also comprises cross-border transactions within the emerging markets that 
might deviate in the value impact on acquiring firms from “real” domestic transactions.  
Second, most studies focusing on value creation of emerging markets bidding companies 
engaged in “outbound emerging markets” M&A solely suggest positive CAARs for the 
acquirer without drawing a comparison with the value impact of “domestic emerging 
markets” M&A on the acquiring companies (e.g. Aybar & Thanakijsombat, 2015 & Boateng 
& Du, 2015). Therefore, the empirical findings in this thesis are consistent with those studies, 
suggesting a positive CAAR of 1.46 statistically significant on a 5% level two days post the 
acquisition announcement (Exhibit 40 in Appendix).  
Third, hypothesis 2 was mainly based on the bootstrapping theory suggesting that the stock 
market rewards developing country bidding firms’ attempt to bootstrap itself to the higher 
governance standards of a developed country target. Based on the empirical findings in this 
study the bootstrapping theory only holds true to a limited extent, which is in line with results 
of Aybar & Ficici (2009) suggesting that the bootstrapping theory does not sufficiently 
explain value creation in outbound emerging markets transactions. Possibly other factors 
negatively influence CAARs of the acquiring firm leading to not significant CAARs over the 
whole event window at day ten post the acquisition announcement (Exhibit 40 in Appendix). 
Limited experience in the undertaking of cross-border acquisitions (Narayan & Thenmozhi, 
2014) as well as the lower bargaining power in international transactions (Menéndez-Requej, 
2011) are the most frequently cited reasons in existing literature burdening value creation for 
“outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms. 
Fourth, as presented in point 5.1.8 the share of acquiring firms engaged in industry 
diversifying M&As is with 72.3% higher for “domestic emerging markets” bidders than for 
“outbound emerging markets” acquirers with 67.4% (Exhibit 20 in point 5.1.8). In case of 
higher value creation for industry diversifying M&A announcements as suggested in 
hypotheses set 4 this may have impacted the results in favor of “domestic emerging markets” 
bidding companies justifying the contradictory results concerning hypothesis 2. 
Finally, Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) suggest that positive market reaction to a M&A 
announcement for “outbound emerging markets” acquirers is limited to a short period of up to 
four days post the event date. This is consistent with findings in this thesis where statistically 
significant CAARs in the market model are only obtained in a short time frame within the 
event window starting one day post the event day and ending four days post the acquisition 
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announcement (+1, +4). Furthermore, an event window ending two days post the 
announcement (-10, +2) would lead to the confirmation of hypothesis 2, since “outbound 
emerging markets” acquirers achieve a CAAR of 1.46% statistically significant on the 5% 
level at day two post the announcement exceeding the referring CAAR of 1.15% statistically 
significant on the 5% level obtained for “domestic emerging markets” companies (Exhibit 40 
in Appendix).  
5.2.3 Inbound vs. Outbound M&A  
Exhibit 41 (Appendix) presents AARs and CAARs for acquiring companies engaged in 
“inbound emerging markets” (Panel A) and “outbound emerging markets” (Panel B) M&A 
during the event window period, while comparing daily AARs and CAARs obtained through 
the market model with AARs and CAARs calculated through the constant mean model. 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
The results obtained through the market model suggest that both Panel A and Panel B 
acquiring firms benefit from statistically significant positive AARs in the short term around 
the event date. Whereas “inbound emerging markets” acquirers obtain positive and 
statistically significant on the 1% level AARs at the event day and one day post the 
announcement (0,+1) with 0.64% and 0.78% respectively, “outbound emerging markets” 
acquirers achieve positive AARs significant different from zero on the 1% and 10% level 
respectively in a period ranging from one day prior to the event day until one day post the 
event day (-1,+1) with 0.32%, 0.72% and 0.35% respectively. These results are also supported 
by the constant mean model, whereas AARs tend to assume lower values and are less 
statistically significant (Exhibit 41 in Appendix). Additionally, in the case of “inbound 
emerging markets” acquiring companies a negative AAR statistically significant on the 5% 
level can be observed in both models seven days prior to the announcement day, indicating an 
early leakage of information causing a negative market response to the upcoming takeover. 
Therefore, sample 3 covering “inbound emerging markets” acquiring companies causes the 
similar negative AAR statistically significant on the 1% level in the aggregated sample on day 
seven prior to the event with application of the market model (Exhibit 39 in Appendix). 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
Exhibit 24 illustrates the development of both “inbound emerging markets” as well as 
“outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms’ CAARs during the event window period using 
the market  model approach, while Exhibit 25 is presenting  the referring information but with  
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application of the constant mean model. Additionally, the referring exact values and 
significance statistics are provided in Exhibit 41 (Appendix). 
The results in Exhibit 41 (Appendix) indicate that the CAAR for “inbound emerging markets” 
acquiring companies over the event window of 21 trading days (-10, +10) assumes a positive 
value statistically significant on the 5% level of 1.26% in the market and a positive not 
statistically significant value of 0.96 in the constant mean model. In contrast to that, 
“outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms achieve in the same period a statistically not 
significant CAAR of 1.32% in the market and 0.12% in the constant mean model. 
 Exhibit 24 illustrating a comparison between CAARs for “inbound emerging markets” and 
“outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms within the event window obtained through the 
market model suggests that the CAARs for both types of acquirers develop similar around 
values of zero in a period from ten to five trading days prior to the event day (-10,-5). In the 
following period (-4,+1)“inbound emerging markets” acquirers’ CAARs increase up to a 
value of 1.85% statistically significant on a 1% level at day one post the acquisition 
announcement. In contrast to that “outbound emerging markets” acquirers’ CAARs decrease 
on day four and three prior to the event day (-4,-3) to a not statistically significant values of    
-0.26%, before the CAAR increases in the following period (-2,+2) up to the maximum value 
within the event window of 1.46% statistically different from zero on a 5% level. In the 
remaining period within the event window (-3,-10) CAARs for both inbound and outbound 
emerging markets acquirer slightly decrease, whereas CAARs for “inbound emerging market” 
bidding firm remain constantly on a higher level than CAARs for “outbound emerging 
market”acquirers except for the last trading day ten post the announcement (Exhibit 24, 
Exhibit 41 in Appendix). 
Exhibit 24 – Market Model CAARs for Inbound and 
Outbound  
 
Exhibit 25 − Constant Mean CAARs for Inbound and 
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Exhibit 25 relating to constant mean model illustrates for “inbound emerging markets” 
bidding firms a similar CAAR development, whereas especially CAARs for “outbound 
emerging markets” acquirers assume values lower than the one suggested by Exhibit 24 and 
the market model. Especially in the period (-6,-3) “outbound emerging markets” acquirers’ 
CAARs decrease to a not statistically significant value of -0.89% at day three prior to the 
event day, whereas in the market model the referring CAAR is with the not statistically 
significant value of -0.32% higher (Exhibit 41 in Appendix). Furthermore, in contrast to 
Exhibit 24 and the market model Exhibit 25 illustrates that CAARs of “outbound emerging 
markets” firms decrease back to values around zero on day five post the acquisition 
announcement and remain on this level for the remaining event window (-5,-10). Therefore, 
results in Exhibit 25 suggest that starting with trading day seven prior to the event day until 
the last trading day of the event window (-7,+10) CAARs for “inbound emerging markets” 
acquirers are on a higher level than CAARs of “outbound emerging markets” bidders. 
Hypothesis Decision 
Therefore, based on the empirical findings presented, hypothesis 3, relating to the difference 
in the impact of M&A announcements on “inbound emerging markets” acquirers and 
“outbound emerging markets” bidding firms, cannot be rejected with reserve. 
Hypothesis 3: The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets engaged in inbound 
emerging markets acquisitions is larger than the CAAR for acquirers 
from emerging markets in outbound emerging markets acquisitions. 
By simply comparing the CAAR obtained with market model over the whole event window at 
day ten post the event day for “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms (1.32%) with the 
referring CAAR for “inbound emerging markets” acquirers (1.26%), hypothesis 2 cannot be 
confirmed. However, such a decision would neglect three important factors. First, the CAAR 
of 1.26% obtained for “inbound emerging markets” bidders is statistically significant at a 5% 
level, whereas the referring CAAR of 1.32% for “outbound emerging markets” bidders is not 
statistically significant from zero making a concrete interpretation and thus comparison of the 
two values difficult (Exhibit 41 in Appendix).  
Second, in the market model approach illustrated in Exhibit 24 the CAARs for “inbound 
emerging markets” acquiring firms are higher than for “outbound emerging markets” bidders 
over the whole period lasting from four days prior to the event day until nine days post the 
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announcement (-4,+9) indicating higher value creation for “inbound emerging markets” 
bidders in the short term around the announcement as suggested in hypothesis 3. 
Finally, in the constant mean model the CAAR obtained over the whole event window at day 
ten post the M&A announcement for “inbound emerging markets” bidding firms is with 
0.96% larger than the referring CAAR for “outbound emerging markets” acquirers with 
0.12% (Exhibit 41 in Appendix). Although both CAARs are not statistically significant, this 
result supports the decision to not reject hypothesis 3 and higher value creation for “inbound 
emerging markets” acquirers. 
Critical Discussion 
Hypothesis 3 is based on the assumption that “inbound emerging markets” acquirers benefit 
from larger AARs around the M&A announcement day especially due to the developed 
markets companies’ higher experience in terms of acquisition procedures (Narayan & 
Thenmozi, 2014). However, this difference between emerging and developed markets 
companies continuously decreases as an increasing number of emerging markets companies 
become multinational while also benefitting from skills and experience in terms of 
international M&A (Kale, 2004). Therefore, the partially contradictory results concerning 
hypothesis 3 may be justified by these developments. 
Additionally, as presented in point 5.1.8 the share of acquiring firms engaged in industry 
diversifying M&A is with 67.4% higher for the sample 2 with “outbound emerging markets” 
bidders than for sample 3 comprising “inbound emerging markets” bidders with 63.2% 
(Exhibit 20 in point 5.1.8). In case of higher value creation for industry diversifying M&A 
announcements, as suggested in hypotheses set 4, this may have impacted the results in favor 
of “outbound emerging markets” bidding companies justifying the partially contradictory 
results concerning hypothesis 3. 
Finally, hypothesis 3 refers to suggestions of existing literature (e.g. Narayan & Thenmozhi, 
2014) that “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms are often obliged to engage in tender-
offer-based acquisitions due to their lower bargaining power in international financial 
transactions. However, emerging markets countries such as China, India, Malaysia and Russia 
benefit from governmental outward direct investment policies promoting and supporting 
“outbound emerging markets” M&A which might offset the disadvantages and increases 
financial flexibility and limits information asymmetries burdening negotiations (refer to point 
1.1). 
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5.2.4 Diversifying vs. Focused Outbound M&A 
Exhibit 42 (Appendix) presents AARs and CAARs for acquiring companies engaged in 
“diversifying outbound emerging markets” (Panel A) and “focused outbound emerging 
markets” (Panel B) M&A during the event window period, while comparing daily AARs and 
CAARs obtained through the market model with AARs and CAARs calculated through the 
constant mean model. 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
The results obtained through the market model in Exhibit 42 (Appendix) suggest that Panel A 
acquiring firms benefit from statistically significant positive AARs in the short term around 
the event date, whereas for “focused outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms in this 
period no statistically significant positive returns are observable. Whereas “diversifying 
outbound emerging markets” bidding firms obtain on the event day zero as well as one day 
post the acquisition positive AARs of 1.15% and 0.58% statistically significant on a 1% level 
as well as two days prior to the event a positive AAR of 0.43% statistically significant on a 
5% level, “focused outbound emerging markets” acquirers suffer from a negative AAR on 
day six prior the announcement of -0.60% as well as achieve a positive AAR of 0.56% on the 
last trading day of the event window both statistically significant on a 10% level. Similar 
results are obtained with the constant mean model, whereas for “focused outbound emerging 
markets” bidding firms no statistically significant AARs are observable (Exhibit 42 in 
Appendix). 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
Exhibit 26 shows the development of both “diversifying outbound emerging markets” as well 
as “focused outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms’ CAARs during the event window 
period using the market model approach, whereas Exhibit 27 presents the referring 
information but with application of the constant mean model. Additionally, the referring exact 
values and significance statistics are provided in Exhibit 42 (Appendix). 
The results in Exhibit 42 (Appendix) indicate that the CAAR for “diversifying outbound 
emerging markets” bidding companies over the event window of 21 trading days (-10, +10) 
assumes a positive value statistically significant on the 5% level of 2.00% in the market and a 
positive not statistically significant value of 0.73 in the constant mean model. In contrast to 
that, “focused outbound emerging markets” acquirers achieve in the same period a statistically 
not significant CAAR of 0.01% in the market and -1.06% in the constant mean model. 
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Exhibit 26 illustrating a comparison between CAARs for “diversifying outbound emerging 
markets” and “focused outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms within the event window 
obtained through the market model suggests that the CAARs for “diversifying outbound 
emerging markets” acquirers in the first period of the event window until two days prior to the 
M&A announcement (-10,-2) assume negative values and are below the CAARs of “focused 
outbound emerging markets” bidders with values constantly around zero. However, in the 
following period around the announcement day (-1,+2) “diversifying outbound emerging 
markets” acquirers’ CAARs increase up to a values of 2.07% statistically significant on a 1% 
level on day two post the event, whereas CAARs of “focused outbound emerging markets” 
bidders remain constant slightly above zero with a not statistically significant value of 0.28% 
two days post the announcement day. In the remaining event window (+3,+10) CAARs of 
“diversifying outbound emerging markets” acquirers remain stable at a statistically 
significant positive level finishing with a positive value statistically significant on the 5% 
level of 2.00% at day ten post the event, whereas CAARs of “focused outbound emerging 
markets” bidders first drop to a statistically not significant value of -0.61% at day seven post 
the event day before returning back to not a statistically significant value of 0.01% on the last 
trading day within the event window (Exhibit 26; Exhibit 42 in Appendix). 
Exhibit 27 relating to the constant mean model presents a similar development of CAARs 
within the event window for both “diversifying outbound emerging markets” and “focused 
outbound emerging markets” acquirers. However, in general for both type of acquirers 
CAARs assume lower values than in the case of the market model application (Exhibit 26). 
Therefore CAARs obtained through the constant mean model are mainly not statistically 
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significant for both “diversifying outbound emerging markets” and “focused outbound 
emerging markets” acquirers (Exhibit 42 in Appendix). 
Hypothesis Decision 
Therefore based on the empirical findings presented hypothesis 4a, relating to the difference 
in the impact of M&A announcements on “diversifying outbound emerging markets” 
acquirers and “focused outbound emerging markets” bidding firms, cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 4a: The CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets engaged in industry 
diversifying emerging markets outbound acquisitions is larger than the 
CAAR in industry focused outbound acquisitions. 
More precisely, the sophisticated market model indicates that “diversifying outbound 
emerging markets” acquiring firms achieve over the event window a higher CAAR of 2.00% 
statistically significant on the level of 5% in contrast to “focused outbound emerging markets” 
firms with a CAAR on day ten post the acquisition announcement of only 0.01% being not 
statistically significant different from zero. This difference is especially due to statistically 
significant positive AARs obtained by “diversifying outbound emerging markets” firms in the 
short period around the event day (-2, +1) increasing the CAAR, whereas for “focused 
outbound emerging markets” no value generation through the M&A announcement is 
observed (Exhibit 42 in Appendix). 
Critical Discussion 
Hypothesis 4a is based on the assumption that emerging markets acquirers in the initial stage 
of the diversification process are able to benefit from industry unrelated diversifying 
acquisitions due to an increase in market power and profitability (Palich et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, risk reduction achieved through the co-insurance effect and a more efficient 
internal capital market is frequently mentioned in research as value drive stemming from an 
industry diversifying M&A strategy (refer to point 2.4.2). The results presented in Exhibit 26, 
27 and 42(Appendix) clearly support this suggestions. However the following points have to 
be considered in order to draw the right conclusions. 
First, in the sample no differentiation is made between related and unrelated diversification. 
Therefore, no statement on the distribution of value creation among industry related and 
unrelated diversifying takeovers can be made. It can solely be concluded that “outbound 
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emerging markets” M&A on average creates more value for the acquirer in case of bidding 
and target companies coming from different industries indicated by different SIC-codes. 
Second, the positive CAAR of 2.00%, statistically significant on a 5% level, obtained in the 
market model for the last day of the event window does not imply that value creation took 
place over the whole event window period (-10.+10). In fact in this sample value creation 
stemming from industry diversifying M&A announcements is exclusively limited on three 
trading days (-2,0,+1) around the event, where AARs are statistically significant different 
from zero. Therefore, value creation is neither suggested several days prior nor more than one 
day post the acquisition (Exhibit 42 in Appendix). 
Finally, especially Scharfstein & Stein (1999) claim that investors require more information to 
evaluate companies engaged in industry diversification. According to their study investors are 
usually not provided with additional information leading to information asymmetry and to 
acquiring companies engaged in industry diversification trading to a discount. Furthermore 
cross-subsidization of failing business segments as well as agency costs might increase 
through industry diversification causing value destruction (refer to point 2.4.2). The results in 
this thesis contradict the suggestions of Scharfstein & Stein (1999). However, the effects of 
cross-subsidization of failing business segments as well as agency costs are observable rather 
in the long term and thus are not captured by this event study focusing on the short term. 
Additionally, investors in recent years benefit from greater access to information especially in 
terms of developed markets targets indicating that the mentioned information asymmetry 
burdening the valuation of “diversifying outbound emerging markets” bidding firms is likely 
to decrease compared to the time period covered in the study of Scharfstein & Stein (1999). 
5.2.5 Diversifying vs. Focused Inbound M&A 
Exhibit 43 (Appendix) presents AARs and CAARs for acquiring companies engaged in 
“diversifying inbound emerging markets” (Panel A) and “focused inbound emerging markets” 
(Panel B) M&A during the event window period, while comparing daily AARs and CAARs 
obtained through the market model with AARs and CAARs calculated through the constant 
mean model. 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
The results obtained through the market model suggest that both Panel A and Panel B 
acquiring firms benefit from positive AARs at the event day of 0.51% and 0.79% respectively 
statistically significant on the 1% level (Exhibit 43 in Appendix). In addition to that 
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“diversifying inbound emerging markets” bidding firms benefit from positive ARRs on day 
four prior and day one post the announcement day of 0.46% and 1.21% respectively 
statistically significant on the 5% and 1% level respectively, while the AAR on day seven 
prior to the event assumes a negative value of -0.37% statistically significant on the 5% level. 
Similar results are also obtained with the constant mean model, whereas for “diversifying 
inbound emerging markets” acquirers an additional negative AAR on day seven post the 
acquisition of -0.34% statistically significant on a 10% level is observed. Furthermore, 
according to the constant mean model “focused inbound emerging markets” bidding firms 
additionally benefit from a positive and statistically significant AAR of 0.53% one day post 
the acquisition, while suffering from an additional negative statistically significant AAR of -
0.36% at day four post the acquisition (Exhibit 43 in Appendix). 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
Exhibit 28 shows the development of both “diversifying inbound emerging markets” as well 
as “focused inbound emerging markets” acquiring firms’ CAARs during the event window 
period using the market model approach, whereas Exhibit 29 presents the referring 
information but with application of the constant mean model. Additionally, the referring exact 
values and significance statistics are provided in Exhibit 43 (Appendix). 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
The results in Exhibit 43 (Appendix) indicate that the CAAR for “diversifying inbound 
emerging markets” bidding companies over the event window of 21 trading days (-10,+10) 
assumes a positive value statistically significant on the 1% level of 2.25% in the market and 
2.05% in the constant mean model. In contrast to that, “focused outbound emerging markets” 
Exhibit 28 – Market Model CAARs for Inbound 
Diversifying and Focused 
   
Exhibit 29 – Constant Mean CAARs for Inbound 
Diversifying and Focused  
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acquiring firms achieve in the same period a statistically not significant CAAR of 0.06% in 
the market and -0.38% in the constant mean model. 
Exhibit 28 illustrating a comparison between CAARs for “diversifying inbound emerging 
markets” and “focused inbound emerging markets” acquiring firms within the event window 
obtained through the market model suggests that the CAARs for both type of acquirers in the 
first period of the event window up to five days prior to the M&A announcement (-10,-5) 
develop similarly assuming values closely to zero. However, in the following period (-4,+1) 
“diversifying inbound emerging markets” bidding firms’ CAARs increase up to a value of 
2.59% statistically significant on the 1% level at day one post the acquisition where they 
remain more or less constant over the remaining event period (+2,+10). In contrast to that 
“diversifying inbound emerging markets” bidding firms’ CAARs only start to increase at the 
event day until day three post the acquisition (0,+3) up to a value of 1.01% not statistically 
significant different from zero before in the remaining period (+4,+10) the CAAR returns 
back to not statistically significant values around zero with 0.06% at the last trading day of the 
event window (Exhibit 28; Exhibit 43 in Appendix). 
Exhibit 29 relating to the constant mean model presents a similar development of CAARs 
within the event window for both “diversifying inbound emerging markets” and “focused 
inbound emerging markets” acquirers. However, for both type of acquirers CAARs assume 
lower values than in the case of the market model application (Exhibit 28). Therefore none of 
the CAARs obtained through the constant mean model for “focused outbound emerging 
markets” acquirers is statistically significant (Exhibit 43 in Appendix). 
Hypothesis Decision 
Based on the empirical findings presented hypothesis 4b, relating to the difference in the 
impact of M&A announcements on “diversifying inbound emerging markets” acquirers and 
“focused inbound emerging markets” bidding firms, cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 4b: The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets engaged in industry 
diversifying emerging markets outbound acquisitions is larger than the 
CAAR in industry focused outbound acquisitions. 
More precisely, the sophisticated market model indicates that “diversifying inbound emerging 
markets” acquiring firms achieve over the event window a higher CAAR of 2.25% 
statistically significant on the level of 1% compared to “focused outbound emerging markets” 
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companies with a CAAR on day ten post the acquisition announcement of only 0.06% being 
not statistically significant different from zero. Whereas “focused outbound emerging market” 
bidders solely benefit from a positive AAR of 0.79% statistically significant at the 1% level at 
the event day, “diversifying outbound emerging market” bidding firms achieve positive and 
statistically significant AARs four days prior, at the event day and one day post the 
announcement day of 0.46%, 0.51% and 1.21% respectively (Exhibit 43 in Appendix).  
Critical Discussion 
Hypothesis 4b mainly relies on existing literature suggesting that “inbound emerging 
markets” acquiring firms benefit from related industry diversification through both synergy 
realization as in focused transactions as well as risk reduction through the co-insurance effect, 
conglomerate power, and a more efficient internal capital market (refer to point 2.4.2). The 
results presented concerning hypothesis 4b support these suggestions. However, some factors 
have to be considered when concluding on the findings presented. 
First, similar to the critical discussion in point 5.2.4 the sample is not differentiated between 
related and unrelated diversification. Therefore it is not possible to comment on the 
distribution of value creation among industry related and unrelated diversifying takeovers. It 
can solely be concluded that “inbound emerging markets” M&A on average creates more 
value for the acquirer in case of bidding and target companies coming from different 
industries indicated by different SIC-codes. 
Second, value creation for “diversifying inbound emerging markets” bidders does not occur 
over the whole event window period but is limited to day four prior to the event window as 
well as on the event day and one day post the announcement. Therefore; there are neither 
statistically significant positive AARs in the beginning of the event window nor more than 
one day post the acquisition announcement (Exhibit 43 in Appendix). However, in comparison 
to “diversifying outbound emerging markets” acquiring companies (refer to point 5.2.4), the 
wealth impact is realized already two days earlier at day four prior to the event, indicating 
early leakage of information. A possible reason may be the weak institutional and legal 
environment in the target companies’ home countries. 
Finally, studies conducted by Martynova & Rennebog (2008) as well as Feito-Ruiz & 
Menéndez-Requejo (2012) suggest that industry diversifying mergers of European acquirers 
on average lead to lower abnormal returns than focused mergers contradicting the results 
related to hypothesis 4b in this thesis. However, in contrast to this thesis both studies are 
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limited to European acquiring companies, while Martynova & Rennebog (2008) additionally 
solely cover intra-European mergers. Therefore, a direct comparison between these studies 
and the results obtained in the thesis is not feasible. 
5.2.6 Diversifying Outbound vs. Diversifying Inbound M&A 
Exhibit 44 (Appendix) presents the differences in AARs and CAARs between “industry 
diversifying” and “industry focused” M&A announcements for both “outbound emerging 
markets” bidding firms (Panel A) and “outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms (Panel 
B) during the event window period, while comparing differences in AARs and CAARs 
obtained through the market model with differences in AARs and CAARs calculated through 
the constant mean model. 
Differences in Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) 
For Panel A acquiring firms in the market model a negative difference in AARs is 
predominant in the initial period of the event window (-10, -7) indicated by values of -0.42% 
on day ten, -0.06% on day nine and -0.52% at day seven prior to the announcement 
suggesting that the industry focused strategy in this period creates more value than the 
industry diversifying strategy. However, in the following relatively high positive differences 
in the AARs between the diversified and focused subsamples can be observed for “outbound 
emerging markets” bidding firms especially six days and two days prior to the event, day zero 
as well as one day post the event day (+6,+2,0,-1) with values of 0.52%, 0.63%, 1.26% and 
0.66% respectively, suggesting the superiority of the industry diversification strategy in terms 
of value creation in the short term around the M&A announcement (Exhibit 44 in Appendix).  
For Panel B bidding firms in the initial period of the event window (-10, -5) the difference in 
AARs remains stable around zero. In the following the development is similar to Panel A but 
with a delayed occurrence of relatively high differences in AAR at day 4 prior to the event as 
well as day one, five and six post the M&A announcement (-4,+1,+5,+6). For the constant 
mean model similar results are obtained for both Panel A and B acquiring companies (Exhibit 
44 in Appendix). 
Differences in Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
Exhibit 30 shows the development of both “diversifying inbound emerging markets” as well 
as “focused inbound emerging markets” acquiring firms’ CAARs during the event window 
period using the market model approach, whereas Exhibit 31 presents the referring 
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information but with application of the constant mean model. Additionally, the referring exact 
values are provided in Exhibit 44 (Appendix). 
Exhibit 30 illustrates a comparison between the differences in CAARs for “outbound 
emerging markets” and “inbound emerging markets” acquiring firms within the event window 
obtained through the market model. It suggests that the differences in CAARs for “inbound 
emerging markets” acquirers is slightly higher than for “outbound emerging markets” in the 
beginning of the event window until one day prior to the M&A announcement (-10,-1). 
Additionally, for “inbound emerging markets” bidding firms the difference in the CAARs is 
negative until day five prior to the event announcement (-10,-5), whereas in the following the 
difference constantly increases throughout the event window (-4,+10) up to a value of 2.19% 
at day ten post the announcement suggesting the superiority of an industry diversification 
strategy in comparison to a focused M&A strategy (Exhibit 44 in Appendix).  
For “outbound emerging markets” acquirers according to Exhibit 30 the difference in CAARs 
remains negative and below CAARs of “inbound emerging markets” acquirers until one day 
prior to the announcement (-10,-1) indicating higher value creation for focused M&A 
announcements in the initial event window period. In the following period until the end of the 
event window (0,+10) the differences for “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms 
strongly increase up to a maximum value of 2.48% on day six post the event. Additionally, in 
this second period in the event window (0,+10) the differences in CAARs for both “outbound 
emerging markets” and “inbound emerging markets” develop almost similar suggesting that 
for both type of acquirers the value creation advantage of a diversification strategy over 
focused M&A is almost equal (Exhibit 30; Exhibit 44 in Appendix).  
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Exhibit 31 relating to the constant mean model presents a similar development of the 
differences in CAARs within the event window for “inbound emerging markets” bidding 
firms. However, the difference in CAARs for “outbound emerging markets” firms on average 
assumes lower values than in the market model over the whole event window suggesting that 
focused M&A in this model is less disadvantaged compared to an industry diversification 
strategy. Therefore, the constant mean model results show that for “inbound emerging 
markets” firms the value creation advantage of a diversification strategy over focused M&A is 
higher than for “outbound emerging markets” companies (Exhibit 31; Exhibit 44 in 
Appendix). 
Hypothesis Decision 
Based on the empirical findings presented hypothesis 4c, relating to the development of the 
differences in CAARs for both “outbound emerging markets” acquirers and “inbound 
emerging markets” bidding firms, cannot be confirmed. 
Hypothesis 4c: The difference between industry diversifying and focused CAARs is 
larger for outbound acquirers from emerging markets than for inbound 
bidding companies from developed markets. 
More precisely, the sophisticated market model indicates that for “inbound emerging 
markets” acquiring firms at trading day ten post the announcement the difference in CAARs 
with 2.19% is higher compared to “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms with 1.99% 
suggesting that for “inbound emerging markets” firms the value creation advantage of a 
diversification strategy over focused M&A is higher than for “outbound emerging markets” 
companies (Exhibit 44 in Appendix). However, to interpret the results correctly three different 
periods within the event window have to be discussed. 
First, in the initial event window period of (-10,-1) until one day prior to the M&A 
announcement the differences in CAARs for “outbound emerging markets” acquirers are 
clearly below the differences for “inbound emerging markets” bidders suggesting less value 
creation through industry diversification.  
Second, in the following period until seven days post the acquisition (0,+7) the differences in 
CAARs for “outbound emerging markets” acquirers exceeds the ones for “inbound emerging 
markets” acquirers suggesting that the value creation advantage of a diversification strategy 
over focused M&A is higher for “outbound emerging markets” acquirers. 
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Third, in the remaining event window period (+8,+10) “outbound emerging markets” and 
“inbound emerging markets” acquirers’ difference in CAARs alternate in assuming higher 
values and in general develop similar(Exhibit 30 & 31; Exhibit 44 in Appendix). 
Therefore, by considering these three different periods in terms of value creation stemming 
from an industry diversification strategy, it can be stated that neither “inbound emerging 
markets” nor “outbound emerging markets” acquiring firms gain more advantage of a 
diversification strategy over focused M&A in comparison to the referring other type of 
acquirer. 
Critical Discussion 
The expected outcome that “outbound emerging markets” bidders benefit to a larger extent 
from the advantage of an industry diversification M&A strategy than “inbound emerging 
markets” acquiring firms cannot be confirmed based on the findings presented. However, the 
deviation from the expected results may stem from several factors to be discussed in the 
following. 
First, Scharfstein & Stein (1999) suggest that acquiring companies engaged in industry 
diversifying M&A may trade to a discount due to investors’ difficulty to evaluate diversified 
companies based on information asymmetries arising from a lack of access to relevant 
information (refer to point 2.4.2). Since especially investors in acquiring companies from 
emerging markets, where information disclosure policies are less sophisticated as well as the 
market and institutional environment is considered to be weaker than in developed markets, 
suffer from higher information asymmetries, “diversifying outbound emerging markets” 
acquirers may create less shareholder value than “diversifying inbound emerging markets” 
bidders supporting the findings in this thesis. 
Second, hypothesis 4c is based on empirical evidence of existing research suggesting that 
emerging markets acquirers in the initial stage of the diversification process are supposed to 
benefit from unrelated diversifying acquisitions due to an increase in market power and 
profitability (Palich et al., 2000). However, today a large number of emerging markets 
multinational companies is already in a later stage of the diversification process and thus does 
probably not benefit to such an extent from unrelated diversification as described by Palich et 
al. (2000) explaining the contradictory findings concerning hypothesis 4c. 
Third, studies promoting value creation for unrelated diversifying M&A of emerging markets 
acquirers and value destruction of industry diversifying mergers of European acquirers (e.g. 
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Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2012; Martynova & Rennebog, 2008), that are the basis for 
the development of hypothesis 4c, have a different geographical scope. Contrary to the sample 
selection in this thesis, Martynova & Rennebog (2008) and Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo 
(2012) limit their sample to European acquiring companies, while Martynova & Rennebog 
(2008) additionally solely cover intra-European mergers. Furthermore, Palich et al. (2000) 
summarize in their study three decades of literature and thus consider not only “outbound 
emerging markets” acquisitions. Therefore, a direct comparison between these studies and 
results obtained in the thesis is not feasible. 
Finally in a recent study conducted by Narayan & Thenmozhi (2014) similar results to this 
thesis are obtained suggesting that emerging markets acquiring firms engaged in cross-border 
acquisitions benefit from targets in related industries compared to industry diversification. 
According to Narayan & Thenmozhi (2014) emerging markets firms are equipped with 
limited experience in undertaking acquisitions and thus have difficulties to deal with the 
increased risk of acquiring an unrelated business. In line with these suggestions, in this 
sample “diversifying outbound emerging markets” bidding companies might suffer from this 
risk of inexperience and thus create less value in comparison to “diversifying inbound 
emerging markets” acquirers. 
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5.3 OLS-Regression 
Exhibit 32 provides an overview about the results obtained through the OLS-regressions for 
each of the three samples. In the following first and initial overview about the results obtained 
is provided. In a second step these results are interpreted in order to decide on the hypotheses 
5–8. 
Exhibit 32 – OLS-Regression Results 
Variable 
CAR Sample 1 CAR Sample 2  CAR Sample 3 
Coefficient T-stat.  Coefficient T-stat.  Coefficient T-stat 
Relative Deal Size 0.031 3.01** 
 
0.035 3.24*** 
 
0.037 3.41*** 
Corporate Control -0.012 0.87 
 
-0.024 1.64* 
 
-0.014 1.01 
Cash -1.735 0.32 
 
-0.934 0.11 
 
-1.644 0.29 
Stock -1.122 1.65* 
 
-1.032 1.49 
 
-1.261 1 .73* 
Public -0.883 1.92* 
 
-2.748 3.37*** 
 
-1.512 2 .78*** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.181  0. 091  0.193 
Sample Size N 519  298  617 
Included Observations 212  131  301 
Reported are the determinants of the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the event window of 21 
trading days for each of the three samples namely “domestic emerging markets” acquirers (sample 1), “outbound 
emerging markets” acquirers (sample 2) as well as “inbound emerging markets” acquirers (sample 3). The 
dependent variable is CAR (−10,+10) in each regression. Other variables are defined in point 4.3.2. T-statistics 
are computed using heteroscedascticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** show respectively that the 
referring coefficient is significant under the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. Additionally, winsorization was done at 
the 5% level while results remained the same. 
5.3.1 Overview 
By looking at the adjusted R-squared one can conclude that only a minor fraction of the 
dependent variable variation can be explained through the linear model suggested, with 18.1% 
for sample 1, 9.1% for sample 2 as well as 19.3% for sample 3 (Exhibit 32). However, a low 
R-squared value does not necessarily imply the inadequacy of the regression model. Since 
there are several statistically significant coefficients presented in Exhibit 32, in the following 
it can be determined how the dependent variable is affected by changes in the independent 
variable.  
5.3.2 Relative Deal Size 
 Hypothesis 5: There is a positive correlation between CAR and relative deal size. 
The results in Exhibit 32 suggest that “relative deal size” is positively correlated to CARs of 
acquiring companies across all three samples with regression coefficient values statistically 
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significant on a 1% (sample 2 and 3) and 5% level (sample 1). Therefore, hypothesis 5 cannot 
be rejected. 
The correlation is the highest for the sample 3 acquirers with a coefficient value of 0.037, 
followed by “outbound emerging markets” bidding companies with 0.035 and “domestic 
emerging markets” acquiring companies with 0.031. The results indicate that especially 
“inbound emerging markets” acquirers announcing M&A deals with high “relative deal size” 
obtain on average higher CARs within the event window. As explained in point. 2.2.4 these 
findings are consistent to existing literature suggesting that the adverse selection problem is 
less prevalent in high value transactions (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Feito-Ruiz & 
Menéndez-Requejo, 2011). 
5.3.3 Corporate Control 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive correlation between CAR and corporate control. 
In contrast to the expectations, the OLS-regression results presented in Exhibit 32 show that 
there is a negative correlation between the ownership percentage acquired and the bidding 
firm’s CAR. However, the regression coefficient is solely statistically significant on a 10% 
level for “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms with a value of -0.024, whereas for 
sample 1 and 2 no statistically significant results are obtained making an interpretation 
difficult (Exhibit 32). Based on the results presented hypothesis 6 cannot be confirmed.  
This is in contradiction to existing research of La Porta et al. (1998) and Chari et al. (2004) 
suggesting that acquirers of majority control are less exposed to weak investor protection and 
thus avoid being expropriated by the management (refer to point 2.4.2). However, the 
contradictory and statistically significant negative correlation obtained for “outbound 
emerging markets” acquiring firms may stem from minority investors in developed countries 
providing benefits in terms of information and business network access that is absent in case 
of a 100% buyout. Furthermore, the study of Chari et al. (2004) mainly focuses on a time 
period within the 1990s in which corporate control in emerging markets was a key feature of 
transactions creating shareholder value.  
5.3.4 Payment Method 
Hypothesis 7a: For M&A announcements with cash as payment method the CAR is 
lower than for announcements with the combined payment method. 
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Since “cash” is established as dummy variable, it has to be compared with the control variable 
“combined payment” by analyzing the regression coefficient. In line with the expectation in 
hypothesis 7a , the acquisition announcements with a combined payment method yield to 
higher CARs than cash-only payment in each of the three samples indicated by a negative 
regression coefficient for the dummy variable of -1.735, -0.934 and -1.644 for sample 1, 2 and 
3 respectively (Exhibit 32). However, the values obtained for the regression coefficient are not 
statistically significant across all three samples making an interpretation of the results 
difficult. Therefore, based on the not statistically significant value obtained, hypothesis 7a 
cannot be confirmed.  
As outlined in point 2.4.2 and according to Eckbo et al (1990) a combined payment method is 
supposed to be superior to cash-only bids in terms of acquiring company value creation due to 
taxes on capital gains to be paid in the case of cash-only deals. However, this suggestion can 
neither be rejected nor confirmed in the three samples due to not statistically significant 
results obtained through the OLS-regressions. 
Hypothesis 7b: For M&A announcements with stock as payment method the CAR is 
lower than for announcements with the combined payment method. 
The results presented in Exhibit 32 suggest that the combined payment method tends to yield 
to higher CAR for bidding firms stock-only payment indicated by a negative regressions 
coefficient of -1.122, -1.032 and -1.261 for sample 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Whereas for 
“domestic emerging markets” and “inbound emerging markets” acquirers the results obtained 
are statistically significant on a 10% level, for “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms 
the regression coefficient is not statistically significant. Therefore, for sample 1 and 3 
hypothesis 7b cannot be rejected confirming the expected outcome, whereas for sample 2 the 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed due to statistically not significant results.  
The regression coefficients obtained for sample 1 and 3 are consistent with existing literature 
suggesting information asymmetry as major drawback and value destructive for acquiring 
companies in M&A announcements with stock-only payment (Eckbo et al., 1990). 
5.3.5 Legal Status of Target Company 
Hypothesis 8: For M&A announcements with public listed target companies the CAR 
is higher than for announcements with non-listed target companies. 
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In contradiction to the expectation in hypothesis 8, the results in Exhibit 32 show that non-
listed target companies are associated with higher CARs for acquiring companies across all 
samples indicated by a negative regression coefficient of -0.883, -2.748 and -1.512 for sample 
1, 2 and 3 respectively (Exhibit 32). Whereas results obtained for “outbound emerging 
markets” as well as “inbound emerging markets” are statistically significant on the 1% level, 
for “domestic emerging markets” companies they are only statistically significant on the 10% 
level. To conclude, hypothesis 8 cannot be confirmed since the opposite effect is observed 
across all three samples.  
This is not consistent with findings of Bradley & Sundaram (2004) suggesting that 
information asymmetries arising from lower disclosure requirements lead to less value 
creation for acquiring companies purchasing privately held target firms. However, the 
opposite effect across all of the three samples in this thesis might be due to the illiquidity 
discount bidding firms obtain from acquiring non public targets. More precisely, Martynova 
and Renneboog (2011) argue, that tender offer based acquisitions of listed targets are less 
likely to create value for the acquiring company due to premiums to be paid arising from 
difficult negotiations prior the takeover announcement.  
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6. Conclusion 
The concluding chapter first provides a short summary about the main results and major 
limitations faced in this thesis. Additionally, potential future research areas are recommended 
followed by a list of managerial implications of this study. 
6.1 Synthesis of Main Results 
The thesis analyzes the acquiring company’s share price effect caused by takeover 
announcements, differentiating between domestic, inbound and outbound emerging markets 
transactions as well as between industry diversifying and industry focused M&A strategies. 
Additionally contextual factors are determined that drive the value creation patterns in the 
event study. The sample comprises share price returns of acquiring companies in the event 
window of 21 trading days (-10,+10) around M&A announcements in a time period from 
January 2000 until January 2016. 
The results obtained in this thesis suggest that for all three samples comprising “domestic 
emerging markets”, “outbound emerging markets” as well as “inbound emerging markets” 
acquiring firms respectively the share price in the short term around the announcement date is 
positively impacted by M&A announcements indicated by positive CAARs in each of the 
three sample over the event window period of 21 trading days (-10,+10). However, the 
positive impact is the strongest and the most statistically significant for “domestic emerging 
markets” acquirers indicating the superiority of takeover announcements with acquiring and 
target company coming from emerging countries in terms of acquirer’s shareholder value 
creation. Additionally, over the whole event window (-10,+10) “outbound emerging markets” 
and “inbound emerging markets” M&A announcements included in the samples on average 
create similar wealth for bidding firms, whereas within a shorter time period around the event 
day (-10,+8) “inbound emerging markets” announcements are clearly superior in terms of 
shareholder value creation (refer to points 5.2.2 & 5.2.3). 
Furthermore, results suggest that industry diversifying M&A announcements are superior in 
terms of value creation for both “outbound emerging markets” acquirers as well as “inbound 
emerging markets” bidding firms. Whereas industry diversifying takeover announcements in 
both samples lead to statistically significant positive CAARs, industry focused 
announcements generate not statistically significant CAARs close to zero. Moreover, based 
on the empirical findings for both type of acquirers the value creation advantage of a 
diversification strategy over focused M&A is almost equal (refer to points 5.2.4 – 5.2.6). 
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Finally, based on OLS-regression results contextual factors are identified influencing the 
value creation patterns observed in the event study. Whereas factors such as the relative deal 
size, combined payment method (cash and stock) as well as private legal status of the target 
company are positive correlated to CARs of acquiring companies and thus value creation 
across all samples, no statistically significant results were obtained for the percentage of 
ownership acquired (refer to points 5.3.2 – 5.3.5). 
6.2 Limitations 
In the following the major limitation factors, challenging the results obtained in this study, are 
outlined. 
First, empirical findings in this thesis are tested for robustness by applying a parametric t-test. 
However, parametric tests are based on a set of assumptions about the distribution of the 
sample population. The parametric test requires independent, identical and normal distribution 
of abnormal returns in order to deliver valuable test results. Although parameters such as 
mean, skewness and excess kurtosis indicate across all samples a tendency towards normal 
distribution of the sample populations, no further normal distribution tests were conducted 
(refer to point 4.2.6). Although the large total sample size of 1,434 observations supports the 
normal distribution assumption, the “focused outbound emerging markets” subsample 2a with 
only 102 observations is likely to be not perfectly normally distributed (refer to point 5.1.1). 
Therefore, the interpretation of results obtained in this thesis is contingent upon independent, 
identical and normal distribution of abnormal returns. 
Second, the event study research methodology applied in this thesis relies on the hypothesis of 
perfectly efficient capital markets. More precisely, it is assumed that share prices of acquiring 
companies reflect all economic gains/losses expected from the acquisition already at the time 
of the M&A announcement. However, the perfect capital market theory assumes no 
transaction costs as well as the absence of information asymmetries which cannot be 
confirmed in the “real” world. Especially in smaller and indebted emerging market economies 
imperfect capital markets can be observed (Agénor, 1997). According to Bild (1998) stock 
market reactions to M&A announcements may reflect various factors independent from the 
marginal impact of the acquisitions. Although the impact of confounding factors is addressed 
by different initiatives (refer to point 4.1.2) there is a remaining probability of factors driving 
the share price independent from the impact of the acquisition announcement.  
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Third, the choice of the short term event window comprising 21 trading days around the event 
date (-10,10) bears the risk that potential information leakage more than 10 days prior to the 
event day is not captured in the abnormal returns. Additionally, delays in the information 
dissemination exceeding day ten post the M&A announcement may lead to incomplete value 
creation results (Peterson 1989). 
Fourth, results obtained in the OLS-regression have to be interpreted with caution since the R-
squared obtained is fairly low indicating that only a minor fraction of the dependent variable 
variation can be explained through the linear model suggested (refer to point 5.3). Therefore, 
there are probably a range of other factors that might drive CARs of acquiring companies 
which are not considered in the analysis of this thesis. 
Finally, all acquiring companies included in the sample are listed public firms since share 
price value creation is substance of the analysis. Therefore, suggestions derived from the 
results are solely limited to public listed companies. Furthermore, no conclusions on the 
future value creation of individual companies should be drawn, since the results presented in 
point 5.2 are average values derived from a large sample of different acquiring firms. 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on topics revealed in the interpretation of empirical findings (refer to point 5.2) the 
following areas for potential future research are recommended. 
First, the comparison of “outbound emerging markets” and “inbound emerging markets” 
M&A value creation in this thesis revealed in contradiction to previous expectations no 
significant difference between both developed countries and emerging countries acquirers. As 
suggested by Kale (2004) the difference in value creation between emerging and developed 
markets companies continuously decreases as an increasing number of emerging markets 
companies become multinational and thus also benefits from experience in international 
M&A. Therefore, in order to confirm this suggestion future research is recommended to 
compare value creation of “outbound emerging markets” acquiring companies engaged in 
M&A in the past with value creation of referring companies engaged in similar transactions in 
the recent years to draw conclusions about the evolution of value creation over time. 
Second, as suggested in point 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 in this study no differentiation is made between 
related and unrelated industry diversification. Therefore, in order to capture the value effect 
for this two different M&A types in contrast to industry focused M&A strategies for both 
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“outbound emerging markets” as well as “inbound emerging markets” acquiring companies, 
future event studies should consider this differentiation. 
Third, as suggested in point 5.2.2 the definition of domestic M&A in this thesis differs from 
the general definition applied in most studies. Whereas in this study “domestic emerging 
markets” M&A refers to transactions with acquiring and target company coming from 
emerging markets but not necessarily the same country, usually domestic M&A comprises 
transactions with acquiring and target companies coming from the same country. Therefore, 
future research is recommended to distinguish between “real” domestic M&A within 
emerging markets as well as cross-border M&A within emerging markets. Additionally, a 
comparison between these two samples in combination with “outbound emerging markets” as 
well as “inbound emerging markets” M&A value creation would add value to the empirical 
findings obtained in this thesis. 
Finally, this study is limited to the short term effects of M&A announcements. Therefore 
domestic, inbound and outbound emerging markets transactions and their value creation for 
acquiring companies should also be the focus of studies analyzing the long term value impact 
of acquisitions by application of research methods such as the accounting study or the 
incremental cash flow method (refer to point 4.1.2). 
6.4 Managerial Implications 
In this closing paragraph a linkage between the empirical findings obtained in this study and 
the implications for operational decisions within businesses is established. 
As suggested in point 6.1 “domestic emerging markets” transactions with acquiring and 
bidding companies coming from emerging countries create the highest shareholder value 
around the M&A announcement for the acquiring company in this sample. Therefore, 
decision makers in emerging markets companies searching for M&A opportunities have to 
consider that especially the takeover of targets from emerging markets has the potential to 
create significant positive shareholder value in the short term. Although there is an ongoing 
trend of emerging markets firms acquiring companies in developed countries, managers have 
to be aware that in terms of shareholder value creation a developing country target is likely to 
be superior to a developed country target. 
Additionally, results of the thesis suggest that for both “inbound emerging markets” acquiring 
companies as well as “outbound emerging markets” bidding firms value creation is only 
realized for industry diversifying transactions, whereas industry focused takeovers do not 
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yield to statistically significant positive CAARs (refer to points5.2.4 – 5.2.6). Although 
focused takeovers are more likely to translate into wealth creation in the long term through the 
realization of operational, managerial and market power synergies (refer to point 2.1.1), 
managers should consider the opportunity to create shareholder value in the short term 
through industry diversifying takeovers. 
Finally, with reference to the OLS-regression results obtained across all samples (refer to 
point 5.3) it is more beneficial in terms of shareholder value creation for acquiring companies 
to purchase a not listed privately held company by using a combined payment method (stock 
and cash), while large value transactions are additionally more likely to provoke positive 
stock market reactions. Therefore, managers of acquiring companies are advised to consider 
the superiority of privately held target firms over a listed target companies in terms of short 
term shareholder value creation. Additionally, if possible a combined payment method should 
be negotiated since it is more likely to translate into shareholder value than cash-only and 
stock-only payments. Furthermore, decision makers in acquiring companies should take into 
consideration to engage primarily in large value transactions since it is more likely to generate 
shareholder wealth in the short term compared with small-sized transactions. 
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Exhibit 34 − Summary M&A Value Creation Event Studies 
Panel A: Returns to the Target Shareholders 
Study 
Cumulative  
Abnormal  
Returns  
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Maquieira 
et al. (1998) 
41.65% 
conglomerate 
38.08% 
non-congl. 
47 
 
55 
 
1963-1996 (-60,60) 
61.8.% 
 
83.0% 
 
Diversified 
 
U.S. 
Study of returns for conglomerate 
and non-conglomerate 
stock-for-stock mergers 
Mulherin & 
Boone (2000) 
21.2% 376 1990-1999 (-1,1) N/A 
Financial and 
non-financial 
U.S. 
 
Mulherin (2000) 10.14% 202 1962-1997 (-1,0) 76% Diversified U.S. 
A sample of incomplete 
acquisitions 
DeLong (2001) 16.61% 280 1988-1995 (-10,1) 88.6% Banking U.S. 
Studied deals with one partner 
being a bank 
Houston et al. (2001) 
15.58% 
24.60% 
20.80% 
27 
37 
64 
1985-1990 
1991-1996 
1985-1996 
 
(-4,1) 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
Banking 
 
 
U.S. 
 
Deals with both partners 
being banks 
Martinez- Jerez 
(2002) 
13.62% 335 1990-1998 (-1,1) 82% 
Diversified 
non-financial 
U.S. 
Pooling of interests versus 
purchases 
Kuipers et al. (2002) 
35.83% 
32.22% 
3.60% 
23.07% 
181 1982-1991 AD-20 to ED+5 N/A 
Diversified 
non-financial 
OECD 
countries 
AD: first announcement date of any 
bid for US or foreign target 
ED: corresponding effective date of 
the final bid for the target 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Returns to the Target Shareholders (Continued) 
Study 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Georgen & 
Renneboog (2004) 
9.01% 
12.96% 
15.92% 
23.43% 
21.78% 
.21.59% 
129 
 
 
1993-2000 
 
 
(-1, 0) 
(-2, 2) 
(-5, 5) 
(-30,30) 
(-60,60) 
(-90,90) 
N/A Diversified European 
Large acquisitions (over USD 100 
million) 
Karceski et al. (2000) 8.48% 39 1983-1996 
(-7,0) 
(1,7) 
N/A Banking Norway. 
 
Schwert (1996) 23.4% 1,814 1975-1991 (-42,126) N/A Diversified U.S. 
All successful and unsuccessful 
merger offers in the U.S. 
Schwert (2000) 20.0% 2,296 1975-1996 (-63,126) N/A Diversified U.S. 
All successful and unsuccessful 
merger offers in the U.S. 
Tauseef & Nihast 
(2014) 
-0.14% 
1.86% 
2.79% 
2.35% 
-0.81% 
-7.47% 
-0.79% 
6.85% 
-9.07% 
-2.23% 
7 2003-2008 
(-30,-20) 
(-20,-11) 
(-10,-1) 
(0) 
(1,10) 
(11,20) 
(21,30) 
(-30,0) 
(0,30) 
(-30,30) 
 
N/A 
 
 
Banking 
 
Pakistan 
Takeovers in the Pakistan banking 
industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Returns to the Target Shareholders (Continued) 
Study 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Akben-Selcuk 
 (2014) 
5.25% 
8.53%. 
67 2000-2014 
(-1,1) 
(-5,5) 
N/A Diversified Turkey Turkish target companies analyzed 
Mallikarjunappa 
& Panduranga (2014) 
36.68% 227 1998-2007 (-30,30) N/A Diversified India. 
 
Martynova & 
Renneboog (2008) 
26.84% 
cross-border 
24.99% 
Domestic 
296 
 
764 
 
1993-2001 (-60,60) N/A Diversified 
Europe, 
Russia and 
U.K. 
Comparison of domestic and 
 cross-border acquisitions 
 
 
 
Panel B : Returns to Acquiring Shareholders 
Panel B1: Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquirer 
Study 
Cumulative  
Abnormal  
Returns  
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Mulherin &  
Boone (2000) 
-0.37%. 281 1990-1999 (-1,1) N/A 
Diversified, 
non-financial 
 
U.S. 
 
 
Mitchell & 
Stratford (2000) 
-0.14% 366 1961-1993 (-1,0) N/A 
  
Fama and French 3-factor model 
applied to monthly returns 
Walker (2000) -0.84% 278 1980-1996 (-2,2) 41.4% 
Non-financial 
and non-
utilities bank 
U.S. 
A sample of incomplete 
acquisitions 
DeLong (2001) -1.68% 280 1988-1995 (-10,1) 33.6% Banking U.S. 
Deals in which at least one 
 party is a bank 
Houston et al. 
 (2001) 
-4.64% 
-2.61% 
.-3.47% 
27 
37 
64 
1985-1990 
1991-1996 
1985-1996 
(-4,1) N/A 
 
Banking 
 
U.S. 
Deals in which both parties 
 are banks 
Martinez- Jerez 
(2002) 
-2.93% 335 1990-1998 (-1,1) 32% Diversified  U.S. 
 
Georgen & 
Renneboog. (2004) 
0.70% 
1.18% 
0.39% 
-0.48% 
0.41% 
139 1993-2000 
(-1,0) 
(-2,2) 
(-30,30) 
(-60,60) 
(-90,90) 
N/A Diversified  
18 
European 
countries 
Large acquisitions (over USD 100 
million) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B : Returns to Acquiring Shareholders (Continued) 
Panel B1: Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquirer 
Study 
Cumulative  
Abnormal  
Returns  
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Kuipers et al. 
 (2002) 
-2.12% 
-2.14% 
-1.32% 
-0.06% 
-0.92% 
138 1990-1998 
AD-20 to ED+5 
AD-5 to ED+5 
AD-5 to AD+5 
AD-20 to AD-6 
AD-1 to AD0 
N/A Diversified,  
 
OECD 
 
AD: first announcement date of 
any bid for U.S. or foreign target 
ED: corresponding effective date 
of the final bid for the target  
Beitel et al. 
(2002) 
-0.14% 
-0.01% 
-0.20% 
98 1985-2000 
0 
(-1,1) 
(-20,20) 
46% 
Banking, 
Insurance 
Developed & 
Developing 
Countries 
Targets worldwide being acquired 
by European banks 
Doukas et al. 
(2002) 
-2.37% 
-1.12% 
-0.52% 
0.62% 
-0.91% 
101 1980-1995 
(-5,5) 
(-5,1) 
(-1,1) 
(-1,0) 
(0,1) 
46% Diversified Sweden 
Diversifying acquisitions display 
negative returns 
Martynova & 
Renneboog (2008) 
-3.63% 
cross-border 
-2.49% 
domestic 
653 
 
1456 
 
1993-2001 (-60,60) N/A Diversified 
Europe, 
Russia and 
U.K. 
Comparison of domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B : Returns to Acquiring Shareholders (Continued) 
Panel B2: Studies Reporting Positive Returns to Acquirer 
Study 
Cumulative  
Abnormal  
Returns  
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Maquieria et al. 
(1998) 
6.14% non-
conglomerate 
-4.79% 
conglomerate 
55 
 
47 
 
1963-1996 (-60,60) 
61.8% 
 
36.2% 
 
Diversified,  
 
U.S. 
 
Study of returns in 
 conglomerate and non-
conglomerate stock deals 
Mulherin 
(2000) 
0.85% 161 1962-1997 (-1,0) 49.0% Diversified U.S. 
A sample of incomplete 
acquisitions 
Kohers & Kohers 
(2000) 
1.37% cash 
deals 
1.09% stocks 
1.26% whole 
sample 
961 
 
673 
1634 
 
1980-1995 (0,1) N/A Technology U.S. 
Sample of mergers among  
high-tech firms 
Floreani & 
Rigamonti (2001) 
3.65% 56 1996-2000 (-20,2) N/A Insurance 
U.S., 
Europe, 
Australia 
 
Raj & Forsyth 
 (2002) 
1.60% 
0.75% 
340 1994-1998 (-15,15) N/A Diversified U.K. 
Related Sample 
Unrelated Sample 
 
 
 
 
Panel B : Returns to Acquiring Shareholders (Continued) 
Panel B2: Studies Reporting Positive Returns to Acquirer 
Study 
Cumulative  
Abnormal  
Returns  
Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) 
Positive 
Returns 
Industry 
Coverage 
Country 
Coverage 
Notes 
Beitel et al. 
 (2002) 
0.42% 
0.14% 
0.38% 
0.07% 
0.06% 
0.18% 
0.46% 
0.24% 
98 1985-2000 (-20,0) 53% 
Banking, 
Insurance  
 
Developed & 
Developing 
Countries 
 
Targets worldwide being 
acquired by European banks 
Doukas et al. 
(2002) 
2.74% 
1.38% 
1.19% 
0.83% 
0.95% 
101 1980-1995 
(-5,5) 
(-5,1) 
(-1,1) 
(-1,0) 
(0,1) 
46.0% Diversified Sweden 
Focused acquisitions display 
positive return 
Jain et al. 
(2014) 
2.26% 
2.06% 
2.25% 
2.71% 
2.74% 
1.96% 
1.79% 
-2.71% 
255 2003-2008 
(-20,-2) 
(-1,0) 
(-1,1) 
(-2,2) 
(-5,5) 
(-10,10) 
(-20,20) 
(2,20) 
N/A Diversified 
India 
(cross-
border) 
Comparison of domestic 
acquisitions and cross-border 
acquisitions 
 
 
Exhibit 35 − Contextual Factors Outbound M&A 
Contextual Factor Impact on CAR Literature Source 
State ownership of the acquiring 
company 
Positive Boateng & Du (2015) 
High transaction  
value      
Positive Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) 
Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011) 
Previous experience of acquiring 
firm in target country 
Positive Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) 
Target company residing in higher 
operational risk country 
Positive Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) 
Cross-border acquisitions 
involving distant national cultures 
Positive Aybar & Thanakijsombat (2015) 
Large size of the                          
target company 
Positive Aybar & Ficici (2009) 
Private ownership structure of the 
target company 
Positive Aybar & Ficici (2009) 
Diversified business structure of 
the acquiring company 
Positive Aybar & Ficici (2009) 
Strong legal and institutional 
environment in acquirer’s country 
Positive Kuipers et al., 2009 
High corporate governance 
standard of target company 
Positiv Khanna & Palepu (2004) 
Martynova & Rennebog (2008) 
Acquiring majority stake/corporate 
control in the target 
Positiv Chari et al. (2004) 
Tender offer Negative Narayan & Thenmozhi (2014) 
Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011) 
Weak legal and institutional 
environment in acquirer’s country 
Negative Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo (2011) 
Acquiring company from high-tech 
or related industry 
Negative Aybar & Ficici (2009) 
 
 
Exhibit 36 − Overview Hypotheses (1) 
Hypothesis Description 
Hypothesis 1 The CAAR for the acquirer in the short term around the announcement date is larger or 
equal to zero. 
Hypothesis 2 The CAAR for emerging markets acquirers in outbound emerging markets acquisitions is 
larger than the CAAR for emerging markets acquirers in domestic emerging markets M&A. 
Hypothesis 3 The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets in inbound emerging markets acquisitions 
is larger than the CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets in outbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4a The CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets in industry diversifying emerging markets 
outbound acquisitions is larger than the CAAR in industry focused outbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4b The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets in industry diversifying emerging markets 
inbound acquisitions is larger than the CAAR in industry focused inbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4c The difference between industry diversifying and focused CAARs is larger for outbound 
acquirer from emerging markets than for inbound acquirer from developed markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 37 − Estimation and Event Windows: Descriptive Statistics 
Panels N 
Estimation Window    Event Window  
Min 
Average 
Return 
(%) 
Max 
Average  
Return 
(%) 
Mean  
Average 
Return 
(%) 
St. Dev. 
Average 
Return 
Skew.  
Average 
Return 
Kurtosis 
Average 
Return 
  
Min  
Average 
Return 
(%) 
Max 
Average 
Return 
(%) 
Mean 
Average  
Return 
(%) 
St. Dev. 
Average 
Return 
Skew. 
Average 
Return 
Kurtosis 
Average 
Return 
A: domestic emerging markets               
 
            
Diversifying 275 -0.49 0.83 0.11 0.0021 0.26 0.11 
 
-0.20 0.68 0.23 0.0028 0.00 -1.19 
Focused 244 -0.75 0.70 0.08 0.0020 -0.20 0.69 
 
-0.11 0.77 0.20 0.0022 0.82 0.82 
Aggregated 519 -0.36 0.57 0.09 0.0015 0.00 0.05 
 
-0.11 0.64 0.22 0.0021 0.13 -0.81 
B: outbound emerging markets               
 
            
Diversifying 196 -0.44 0.76 0.07 0.0022 0.00 -0.21 
 
-0.28 1.10 0.10 0.0035 1.59 2.38 
Focused 102 -0.70 0.83 0.08 0.0026 0.01 0.04 
 
-0.37 0.58 -0.01 0.0025 0.60 0.05 
Aggregated 298 -0.35 0.63 0.07 0.0018 0.01 -0.12 
 
-0.21 0.67 0.06 0.0024 1.19 0.84 
C: inbound emerging markets 
                     Diversifying 339 -0 .63 0.64 0.07 0.0022 0.03 0.13 
 
-0.24 1.35 0.16 0.0034 2.20 6.82 
       Focused 278 -0.58 0.88 0.06 0.0019 0.27 1.55 
 
-0.30 0.74 0.04 0.0024 1.81 4.03 
Aggregated 617 -0.32 0.38 0 .07 0.0013 -0.08 0.07 
 
-0.23 0.96 0.12 0.0027 1.87 4.62 
Reported are descriptive statistics for three panels namely “domestic emerging markets” (Panel A), “outbound emerging markets“(Panel B) and “inbound emerging markets” 
(Panel C) differentiating between “industry diversifying” and “industry focused” M&A strategies. Descriptive statistics refer to daily average returns of acquiring companies 
collected for both the estimation and the event window. The estimation window starts 265 prior to the event and ends 11 days prior to the event (M&A announcement) comprising 
thus 255 trading days in total (-265, -11).The event window of 21 trading days is starting 10 days prior to the event and ends 10 days post the event (-10, +10). All M&A 
announcements considered occurred in a period ranging from January 2000 until January 2016. Panel A presents the number of “domestic emerging markets” M&A 
announcements, the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and excess kurtosis of the “domestic emerging markets” acquiring companies’ average daily stock 
returns for both the estimation and the event window. Panel B and C present the same statistics for “outbound emerging markets” acquiring companies and “inbound emerging 
markets” acquiring companies respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 38 − Overview Hypotheses (2) 
Hypothesis Description 
Hypothesis 1 The CAAR for acquiring companies in the short term around the announcement date is 
larger or equal to zero. 
Hypothesis 2 The CAAR for emerging markets acquirers in outbound emerging markets acquisitions is 
larger than the CAAR for emerging markets acquirers in domestic emerging markets M&A. 
Hypothesis 3 The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets in inbound emerging markets acquisitions 
is larger than the CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets in outbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4a The CAAR for acquirers from emerging markets in industry diversifying emerging markets 
outbound acquisitions is larger than the CAAR in industry focused outbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4b The CAAR for acquirers from developed markets in industry diversifying emerging markets 
inbound acquisitions is larger than the CAAR in industry focused inbound acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 4c The difference between industry diversifying and focused CAAR is larger for outbound 
acquirers from emerging markets than for inbound acquirers from developed markets. 
Hypothesis 5 There is a positive correlation between cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and relative deal 
size. 
Hypothesis 6 There is a positive correlation between cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and corporate 
control. 
Hypothesis 7a For M&A announcements with cash as payment method the CAR is lower than for 
announcements with the combined payment method. 
Hypothesis 7b For M&A announcements with stock as payment method the CAR is lower than for 
announcements with the combined payment method. 
Hypothesis 8 For M&A announcements with public listed target companies the CAR is higher than for 
announcements with non-listed target companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 39 − Event Window AARs and CAARs for the Aggregated Sample 
Trading 
Days 
Market Model   Constant Mean Model  
AAR (%) Sign.Test CAAR (%) Sign.Test   AAR (%) Sign. Test CAAR (%) Sign. Test 
-10 0.03 0.37 0.03 0.37  0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 
-9 0.05 0.61 0.08 0.69  0.07 0.32 0.08 0.28 
-8 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.66  -0.04 0.21 0.04 0.11 
-7 -0.22 2.62*** -0.12 0.74  -0.23 1.14 -0.19 0.47 
-6 -0.04 0.51 -0.17 0.89  -0.02 0.11 -0.21 0.47 
-5 -0.02 0.19 -0.18 0.89  -0.04 0.18 -0.25 0.51 
-4 0.06 0.75 -0.12 0.54  0.06 0.28 -0.19 0.36 
-3 0.07 0.77 -0.06 0.23  0.03 0.15 -0.16 0.28 
-2 0.15* 1.72 0.09 0.35  0.21 1.05 0.05 0.08 
-1 0.32 3.83*** 0.41 1.55  0.30 1.47 0.35 0.54 
0 0.65 7.66*** 1.06 3.79***  0.57 2.81*** 0.92 1.37 
+1 0.50 5.92*** 1.56 5.33***  0.54 2.69*** 1.46 2.08** 
+2 -0.06 0.74 1.49 4.92***  -0.11 0.53 1.35 1.86* 
+3 0.04 0.47 1.53 4.87***  0.01 0.05 1.36 1.80* 
+4 -0.07 0.83 1.46 4.49***  -0.08 0.40 1.28 1.64 
+5 -0.08 1.00 1.38 4.09***  -0.10 0.50 1.18 1.46 
+6 0.17 2.02** 1.55 4.46***  0.14 0.71 1.32 1.59 
+7 0.03 0.37 1.58 4.42***  -0.05 0.25 1.27 1.48 
+8 0.07 0.89 1.66 4.51***  0.11 0.56 1.39 1.57 
+9 -0.04 0.47 1.62 4.29***  -0.09 0.44 1.30 1.44 
+10 0.07 0.85 1.69 4.37***  0.08 0.42 1.38 1.49 
Reported are the average abnormal daily returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) in 
the event window of 21 trading days for acquiring companies in the aggregated sample obtained through both the 
market and the constant mean model. T-statistics tests are performed to assess whether AARs and CAARs are 
statistically different from zero, based on a standard error estimated from the time series of AARs in the estimation 
period (refer to point 4.2.6).  *, ** and *** show respectively that the referring return is significant under the level of 
10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 40 − Event Window AARs and CAARs for Domestic and Outbound 
Panels 
Market Model   Constant Mean Model  
AAR (%) Sign.Test CAAR (%) Sign.Test   AAR (%) Sign. Test CAAR (%) Sign. Test 
Panel A: Domestic Emerging Markets  
      -10 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.43  0.08 0.50 0.08 0.50 
-9 0.03 0.26 0.09 0.49  0.15 0.96 0.22 1.03 
-8 -0.10 0.77 -0.01 -0.05  -0.10 0.69 0.12 0.45 
-7 -0.18 1.36 -0.19 -0.72  -0.20 1.34 -0.09 0.28 
-6 0.13 0.96 -0.06 -0.21  0.11 0.71 0.02 0.06 
-5 -0.19 1.44 -0.25 -0.78  -0.14 0.94 -0.12 0.33 
-4 0.03 0.22 -0.23 -0.64  0.05 0.34 -0.07 0.17 
-3 0.01 0.10 -0.21 -0.57  0.04 0.25 -0.03 0.07 
-2 0.23 1.77* 0.02 0.06  0.29 1.93* 0.26 0.57 
-1 0.48 3.62*** 0.50 1.20  0.46 3.04*** 0.72 1.51 
0 0.61 4.62*** 1.12 2.53**  0.55 3.60*** 1.27 2.52** 
+1 0.24 1.84* 1.36 2.96***  0.20 1.33 1.47 2.80*** 
+2 -0.21 1.58 1.15 2.40**  -0.19 1.25 1.28 2.34** 
+3 0.24 1.81* 1.39 2.80***  0.31 2.06** 1.59 2.81*** 
+4 0.05 0.38 1.44 2.80***  0.09 0.56 1.68 2.86*** 
+5 -0.09 0.71 1.35 2.54**  -0.09 0.60 1.59 2.62*** 
+6 0.31 2.32** 1.65 3.02***  0.32 2.11** 1.91 3.05*** 
+7 0.36 2.73*** 2.02 3.58***  0.28 1.85* 2.19 3.40*** 
+8 0.28 2.10** 2.29 3.97***  0.33 2.15** 2.51 3.80*** 
+9 -0.08 0.59 2.22 3.74***  -0.11 0.71 2.41 3.55*** 
+10 0.19 1.43 2.41 3.96***  0.21 1.42 2.62 3.77*** 
Panel B: Outbound Emerging Markets             
-10 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.10  -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
-9 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.17  -0.03 0.17 -0.05 0.16 
-8 0.08 0.43 0.12 0.39  -0.04 0.21 -0.09 0.26 
-7 -0.10 0.58 0.02 0.05  -0.16 0.81 -0.25 0.63 
-6 -0.26 1.45 -0.25 0.61  -0.23 1.15 -0.47 1.08 
-5 0.12 0.65 -0.13 0.29  -0.03 0.16 -0.50 1.05 
-4 -0.14 0.75 -0.26 0.55  -0.27 1.36 -0.77 1.48 
-3 -0.06 0.30 -0.32 0.62  -0.12 0.59 -0.89 1.60 
-2 0.21 1.16 -0.11 0.20  0.37 1.86* -0.52 0.89 
-1 0.32 1.77* 0.21 0.37  0.30 1.54 -0.22 0.35 
0 0.72 3.98*** 0.94 1.55  0.60 3.05*** 0.38 0.58 
+1 0.35 1.95* 1.29 2.05**  0.42 2.15** 0.80 1.18 
+2 0.16 0.89 1.46 2.22**  0.02 0.11 0.83 1.17 
+3 -0.15 0.83 1.30 1.92*  -0.27 1.38 0.55 0.75 
+4 -0.14 0.76 1.17 1.66*  -0.19 0.96 0.37 0.48 
+5 -0.17 0.94 1.00 1.37  -0.24 1.23 0.12 0.16 
+6 0.13 0.73 1.13 1.50  0.03 0.14 0.15 0.19 
+7 -0.12 0.65 1.01 1.31  -0.12 0.59 0.04 0.04 
+8 -0.14 0.78 0.87 1.10  -0.21 1.05 -0.17 0.20 
+9 0.19 1.06 1.06 1.30  0.08 0.41 -0.09 0.10 
+10 0.26 1.42 1.32 1.58  0.20 1.04 0.12 0.13 
Reported are the average abnormal daily returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) in 
the event window of 21 trading days for acquiring companies in the “domestic emerging markets”(Panel A) and 
“outbound emerging markets” (Panel B) samples obtained through both the market and the constant mean model. T-
statistics tests are performed to assess whether AARs and CAARs are statistically different from zero, based on a 
standard error estimated from the time series of AARs in the estimation period (refer to point 4.2.6).  *, ** and *** 
show respectively that the referring return is significant under the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 41 − Event Window AARs and CAARs for Inbound and Outbound 
Panels 
Market Model   Constant Mean Model  
AAR (%) Sign.Test CAAR (%) Sign.Test   AAR (%) Sign. Test CAAR (%) Sign. Test 
Panel A: Inbound Emerging Markets  
      -10 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.27  -0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.18 
-9 0.06 0.50 0.09 0.55  0.04 0.35 0.02 0.12 
-8 0.08 0.65 0.17 0.82  0.01 0.08 0.03 0.15 
-7 -0.31 2.57** -0.14 0.57  -0.29 2.22** -0.25 0.98 
-6 -0.08 0.65 -0.22 0.80  -0.03 0.26 -0.29 1.00 
-5 0.07 0.54 -0.15 0.51  0.05 0.39 -0.24 0.75 
-4 0.19 1.55 0.04 0.11  0.22 1.70* -0.02 0.05 
-3 0.17 1.38 0.20 0.59  0.09 0.74 0.08 0.21 
-2 0.04 0.31 0.24 0.66  0.07 0.57 0.15 0.39 
-1 0.19 1.58 0.43 1.13  0.16 1.24 0.31 0.76 
0 0.64 5.24*** 1.07 2.65***  0.57 4.44*** 0.88 2.06** 
+1 0.78 6.46*** 1.85 4.41***  0.89 6.92*** 1.77 3.97*** 
+2 -0.05 0.39 1.80 4.12***  -0.10 0.76 1.67 3.61*** 
+3 -0.04 0.31 1.77 3.89***  -0.11 0.84 1.56 3.25*** 
+4 -0.14 1.14 1.63 3.47***  -0.17 1.31 1.39 2.80*** 
+5 -0.03 0.28 1.59 3.28***  -0.04 0.33 1.35 2.63*** 
+6 0.07 0.59 1.67 3.33***  0.05 0.38 1.40 2.64*** 
+7 -0.17 1.44 1.49 2.90***  -0.30 2.33** 1.10 2.02** 
+8 0.01 0.07 1.50 2.83***  0.09 0.71 1.19 2.13** 
+9 -0.12 0.98 1.38 2.54**  -0.15 1.19 1.04 1.81* 
+10 -0.12 0.97 1.26 2.27**  -0.08 0.65 0.96 1.62 
Panel B: Outbound Emerging Markets             
-10 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.10  -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
-9 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.17  -0.03 0.17 -0.05 0.16 
-8 0.08 0.43 0.12 0.39  -0.04 0.21 -0.09 0.26 
-7 -0.10 0.58 0.02 0.05  -0.16 0.81 -0.25 0.63 
-6 -0.26 1.45 -0.25 0.61  -0.23 1.15 -0.47 1.08 
-5 0.12 0.65 -0.13 0.29  -0.03 0.16 -0.50 1.05 
-4 -0.14 0.75 -0.26 0.55  -0.27 1.36 -0.77 1.48 
-3 -0.06 0.30 -0.32 0.62  -0.12 0.59 -0.89 1.60 
-2 0.21 1.16 -0.11 0.20  0.37 1.86* -0.52 0.89 
-1 0.32 1.77* 0.21 0.37  0.30 1.54 -0.22 0.35 
0 0.72 3.98*** 0.94 1.55  0.60 3.05*** 0.38 0.58 
+1 0.35 1.95* 1.29 2.05**  0.42 2.15** 0.80 1.18 
+2 0.16 0.89 1.46 2.22**  0.02 0.11 0.83 1.17 
+3 -0.15 0.83 1.30 1.92*  -0.27 1.38 0.55 0.75 
+4 -0.14 0.76 1.17 1.66*  -0.19 0.96 0.37 0.48 
+5 -0.17 0.94 1.00 1.37  -0.24 1.23 0.12 0.16 
+6 0.13 0.73 1.13 1.50  0.03 0.14 0.15 0.19 
+7 -0.12 0.65 1.01 1.31  -0.12 0.59 0.04 0.04 
+8 -0.14 0.78 0.87 1.10  -0.21 1.05 -0.17 0.20 
+9 0.19 1.06 1.06 1.30  0.08 0.41 -0.09 0.10 
+10 0.26 1.42 1.32 1.58  0.20 1.04 0.12 0.13 
Reported are the average abnormal daily returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) in 
the event window of 21 trading days for acquiring companies in the “inbound emerging markets” (Panel A) and 
“outbound emerging markets”  (Panel B) samples obtained through both the market and the constant mean model. T-
statistics tests are performed to assess whether AARs and CAARs are statistically different from zero, based on a 
standard error estimated from the time series of AARs in the estimation period (refer to point 4.2.6).  *, ** and *** 
show respectively that the referring return is significant under the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 42 − Event Window AARs and CAARs for Diversified and  Focused Outbound 
Panels 
Market Model   Constant Mean Model  
AAR (%) Sign.Test CAAR (%) Sign.Test   AAR (%) Sign. Test CAAR (%) Sign. Test 
Panel A: Diversifying Outbound Emerging Markets  
     -10 -0.16 0.79 -0.16 0.79  -0.15 0.69 -0.15 0.69 
-9 0.12 0.57 -0.04 0.15  0.09 0.41 -0.06 0.19 
-8 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.04  -0.10 0.47 -0.17 0.43 
-7 -0.28 1.37 -0.27 0.65  -0.33 1.47 -0.49 1.10 
-6 -0.09 0.42 -0.36 0.77  -0.06 0.28 -0.56 1.11 
-5 0.09 0.42 -0.27 0.53  -0.14 0.62 -0.69 1.27 
-4 -0.20 0.97 -0.47 0.86  -0.35 1.56 -1.04 1.76* 
-3 -0.06 0.30 -0.54 0.91  -0.23 1.05 -1.28 2.02** 
-2 0.43 2.06** -0.11 0.18  0.50 2.22** -0.78 1.16 
-1 0.27 1.31 0.16 0.25  0.19 0.84 -0.59 0.84 
0 1.15 5.56*** 1.32 1.91*  1.03 4.60*** 0.44 0.59 
+1 0.58 2.80*** 1.90 2.64***  0.77 3.43*** 1.21 1.55 
+2 0.17 0.81 2.07 2.76***  0.03 0.13 1.24 1.53 
+3 -0.05 0.26 2.01 2.59***  -0.19 0.85 1.04 1.25 
+4 -0.10 0.50 1.91 2.37**  -0.14 0.61 0.91 1.05 
+5 -0.13 0.64 1.77 2.14**  -0.17 0.77 0.73 0.82 
+6 0.20 0.98 1.98 2.31**  0.16 0.73 0.90 0.97 
+7 -0.12 0.59 1.86 2.11**  -0.17 0.75 0.73 0.77 
+8 -0.26 1.25 1.60 1.76*  -0.28 1.23 0.45 0.47 
+9 0.31 1.48 1.90 2.05**  0.18 0.82 0.64 0.64 
+10 0.10 0.48 2.00 2.11**  0.09 0.40 0.73 0.71 
Panel B:Focused Outbound Emerging Markets           
-10 0.26 0.78 0.26 0.78  0.26 0.73 0.26 0.73 
-9 -0.05 0.14 0.22 0.45  -0.27 0.77 -0.01 0.03 
-8 0.12 0.35 0.33 0.57  0.08 0.22 0.06 0.11 
-7 0.24 0.72 0.57 0.85  0.16 0.46 0,23 0.32 
-6 -0.60 1.80* -0.03 0.04  -0.54 1.53 -0.31 0.40 
-5 0.18 0.54 0.15 0.18  0.18 0.49 -0.14 0.16 
-4 -0.01 0.03 0.14 0.16  -0.11 0.32 -0.25 0.27 
-3 -0.04 0.12 0.10 0.10  0.12 0.32 -0.14 0.14 
-2 -0.20 0.61 -0.10 0.10  0.11 0.32 -0.02 0.02 
-1 0.42 1.24 0.31 0.29  0.52 1.48 0.50 0.45 
0 -0.10 0.31 0.21 0.19  -0.22 0.63 0.28 0.23 
+1 -0.08 0.24 0.13 0.11  -0.24 0.68 0.03 0.03 
+2 0.15 0.45 0.28 0.23  0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 
+3 -0.34 1.00 -0.06 0.04  -0.43 1.21 -0.39 0.29 
+4 -0.20 0.60 -0.26 0.20  -0.29 0.81 -0.68 0.49 
+5 -0.25 0.73 -0.50 0.37  -0.37 1.06 -1.05 0.74 
+6 0.00 0.01 -0.50 0.37  -0.23 0.65 -1.28 0.87 
+7 -0.11 0.32 -0.61 0.43  -0.02 0.04 -1.30 0.86 
+8 0.09 0.26 -0.53 0.36  -0.07 0.21 -1.37 0.89 
+9 -0.03 0.08 -0.55 0.37  -0.11 0.32 -1.48 0.94 
+10 0.56 1.68* 0.01 0.01  0.42 1.19 -1.06 0.65 
Reported are the average abnormal daily returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) in 
the event window of 21 trading days for acquiring companies in the “diversifying outbound emerging markets” (Panel 
A) and “focused outbound emerging markets” (Panel B) subsamples obtained through both the market and the constant 
mean model. T-statistics tests are performed to assess whether AARs and CAARs are statistically different from zero, 
based on a standard error estimated from the time series of AARs in the estimation period (refer to point 4.2.6).  *, ** 
and *** show respectively that the referring return is significant under the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
Exhibit 43 − Event Window AARs and CAARs for Diversified and  Focused Inbound 
Panels 
Market Model   Constant Mean Model  
AAR (%) Sign.Test CAAR (%) Sign.Test   AAR (%) Sign. Test CAAR (%) Sign. Test 
Panel A: Diversifying Inbound Emerging Markets  
     -10 -0.04 0.22 -0.04 0.22  -0.03 0.15 -0.03 0.15 
-9 0.13 0.73 0.09 0.36  0.09 0.44 0.06 0.20 
-8 0.04 0.24 0.14 0.44  -0.06 0.31 0.00 0.01 
-7 -0.37 2.03** -0.23 0.63  -0.33 1.71* -0.33 0.87 
-6 -0.01 0.07 -0.25 0.60  0.06 0.31 -0.27 0.63 
-5 0.10 0.54 -0.15 0.33  0.08 0.44 -0.19 0.40 
-4 0.46 2.53** 0.32 0.65  0.48 2.52** 0.30 0.58 
-3 0.17 0.95 0.49 0.94  0.13 0.69 0.43 0.79 
-2 0.09 0.48 0.58 1.05  0.09 0.46 0.52 0.90 
-1 0.29 1.56 0.87 1.49  0.29 1.52 0.81 1.33 
0 0.51 2.78*** 1.38 2.26**  0.48 2.49** 1.29 2.02** 
+1 1.21 6.59*** 2.59 4.06***  1.18 6.15*** 2.48 3.71*** 
+2 -0.04 0.23 2.54 3.84***  -0.12 0.61 2.36 3.40*** 
+3 -0.16 0.85 2.39 3.47***  -0.12 0.64 2.23 3.10*** 
+4 -0.09 0.50 2.30 3.23***  -0.01 0.06 2.22 2.98*** 
+5 0.12 0.64 2.41 3.29***  0.10 0.52 2.32 3.01*** 
+6 0.28 1.54 2.70 3.56***  0.18 0.93 2.50 3.15*** 
+7 -0.20 1.09 2.50 3.20***  -0.34 1.75* 2.16 2.65*** 
+8 0.05 0.29 2.55 3.18***  0.18 0.94 2.34 2.79*** 
+9 -0.15 0.81 2.40 2.92***  -0.19 1.00 2.15 2.50** 
+10 -0.15 0.82 2.25 2.67***  -0.10 0.51 2.05 2.33** 
Panel B:Focused Inbound Emerging Markets           
-10 0.12 0.69 0.12 0.69  -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 
-9 -0.03 0.16 0.09 0.37  0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.07 
-8 0.12 0.68 0.21 0.69  0.10 0.49 0.08 0.23 
-7 -0.24 1.33 -0.02 0.06  -0,23 1.19 -0.15 0.40 
-6 -0.16 0.89 -0.18 0.45  -0.15 0.76 -0.30 0.70 
-5 0.02 0.14 -0.16 0.36  0.01 0.04 -0.30 0.62 
-4 -0.15 0.84 -0.31 0.65  -0.11 0.55 -0.40 0.78 
-3 0.16 0.89 -0.15 0.29  0.05 0.25 -0.35 0.64 
-2 -0.02 0.13 -0.17 0.32  0.05 0.27 -0.30 0.52 
-1 0.08 0.42 -0.10 0.17  0.00 0.02 -0.31 0.50 
0 0.79 4.41*** 0.69 1.17  0.68 3.49*** 0.38 0.58 
+1 0.26 1.48 0.96 1.54  0.53 2.72*** 0.91 1.34 
+2 -0.05 0.30 0.90 1.40  -0.07 0.38 0.83 1.18 
+3 0.11 0.59 1.01 1.51  -0.09 0.45 0.74 1.02 
+4 -0.20 1.09 0.81 1.18  -0.36 1.84* 0.38 0.51 
+5 -0.22 1.23 0.59 0.83  -0.22 1.11 0.17 0.22 
+6 -0.19 1.05 0.41 0.55  -0.11 0.56 0.06 0.07 
+7 -0.14 0.80 0.26 0.35  -0.25 1.29 -0.19 0.23 
+8 -0.05 0.26 0.22 0.28  -0.02 0.10 -0.21 0.25 
+9 -0.08 0.45 0.14 0.17  -0.11 0.54 -0.32 0.36 
+10 -0.08 0.43 0.06 0.07  -0.07 0.34 -0.38 0.43 
Reported are the average abnormal daily returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) in 
the event window of 21 trading days for acquiring companies in the “diversifying inbound emerging markets” (Panel A) 
and “focused inbound emerging markets” (Panel A) subsamples obtained through both the market and the constant 
mean model. T-statistics tests are performed to assess whether AARs and CAARs are statistically different from zero, 
based on a standard error estimated from the time series of AARs in the estimation period (refer to point 4.2.6).  *, ** 
and *** show respectively that the referring return is significant under the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reported are differences between “industry diversifying” (Panel A in Exhibit 42 and 
43) and industry focused” (Panel B in Exhibit 42 and 43) average abnormal daily 
returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CAARs) in the 
event window of 21 trading days for acquiring companies in the “outbound 
emerging markets” (Panel A) and “inbound emerging markets” (Panel B) 
subsamples obtained through both the market and the constant mean model. 
Exhibit 44 − AARs and CAARs Differences for Inbound and Outbound 
 Date 
  
Market Model Constant Mean Model 
AAR (%) CAAR (%)  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
Panel A: Difference Outbound Emerging Markets 
  -10 -0.42 -0.42  -0.41 -0.41 
-9 0.17 -0.26  0.37 -0.05 
-8 -0.06 -0.32  -0.18 -0.23 
-7 -0.52 -0.84  -0.49 -0.72 
-6 0.52 -0.33  0.48 -0.25 
-5 -0.09 -0.42  -0.31 -0.55 
-4 -0.19 -0.61  -0.23 -0.79 
-3 -0.02 -0.64  -0.35 -1.14 
-2 0.63 -0.01  0.38 -0.76 
-1 -0.14 -0.15  -0.34 -1.09 
0 1.26 1.11  1.25 0.16 
+1 0.66 1.77  1.01 1.18 
+2 0.02 1.79  0.03 1.20 
+3 0.28 2.07  0.24 1.43 
+4 0.10 2.17  0.15 1.59 
+5 0.11 2.27  0.20 1.78 
+6 0.21 2.48  0.39 2.18 
+7 -0.01 2.47  -0.15 2.03 
+8 -0.35 2.13  -0.20 1.82 
+9 0.34 2.45  0.30 2.12 
+10 -0.47 1.99  -0.33 1.79 
Panel B: Difference Inbound Emerging Markets 
  -10 -0.16 -0.16  -0.02 -0.02 
-9 0.16 0.00  0.09 0.08 
-8 -0.08 -0.07  -0.16 -0.08 
-7 -0.14 -0.21  -0.10 -0.18 
-6 0.15 -0.07  0.21 0.03 
-5 0.07 0.01  0.08 0.11 
-4 0.62 0.63  0.59 0.70 
-3 0.02 0.64  0.08 0.78 
-2 0.11 0.75  0.04 0.82 
-1 0.21 0.97  0.30 1.12 
0 -0.28 0.69  -0.20 0.91 
1 0.95 1.63  0.65 1.57 
2 0.01 1.64  -0.04 1.53 
3 -0.26 1.38  -0.04 1.49 
4 0.10 1.49  0.35 1.84 
5 0.34 1.82  0.32 2.15 
6 0.47 2.29  0.29 2.44 
7 -0.06 2.24  -0.09 2.35 
8 0.10 2.33  0.20 2.55 
9 -0.07 2.26  -0.09 2.47 
10 -0.07 2.19  -0.03 2.43 
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